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Abstract
In my doctoral research, I developed econometric estimators with strong appli-
cations in analysis of heterogeneous consumer demand. The first chapter de-
velops an estimator for grouped patterns of heterogeneity in an approximately
sparse setting. This setting is used to estimate demand shocks, competition
sets and own-price elasticities for different groups of consumers. The second
chapter, which is joint work with Stefan Hoderlein and Alexander Meister, de-
velops a nonparametric estimator of the marginal effects in a panel data even
if there are only a small number of time periods. This is used to estimate the
heterogeneous marginal effects of increasing income on consumption of junk
food. The third chapter, which is joint work with Stefan Hoderlein and Solvejg
Wewal, is the first difference-in-differences model for binary choice outcome
variables when treatment effects are heterogeneous. We apply this estimator
to examine the heterogeneous effects of a soda tax.
Chapter 1: “Approximately Sparse Models and Methods with Grouped Pat-
terns of Heterogeneity with an Application to Consumer Demand” introduces
post-Lasso methods to time-varying grouped patterns of heterogeneity in linear
panel data models with heterogeneous coefficients. Group membership is left
unrestricted and the model is approximately sparse, meaning the conditional
expectation of the variables given the covariates can be well-approximated by
a subset of the variables whose identities may be unknown. I estimate the pa-
rameters of the model using a grouped fixed-effects estimator that minimizes
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a post-Lasso least-squares criterion with respect to all possible groupings of
the cross-sectional units. I provide conditions under which the estimator is
consistent as both dimensions of the panel tend to infinity and provide infer-
ence methods. Under reasonable assumptions, applying this estimator to a
consumer demand application allows me to partition consumers into groups,
deal with price endogeneity without instrumental variables, estimate demand
shocks, and identify compliments and substitutes for each group. I then use
this estimator to estimate demand for soda by identifying different groups’
competition sets as well as demand shocks using Homescan data.
Chapter 2: In “A Panel Data Estimator for the Distribution and Quantiles
of Marginal Effects in Nonlinear Structural Models with an Application to the
Demand for Junk Food”, we propose a framework to estimate the distribution
of marginal effects in a general class of structural models that allow for arbitrary
smooth nonlinearities, high dimensional heterogeneity, and unrestricted correla-
tion between the persistent components of this heterogeneity and all covariates.
The main idea is to form a derivative dependent variable using two periods of
the panel, and use differences in outcome variables of nearby subpopulations to
obtain the distribution of marginal effects. We establish constructive nonpara-
metric identification for the population of “stayers” (Chamberlain, 1982), and
show generic non-identification for the “movers”. We propose natural semi-
parametric sample counterparts estimators, and establish that they achieve
the optimal (minimax) rate. Moreover, we analyze their behavior through a
Monte-Carlo study, and showcase the importance of allowing for nonlinearities
and correlated heterogeneity through an application to demand for junk food.
In this application, we establish profound differences in marginal income ef-
fects between poor and wealthy households, which may partially explain health
issues faced by the less privileged population.
Chapter 3: In “A Binary Choice Difference-in-Differences Model with Het-
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erogeneous Treatment Effects and an Application on Soda Taxes”, we answer
how should Differences-in-Differences be implemented when outcomes are bi-
nary and we expect heterogeneous effects. The scope for applications is clearly
vast, including labor force participation, product purchase decisions, enroll-
ment in health insurance and much more. However, assumptions necessary to
measure heterogeneous effects in classic Difference-in-Difference models break
down with a binary dependent variable. We propose a model with a nonpara-
metric random coefficient formulation that allows for heterogeneous treatment
effects with a binary dependent variable. We provide identification of the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated (ATT) along with identification of the joint
distribution of the actual and counterfactual latent outcome variable in the
treatment group which allows us to show the heterogenous treatment effects.
We suggest an estimator for the treatment effects and evaluate its finite sam-
ple properties with the help of Monte Carlo simulations. We further provide
extensions that allow for more flexible empirical applications, such as including
covariates. We apply our estimator to analyze the effect of a soft drink tax
on consumer’s likelihood to consume soda and find heterogeneous effects. The
tax reduced the likelihood of consumption for the most consumers but not for
those who were most likely to be consuming previously.
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Approximately Sparse Models and Methods with
Grouped Patterns of Heterogeneity with an Ap-
plication to Consumer Demand
1.1 Introduction
Unobserved heterogeneity is a consistent issue in many microeconometric mod-
els. Even in large panel data sets with many variables, there is still large un-
explained variation. Applied researchers face a trade-off between using flexible
approaches to model unobserved heterogeneity and building parsimonious spec-
ifications. This heterogeneity can enter a model through slope-heterogeneity as
well as unobserved individual and time heterogeneity.
Often researchers use individual or time fixed effects to capture much of the
unobserved heterogeneity. These can often be biased by an incidental parame-
ter’s problem and often don’t have enough data to accurately estimate. Further,
these estimates often lead to computational difficulties because of large numbers
of parameters. One way around this issue is to model individual heterogeneity
as a small number of unobserved types (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Hahn and
Moon, 2010). These models may lead to the “incidental parameter bias” when
dealing with short panels (Nickel, 1981). I will improve this by using a frame-
work that allows for clustered time patterns of unobserved heterogeneity that
are common within groups of individuals (Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015).
A further issue depends on slope heterogeneity. Traditional panel data mod-
els simply assume slope homogeneity such that the regression parameters are
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the same across individuals. While convenient and simple, this approach has
been rejected in multiple studies (Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu, 1997; Lee et al., 1997;
Durlauf et al., 2001; Browning et al., 2007). Other researchers will use individ-
ual specific slope heterogeneity where regression parameters are estimated for
each individuals (Baltagi et al., 2000; Hsiao and Pesaran, 2008). This requires
sufficient within individual variation of the covariates as well as a sufficiently
long time-series component of the data. Further, these estimates could have
high variance making inference difficult. These problems are exacerbated in
cases where the number of parameters are large.
The basic model I use to address these challenges will take the following
form based on the work of Bonhomme and Manresa (2015):
yit = x
′
itθgi + αgit + vit (1.1.1)
such that i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T where N is the number of individuals and
T is the number of time periods. The covariates xit are contemporaneoustly
uncorrelated with vit but may be correlated with the group-specifice unobserv-
ables αgit. The number of groups is set by the researcher. My addition to the
work of Bonhomme and Manresa is that I assume that θgi varies between groups
and is approximately sparse, which means that the conditional expectation of
the yit given xit can be well-approximated by a subset of the variables whose
identities may be unknown. This can be seen as adding constraints such that
the individual slope parameters are constrained to be equal to certain group
parameters, and some of the group parameters are constrained to be zero.
This model uses group-specific time effects to address unobserved hetero-
geneity. This allows for time effects to differ across individuals while allowing
larger portions of the data to identify each parameter which avoids many of
the problems with standard fixed-effects approaches. In order to address the
slope heterogeneity concerns, I use group-specific slope parameters and assume
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approximate sparsity. I will use Post-Lasso methods based on Belloni et al.
(2012), which is an extension on the classic Lasso (Tibshirani, 1996), in order
to shrink the parameter space which will improve estimation.
I will use this approach in a consumer demand framework. Consumer de-
mand can be challenging because researcher have many heterogeneous con-
sumers and many different prices. In a product space estimation approach, as
the number of products increases, the parameters needed to estimate the model
increases exponentially. Thus, in order to get stable estimation, researchers of-
ten make significant assumptions about consumer behavior. One way to do
that is to impose functional form assumptions on utility and grouping prod-
ucts together. This is called the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton, 1980).
Another solution to these problems is to use a product characteristic approach
instead, but the researcher will still have to determine what characteristics to
include as well as making other assumptions on consumer preferences. My ap-
proach will allow the data to tell us information about the consumer preferences
and minimize the assumptions made by the researcher.
Assume yit is a log quantity and xit is log price. This would imply θgi is the
group specific own- and cross-price elasticities. Using my estimator allows each
group to have different own- and cross-price elasticities and will set many of the
cross-price elasticities to zero. Assuming that the cross-price elasticity space
is approximately sparse is reasonable since consumers will often only consider
a subset of all possible items when making purchasing decisions because of
search costs, and may only consider the prices of some of those products, which
I will call their competition set. My model is imposing constraints on price
elasticities such that individual price elasticitis are equal to each other and
some price elasticities are set to zero. However, this model allows the data to set
which price elasticities are applied to, rather than leaving that to assumptions
determined by the researcher’s intuition.
3
In addition, these elasticities can allow us to identify different products’ in-
teraction effects (substitutes or complements) even when the number of prod-
ucts is large. It will also identify how some products may be substitutes for
some consumers, while not (or perhaps even complements) for others. Identify-
ing complements and substitutes from a large number of products is a helpful
addition to the literature.
My model further informs us more about consumer demand by using time-
varying group fixed effects. These time-varying fixed effects can help us identify
different trends in demand between different groups of individuals. For example,
consumers may not consume unhealthy food at the start of the year as a new-
years resolution, but will eat more unhealthy food throughout the year and
their resolution fades (Cherchye et al., 2017). There also may be seasonal trends
in consumption that may not hold for everyone. Grouped time-varying fixed
effects can then measure demand patterns and shocks for groups of individuals.
Further, these time-varying grouped fixed-effects will capture many of the
shocks that would lead to endogeneity issues in my estimates. However, if a
demand shock impacts the whole population or only subset of my sample, these
shocks will be captured by α and they will not bias my estimates of θ. Thus,
I argue that I do not need to use instrumental variables to measure cross-price
effects.
For my application of consumer demand, I will look at the Nielsen Scanner
Data which is available through the Kilts Center at the University of Chicago
Booth School of Business. I will focus on aggregate monthly purchases in 2014.
I will estimate the demand for the most popular soft drink product based on
demographic characteristics of the individual as well as the prices of the soft
drink product and other popular soft drink products based on my data.
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1.1.1 Related Work
Beyond the basic AIDS approach (Deaton, 1980) to consumer demand, another
product space demand estimation was done by Hausman et al. (1994) in a three
stage approach. First, they estimated demand for product category. Second,
they estimated demand for the various groups of products and third was the
demand for individual products within the groups. There has been additional
work to help use the data to help identify which groups to use and include
(Blundell and Robin, 2000). Adding heterogeneity into an AIDS was done
by Jorgenson (1990). For a review of methods to add heterogeneity when
aggregating results, see Stoker (1993).
A different possible demand estimation solution in this setting involves in-
cluding many product characteristics to a BLP, (Berry et al., 1995a), type
model. This is done by using lasso to estimate high dimensional product char-
acteristics space by Gillen et al. (2014) and using double-Lasso (Gillen et al.,
2015) to control for the large number of demographic characteristics. They can
include many product characteristics, but considering how difficult it is to get
product characteristics data, it is impossible to get every product characteristics
consumers might consider.
Additional research addressing consumer demand with many prices and con-
sumer heterogeneity using machine learning techniques has been done by Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2019). To estimate the aggregate price and income-elasticities,
they similarly use a Lasso estimate but rely on double machine learning to
relax the sparsity assumptions (Chernozhukov et al., 2018). Heterogeneity is
introduced on an individual level with individual slope parameters which are
averaged (as in Chamberlain (1982, 1992)) and regulated using a ridge penalty
for how far away the individual parameter is from the average.
While this structure allows a relaxing of the sparsity assumption, to model
heterogeneity, it requires a long time dimension for identification and assumes
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time homogeneity of preferences. This assumption is common and useful in
econometric panel data models (See Chernozhukov et al. (2013), Graham and
Powell (2012), Hoderlein and White (2012), Chernozhukov et al. (2015) and
Chernozhukov et al. (2019) for examples). While this assumption is helpful in
allowing enough within individual varition to identify the slope parameters, it
may not hold in consumer demand settings and is not required for my model.
There is a significant literature on estimating the subsets of goods a con-
sumer considers when making a purchasing decision. Estimating the probability
of each subset of goods being in an individual’s consumption set has been of
interest in psychology and marketing (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Shocker
et al., 1991). In economics, they are often used as a generalization of discrete
choice models (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Abaluck and Adams, 2017). Chiong and
Shum (2018) estimate a discrete choice model with high dimensional choice sets
using machine learning to shrink the initial product space to a smaller subset
while keeping the estimation consistent. Barseghyan et al. (2019) establishes a
model that does not require strict assumptions to estimate demand preferences
and perform welfare analysis but is unable to point identify the choice sets.
While my estimation can choose what I call an individual’s competition set, I
cannot identify their consideration set. There may be additional research on
how these two sets compare.
Some papers in the economic literature have used individual choice data
to esitmate parameters to estimate interactive effects (substitutes or comple-
ments) for a very small number of items; see Chintagunta and Nair (2011) and
Berry et al. (2014) for summaries of this literature. Some researchers have
attempted to treat each potential bundle as a discrete alternative and impose
a parametric structure to identify complementary between items (Train et al.,
1987; Gentzkow, 2007). Song and Chintagunta (2007) build a model to estimate
whether to purchase and how much to purchase each good. However, because
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of the computational difficulties of these models, the number of goods included
is very small and chosen by the researcher. My approach allows the data to tell
us which goods may be compliments or substitutes.
There is also previous research dealing with heterogeneity and lasso using
a random coefficients model (Fan and Li, 2012). While this allows some coef-
ficients to be set to zero, it does not consistently let some variables set to zero
for some individuals but not others and is in a cross-sectional setting. It also
doesn’t identify the parameters for each individual but instead identifies the
distribution of the parameters.
Grouping individuals together is an effective way to measure heterogene-
ity when estimating consumer demand. For example, consumer brand choice
analysis using individuals or groups of individuals yield similar general trends
(Oliveira-Castro et al., 2006). Further, it is common to group individuals to-
gether based on where they live (Huang and Lin, 2007), their income level
(Aasnass and Rødseth, 1983), their search costs (Koulayev, 2009), or some
combination of these (Asano and Fiuza, 2015; Bester and Hansen, 2016).
Su et al. (2016) develops the C-Lasso to shrinks individual coefficients to
group-specific coefficients. While it allows for individual fixed-effects, this
model solely relies on the coefficients for group classification and does not group
on unobserved heterogeneity. This is important in my setting sense I am group-
ing consumers not only on their price elasticites but their demand shocks over
time. Further, Su et al. does not use a Lasso within each group, which often
leads to large variation in situations with many covariates. The extenstion (Su
and Ju, 2017) allows for fixed effects with time interactions based on Bai (2009)
but often requires large time series data points for proper classification.
Ando and Bai (2016) expands on these ideas to use interactive fixed effects
and minimizes sum of least squared errors with a shrinkage penalty to allow for
large number of covariates. This paper differs from mine in a few important
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ways. It requires N and T to go to infinity simultaneously since it uses the
SCAD penalty of Fan and Li (2001) and interactive fixed-effects. It also does
not have a way to estimate the regularization parameter since cross-validation
is normally infeasible because computation is very intensive in these types of
models.
The number of groups in this paper and the papers listed above is fixed.
There are methods in a standard panel model to use a kmeans clustering algo-
rithm to identify the number of groups and sort the individuals into the groups
prior to estimating the model (Bonhomme et al., 2017) which allows the number
of groups to grow as the sample size grows. This does not allow for covariates to
have different effects on each group which is a significant feature of my model.
A different approach to this answer is done by Su et al. (2019) where individuals
can change groups over time. My approach does not currently allow for such
generalizations so this remains left for future research.
1.2 Estimator
This section will begin with a discussion of the model and estimator. Then I
will discuss computational methods.
1.2.1 Model
This model (1.1.1), based on the model in Bonhomme and Manresa (2015),
contains three types of parameters: the parameter vector θg ∈ Θ for all g ∈
{1, ..., G}; the group-specific time effects αgit ∈ A, for all g and all t ∈ {1, ..., T};
and the group membership variables gi for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} which maps indi-
vidual units into groups. The parameter spaces Θ and A are subsets of RP and
R, respectively. Let γ ∈ ΓG denote a particular grouping (or partition) of the
N units, where ΓG is the set of all possible groupings.












(yit − x′itθgi − αgit)2 (1.2.1)
which is the minimum over all possible groupings γ of the N units into G
groups, common group parameters θ, and group-specific time effects α.
In my setting, which differs from Bonhomme and Manresa’s model here, I
will assume that the θs will be approximately sparse, defined formally below.
Condition 1. - Approximately Sparse: Each optimal function of fg(xit) is
well-approximated by a function of unknown s > 1 variables:
yit = fg(xit) + vit,





g + αgit + a(xit)




This requires that there are at most s terms that are able to approximate
the conditional expectation of yit. This allows the support of θ
AS, T , to be
unknown. Note that the number s is chosen such that the approximation error
is of the same magnitude as the estimation error. The underlying key growth
condition is:
s log(P ∨N) = o(N) (1.2.3)
This requires that the number covariates required to estimate yit is sufficiently
small in comparison to the sample size.
In my consumer demand setting, this is a reasonable assumption. Con-
sumers often will only consider items in their consideration set and they cannot
consider large numbers of products every time they make a purchase decision.
Further, allowing for approximate sparsity allows for us to add quadratic and
other higher order terms for competing prices (Banks et al., 1997) that may or
may not be included in the post-Lasso estimation.
Thus, my post-Lasso grouped fixed-effects estimator is defined as the solu-
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tion of the following minimization problem:
(








(yit − x′itθgi − αgit)2 (1.2.4)
For given values of θ and α, the optimal group assignment for each individual
unit is:




(yit − x′itθg − αgt)2 (1.2.5)
where I take the minimum g in case of a non-unique solution. The standard
GFE estimator relies on the usual least squares criterion function:
Q̂(θ, α) := EN [(yit − x′itθĝi(θ,α) − αĝi(θ,α)t)2] (1.2.6)
where ĝi(θ, α) is given by equation (1.2.5). The Lasso estimator is defined as a










where λ is the penalty level and Υ = diag(ψ1, ..., ψP ) is a diagonal matrix
specifying penalty holdings. I will use the infeasible “ideal” penalty loadings:






En[x2ijtv2it] j = 1, ..., P (1.2.8)
Since vit is unobserved, the ideal penalty loadings are infeasible. However, by
using conservative penalty loadings at first, such as vit = yit−y, and estimating
vit from the residuals, I can iterate to a feasible penalty loadings estimator.
These penalty loadings allow for sharp convergence.
Ideal penalty loadings are used to introduce self-normalization of the first-
order condition of the lasso problem. I follow the work of Belloni et al. (2012)
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to use moderate deviation theory from Jing et al. (2003) to bound deviations
which allows a penalty level λ/N such that the lasso estimator converges at an
oracle rate. This strategy allows the maximum of normalized scores to be well
approximated by a standard normal quantile (Peña et al., 2008).
The penalty level, λ/N , should dominate the noise and this can be achieved
using moderate deviation theory with the following choice for λ:
λ = c2
√
nΦ−1(1− ψ/(2P )), (1.2.9)
with ψ → 0, log(1/ψ) = O(log(P ∨N))
I set ψ = 0.1/ log(P ∨N) and c = 1.1 as recommended based on simulation
studies in Belloni et al. (2012). This provides a theoretical strategy to use
Lasso penalty that doesn’t require cross-validation (which is will be very costly
because of computation time) or any kind of guess work to choose our penalty
value, λ. These plug-in values have been shown to be effective in estimation
(Bickel et al., 2009; Drukker and Liu, 2019).
I will then use the GFE estimator applied to the model selected by Lasso.
Specifically,
T̂ = support(θ̂L) = {j ∈ {1, ..., P} : |θ̂Lgj| > 0} (1.2.10)
The set B̂ can contain additional variables not selected by Lasso, but the number
of such variables must not be larger than the number selected by Lasso. Thus,






Q̂(θ, α, γ) (1.2.11)
where Q̂(θ, α, γ) is defined from equation (1.2.6). Thus, my Post-Lasso
estimates of θ and α are given by (1.2.11) and of gi is given by (1.2.5).
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1.2.2 Computation
Equation (1.2.11) minimizes a piecewise-quadratic function, where the partition
of the parameter space is defined by different values of ĝi(θ, α). However, the
number of partitions of N into G groups increases dramatically as N increases
so minimizing across all partitions is in-feasible. The following algorithm can
be used to minimize equation (1.2.11) and improve upon this problem.
Algorithm 1. (iterative)
























4. Compute for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}:
g
(s+1)








5. Set s = s+ 1 and go to Step 2 (until numerical convergence).
This algorithm alternates between three steps. The first step is to choose
the variables that are chosen for each group using a Lasso selection technique.
The second step updates θ and α as a post-Lasso. The last step is assigning
each individual unit i to the group gi which minimizes their objective function:
(yit − x′itθ
(s+1)
g − α(s+1)gt )2.
Unfortunately, the solution depends on the chosen starting values since the
least squares objective function is not globally convex (Bai, 2009). Thus, find-
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ing the true values requires using many starting assignments to find which one
minimizes the objective function. This algorithm improves upon this and al-
lows for computation without choosing every partition of N individuals into
G groups. Drawing random starting values provides a practical approach for
many problems.
For higher dimensional problems, I can improve on this using a process
similar to the kmeans clustering algorithm (Forgy, 1965) which uses another
algorithm that exploits recent advances in data clustering (Hansen et al., 2010).
This extension, called Algorithm 2, is outlined in Appendix 1.7.1. A compar-
ison of two very similar algoriths is done by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015).
Computation remains a challenge as N grows large, so there remains potential
for further research to improve these techniques.
1.3 Asymptotic Properties
In this section, I discuss the asymptotic properties of my post-Lasso grouped
fixed-effects (PL-GFE) estimator as N and T tend to infinity in model (1.1.1).
1.3.1 Setup








where g0i ∈ {1, ..., G} denotes group membership, θ0g0i is approximately sparse,
and where the 0 superscripts refer to true parameter values. I assume that the
number of groups G = G0 is known, but I will discuss estimating the number





be the infeasible PL-GFE estimator where group membership gi












yit − x′itθg0i − αg0i t
)2
. (1.3.2)
This is the post-Lasso estimator in the pooled regression of yit on xit and the
interactions of population group dummies and time dummies.
The main result in this section provides conditions where estimated groups
converge to their population counterparts and the PL-GFE estimator defined
in equation (1.2.4) is asymptotically equivalent to equation (1.3.2) as N and T
tend to infinity and N/T ν → 0 for some ν > 0. This allows T to grow much
more slowly than N as long as ν > 1.
1.3.2 Consistency
Consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.1. There exists a constant M > 0 such that:
a. Θ and A are compact subsets of RP and R, respectively.
b. E (||xit||2) ≤M , where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm.
c. E(vit) = 0, and E(v4it) ≤M .
d.







∣∣∣ 1T ∑Tt=1 E(vitvjt)∣∣∣ ≤M .
f.
∣∣∣ 1N2T ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1∑Tt=1∑Ts=1 Cov(vitvjt, visvjs)∣∣∣ ≤M.
In Assumption 1.1.a, the parameter space must be compact. Non-stationarity
in the covariates and errors are ruled out in Assumptions 1.1.b and 1.1.c. These
three assumptions allow us to do my analysis in a bounded space. Assumptions
1.1.d and 1.1.f impose conditions on the time series dependence of errors and co-
variates. Assumptions 1.1.e restricts the amount of cross-sectional dependence.
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Note that this is satisfied when vit is independent across units. Assumptions
1.1.d-f are common in large factor models (Stock and Watson, 2002).
This assumptions must also hold for approximation error using only us-
ing θ from the support T . Assumption 1.1.c implies that E(a(xit)) = 0, and
E(a(xit)4) ≤ M for some M > 0. This holds because the approximation error
is chosen to be no larger than the model error vit. However, I need to make
further assumptions:
Assumption 1.2. There exists a constant M ′ > 0 such that:
a.







∣∣∣ 1T ∑Tt=1 E(a(xit)a(xjt))∣∣∣ ≤M ′.
c.
∣∣∣ 1N2T ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1∑Tt=1∑Ts=1 Cov(a(xit)a(xjt), a(xis)a(xjs))∣∣∣ ≤M ′.
Assumption 1.2 establishes the same weak dependence conditions on this
error, a(xit), as on the model error, vit. Assumption 1.1.d. and 1.2.a. allows
for lagged outcomes. In consumer demand, Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 can allow
us to use lagged prices as covariates and allow the consumers to make dynamic
decisions, which can be important for some consumer demand applications
(Hendel and Nevo, 2006).
In a consumer demand setting, Assumptions 1.1 restricts how much demand
shocks can effect multiple individuals outside of the grouping decided by the
model, as well as how much the demand shocks can last multiple periods outside
of grouped demand shocks. Further, Assumption 1.2 implies that the response
to other individual price changes not included in the post-Lasso estimate follow
the same restrictions as the error terms. This means that these approximation
error terms have restrictions over the time series dependence and how much
they effect multiple individuals outside of the group effect.
Now consider the following additional assumptions on group classification:
Assumption 1.3.
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a. For all g ∈ {1, ..., G} : plimN→∞ 1N
∑N
i=1 1{g0i = g} = πg > 0.
b. There exist constants a > 0 and d1 > 0 and a sequence α[t] ≤ e−at
d1
such that, for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} and g ∈ {1, ..., G}, {vit}t,{a(xit)}t and
{α0gt}t are strong mixing processes with mixing coefficients α[t]. Moreover,
E(α0gtvit) = 0 and E(α0gta(xit)) = 0 for all g ∈ {1, ..., G}.




for all i, t, and m > 0.




)d2 for all i, t, and m > 0.
Assumptions 1.3.a establishes that each of the G population groups has
a large-number of observations. Assumptions 1.3.b-d restrict the dependence
and tail properties of vit and a(xit). Specifically, both vit and a(xit) are as-
sumed to be strongly mixing with a faster-than-polynomial decay rate with
tails also decaying at a faster-than-polynomial rate. These strengthen some
aspects of Assumption 1.1. Further, α0gt is also assumed to be strongly mixing
and contemporaneously uncorrelated with vit and a(xit). This will be discussed
further in Section 1.3.3. These assumptions allow me to bound misclassifation
probabilities.
In the consumer demand case, these assumptions hold as long as there is
the density large individual demand shocks (even if caused by price change
of products left out of the model) is low. This assumption holds as long as
individual demand shocks are not correlated with group aggregate demand
shocks.
Now consider the following assumptions about the random coefficients model:
Assumption 1.4.
a. There exists a ρ̂→p ρ > 0 such that, for all
g : minγ∈ΓG maxg̃∈{1,...,G} ρ̂(γ, g, g̃) ≥ ρ̂, where ρ̂(γ, g, g̃) is the minimum
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eigenvalue of the following (P + T )× (P + T ) matrix (with P = dimxit):
























xi1 1 0 . . . 0
1√
T








xiT 0 0 . . . 1














g − θ0g̃) + α0gt − α0g̃t)2.











= o(T−δ)∀δ > 0











= o(T−δ)∀δ > 0











= o(T−δ)∀δ > 0
Assumption 1.4.a. is a relevance condition which is similar to a full rank
condition in standard models. This requires that xit has enough within-group
variation over time and across units. Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) outlines
many cases where this holds. Assumption 1.4.b. is a group separation condition.
Intuitively it is satisfied if, for all i and g̃ 6= g, {xit}t and {α0gt − α0g̃t}t are not
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collinear. Assumption 1.4.c. holds as long as covariates have bounded support,
or if they satisfy specific tail conditions. Assumption 1.4.d-e. impose further tail







t=1 ||a(xit)xit||. These condi-
tions will hold if xit satisfies mixing and tail conditions outlined in Assumption
1.3.
In the consumer demand application, it is common to divide consumers
in groups based on specific covariates like income and income level (Huang
and Lin, 2007; Aasnass and Rødseth, 1983; Asano and Fiuza, 2015). However,
grouping individual based on unobserved heterogeneity will allow individuals
with varying covariates so I can identify the effect of these covariates within
each group.
I also impose additional moment conditions on xit and vit to insure conver-
gence of the post-Lasso coefficients.
Condition 2. - The following conditions on the error terms. Let ỹit = yit −
E[yit]:
a. There exists a constant M > 0 such that maxj≤P E[ỹ2it] + E[x2itj ỹ2it] +
1/E[x2itjv2it] ≤M .
b. There exist constants Km > 0 such that maxj≤P E[|x3itjv3it|] ≤ Km.
c. K2m log
3(P ∨N) = o(N) and s log(P ∨N) = o(N).
d. maxi≤N,t≤T,j≤P x
2
itj[s log(P ∨N)]/N →p 0.
Parts a-b. introduce moment conditions beyond what were outlined before
but follow similar intuition. Parts c-d establish growth conditions such that
the number of variables needed to approximate yit, s, does not grow too fast in
relation to N .
This growth condition makes sense in my application to consumer demand.
As the number of consumers increase, most of the consumers will fall into
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already defined groups. These groups will have the same competition sets so s
will not increase too quickly in relation to N .
To outline the next regularity condition, I must define sparse eigenvalues.
To begin, I will define the m-sparse subset of a unit sphere as:
∆(m) = {δ ∈ Rp : ‖δ‖0 ≤ m, ‖δ‖2 = 1} ,




δ′Mδ and φmax(m)(M) = max
δ∈∆(m)
δ′Mδ
This allows me to establish the following condition:
Condition 3. For any C > 0, there exist constants 0 < κ′ < κ” <∞, which do
not depend on N but may depend on C, such that, with probability approaching
1, as N, T →∞,
κ′ ≤ φmin(Cs)(E[xitx′it]) ≤ φmax(Cs)(E[xitx′it]) ≤ κ”
Condition 3 establishes that only certain small submatricies of the empir-
ical Gram matrix are well-behaved. This conditions hold for standard i.i.d.
sampling, but holds for more general cases as well,as outlined in Belloni and
Chernozhukov (2013).
I assume that the number of variables selected by post-Lasso is not signifi-
cantly larger than the model selected by Lasso. Specifically, let T̂ be the set of
variables selected by Lasso, and B̂ be the set of variables selected by post-Lasso.
There exists some c such that
|B̂ \ T̂ | ≤ c(1 ∨ |T̂ |) (1.3.3)
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This means that the number variables that must be included whether they are
selected by the Lasso estimator or not should be relatively small. In an ap-
plication to consumer demand, one can include own-price elasticity in every
post-Lasso estimation but the number of cross-price elasticities or demographic
effects included beyond those selected by the Lasso identification must be lim-
ited. I will not include any covariates beyond those selected by the Lasso
identification in my application.
If one was focused on estimating a singular parameter such as own-price
elasticity, one could use the double machine learning method (Chernozhukov
et al., 2016) to solve this problem. This would significantly weaken the assump-
tions needed for convergence and asymptotic normality. It would also increase
computation time in order to properly cross-validate the machine-learning pa-
rameters. However, my focus is on a set of parameters (cross-price elasticities
as well as own-price elasticities) so I will keep my assumptions and proceed.
With these conditions, I can provide the next result which shows that my
PL-GFE estimator and the infeasible least squares estimator with known pop-
ulation groups in equation (1.3.2) are asymptotically equivalent.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose assumptions 1, 2, and 3 all hold as well as conditions
1, 2, and 3 and equation (1.3.3). Also, λ is chosen from equation (1.2.9). Then,





|ĝi − g0i | > 0
)
= o(1) + o(NT−δ), (1.3.4)
and:
θ̂g = θ̃g + op(T
−δ)∀g (1.3.5)
and
α̂gt = α̃gt + op(T
−δ)∀g, t. (1.3.6)
Proof. See Appendix 1.7.2. 
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The following assumptions allow to simply characterize the asymptotic dis-
tribution of the Post-Lasso estimator (θ̂, α̂). I denote xgt as the mean of xit in
group g0i = g.
Assumption 1.5.
a. For all i, j, t, and g: E (1{g0i = g}xjtvit) = 0.
























1{g0i = g}1{g0j = g}vitvjs(xit − xgt)(xjs − xgs)′
]
(1.3.7)





t=1 1{g0i = g}(xit − xgt)vit →d
N (0, σθg) .









1{g0i = g}1{g0j = g}vitvjt
)
= ωgt > 0
e. For all (g, t), and as N and T tend to infinity: 1√
N
∑N
i=1 1{g0i = g}vit →d
N (0, ωgt).
Assumptions 1.5.a-c. imply that the least squares estimator for θg has a
standard asymptotic distribution. Assumption 1.5.a holds if xit is strictly ex-
ogenous or fixed and the observations are independent across units. In the
framework of consumer demand, I will discuss this assumption in depth in Sec-
tion 1.3.3. Assumptions 1.5.d-e. allow for αgt to have a standard asymptotic
distribution.
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Theorem 1.2. Suppose the conditions under Theorem 1.1 and Assumption 1.5
hold. Let N and T tend to infinity such that, for some ν > 0, N/T ν → 0. Then
























where πg is defined in Assumption 3 and Σθ, Ωg, and ωgt are defined in As-
sumption 5.
Proof. The proof follows the proof for Corollary 1 in Bonhomme and Manresa
(2015). Note that because of our assumptions on the growth rate of s and p
(See Condition 2), θ converges at a
√
NT rate because of the penalty loadings
based on the work done by Belloni et al. (2012). 
Thus, under the conditions of Theorem 1.2, my PL-GFE estimator of θ0
g0i
is root-NT consistent and asymptotically normal as long as T can increase
polynomially more slowly than N . My estimator of α0
g0i t
are root-N consistent
and asymptotically normal. Notice that the fixed effect convergence rate is
consistent with other standard time fixed-effects. Lastly, the estimated group
membership indicators are uniformly consistent for the population asN/T ν → 0
for some ν > 0.
1.3.3 Price Endogeneity
In the Industrial Organization literature, there is a large concern about price
endogeneity. A common issue is that prices are set in response to changes in
demand, which would bias common estimates for price elasticity unless one uses
instrumental variables. This becomes particularly challenging in my setting
where I have a large number of prices that would need instruments. Further, in
22
many cases estimates based on instrumental variables can be swayed by one or
two data points (Young, 2019), which can be particularly dangerous with noisy
demand data.
It is common to use Hausman instruments (prices in one city as an in-
strument in another city) to deal with price heterogeneity (Hausman et al.,
1994). There can be some failure when using these instruments. For example,
Hausman estimates that Kellogg Raisin Bran and Post Raisin Bran have a neg-
ative (and statistically significant) cross-price elasticity (Hausman, 1996) even
though they are most likely close substitutes. Problems like this are not rare in
the literature (Nevo, 2011). Many of the problems comes from the assumption
about Hausman instruments that city demand shocks are uncorrelated.
Many authors have tried to avoid these problems by using other instruments,
like choosing average prices of retail chains outside of the store in which the
consumer is shopping (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017; Hitsch et al., 2017).
This instrument is chosen because retail chains change their prices over time
in a coordinated manner across stores at least partially because they face a
constant marginal cost (Stroebel and Vavra, 2019). They thus assume that the
timing of chain-level sales is unrelated to local demand shocks. However, this
does not capture how the chains may change their prices across store because
of a demand shock from the group of consumers that shop at their stores.
It is worth acknowledging that the demographics of consumers is similar
across stores within a chain. Thus, some have suggested to use demographics
of other stores in a chain as an instrumental variable (George and Waldfogel,
2003). This has been used in estimating demand for soda and other unhealthy
foods (Allcott et al., 2018, 2019). While demographics can be useful in control-
ling for the groups of consumers and their demand, this does not capture the
unobserved heterogeneity that may dictate which stores consumers may go to.
I use the time-varying grouped fixed-effects estimator, αgit, and group spe-
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cific slope parameters, θgi , to control for these endogeneity problems. To il-
lustrate this, I will use a simple example of just trying to estimate one item’s
own-price elasticity with my model. Let pit be the log price of the good and qit
be the log quantity purchased of that good.
qit = αgit + θgipit + vit (1.3.10)
Based on the proof of Theorem 1.2, my estimates of θg will be unbiased as


















pit − pg0i t
)(



















tends towards zero as N and T go to infinity where pg0i t is the mean of pit in
group g0i = g. This will hold as long as individual price deviation away from
group average price is uncorrelated with individual shocks in demand. With
the stores setting the prices, this does not seem like a big concern in my setting
since they will respond to group changes in demand when setting prices.















i=1 1 {g0i = g}
+ op(1)
tends towards zero as N goes to infinity. This will hold as long as individual
group assignment is uncorrelated with individual demand shock. This should
hold since individuals with correlated shocks would lead to a group time shock
which is captured in the model.
I will illustrate these arguments with a few examples. On the demand
side, households have a store-choice problem that effects the prices since con-
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sumers have unobserved preferences between stores and unobserved shopping
costs (Allcott et al., 2017). However, these individuals can be grouped together
which allows their effect to be measured by αgit. On the supply side, there are
often price discounts around seasonal peaks in demand (Chevalier et al., 2003).
Further, advertising to an individual can lead to an increase of purchases for
similar consumers (Hartman, 2010). Both of these (and most other supply-side
effects) would be captures by the grouped fixed effects estimator. As stores try
to optimize their pricing decisions, they should be doing so by targeting groups
of consumers, rather than individual consumers and my method can identify
those groups as well as their demand shocks.
There is also a concern about storing products. Stores will often put their
goods on sale for a week (Pesendorfer, 2002) and consumers will respond by
buying that good and storing it when the good is no longer on sale (Hendel
and Nevo, 2006). Estimating demand in the setting can sometimes lead to
overestimates of own-price elasticity as well as underestimate some cross-price
elasticities. I can minimize these problems by aggregating sales and price to a
monthly level as well as including lagged variables, which I can do because of
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2.
Note that if one desires to control for endogeneity beyond the fixed effects es-
timators discussed in this section, a standard instrumental variable approach is
not feasible using a grouped fixed-effects estimator. In order to perform statis-
tical inference and maintain consistency of the grouped fixed-effects estimator,
we must use a linear panel data. Therefore, in order to handle endogeneity,
the researcher must use a control function approach similar to that used by
Chernozhukov, Hausman and Newey (2019). Analysis of using this technique
with my PL-GFE estimator is left for further research.
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1.3.4 Choice of number of groups
I will follow the the analysis of large factor models (Bai and Ng, 2002) and
interactive fixed-effects panel data models (Bai, 2009), to create an information
criterion to consistently estimate the number of groups, G0, to be used in my
















where (G) refers to the GFE estimator with G groups and hNT is a penalty. The
estimated number of groups would be defined by:
Ĝ = arg min
G∈{1,...,Gmax}
I(G), (1.3.12)
where Gmax is an upper bound on G
0 and is assumed to be known by the
researcher1. Following Bai and Ng (2002) and (Bai 2009), it can be shown
that the number of groups Ĝ is consistent for G0 if, as N and T go to infinity,
hnt goes to zero and (N ∧ T )hnt tends to infinity. The first condition assures
that Ĝ ≥ G0 with probability approaching one and the second guarantees that
Ĝ ≤ G0.



















where σ̂2 is a consistent estimator of the variance of vit
2. If N and T go
1The issue of selecting Gmax is left for future research.
2I can use the following equation:
σ̂2 =
1










to infinity at the same rate, Ĝ is consistent for G0. If T goes to infinity more
slowly than N such that T/N tends towards zero, the BIC criterion implies
Ĝ ≥ G0 but Ĝ may be inconsistent. Some simulations that show the accuracy
of the criterion are included in Appendix 1.7.3.
1.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
I will run simulations similar to Belloni et al. (2012). I will construct my
simulations off my model:
yit = x
′
itθgi + αgit + vit.
For simplicity, xit, αgit, and vit are all normally distributed N(0, 1). I set G = 4.
I provide results for N = 100 and 200, as well as T = 7 and 12. θgi come from
three possible distributions. There will be 20 possible covariates, P = 20. For
the first simulation, I will set θgi such that each group has three covariates
with θgi = 1 and the rest will be set to zero, s = 3. There will be a similar
problem where s = 10 which could lead the Lasso to perform poorly with the
given sample size. The last simulation will use approximate sparsity rather
than absolute sparsity such that for each θgi to be a randomized order of the
following sequence: (1, 0.7, 0.72, ..., 0.719, 0.720).
I will report the group fixed-effects estimator (GFE) along with my post-
Lasso grouped fixed-effects estimator (PL-GFE). For each estimator, I report
the median bias and median absolute deviation (MAD) for both the fixed ef-
fects, α, and the covariate coefficients, θ. I also include the rate at which units
are misclassified to the wrong group (G-M). The results are reported in Table
1.1.
Simulation 1 and 2 both show that my PL-GFE out performs GFE by having
a smaller bias and deviation for both α as well as θ. It also misidentifies groups
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less frequently. The most dramatic improvements are for θ.
For the case in Simulation 3 which is approximately sparse, there are slight
improvements to the bias of θ but significant improvements to the MAD of θ.
These come at a sacrifice of slight increases in bias and MAD of α. The group
misidentification rate is better for PL-GFE when N is small but when N is
sufficiently small, GFE performs just as well.
In order to prepare for analysis of consumer demand, I do these simulations
again in a scenario where the covariates are correlated. Thus, xit is drawn from
a multivariate normal distribution N (0,Σ) where Σ is a P × P matrix that
takes the value of 1 along the diagonal and 0.1 on every value off the diagonal.
The value 0.1 is an approximation of the value estimated from the prices in my
data. The results are shown in Table 1.2.
All three of these simulations show that when there is this much correlation
between the covariates, the PL-GFE estimator always outperforms the GFE
estimator. The Lasso selection accurately identifies the important covariates,
while the correlation leads to bias and higher variance for the basic GFE estima-
tor. This holds whether there is extreme sparsity, some sparsity, or approximate
sparsity.
In the case of approximate sparsity, the addition of covariate covariance
lead to the PL-GFE estimator significantly outperforming the GFE for the case
N = 100 and T = 7. For instance, the misclassification rate drops by more
than 35%. This illustrates the importance of the PL-GFE estimator in cases
where N and T are relatively small but there are large amounts of correlated
covariates.
This is helpful for my application to consumer demand since I expect prices
to be correlated. Thus, using the PL-GFE will be more effective since it can
determine what prices are actually influencing the purchase decisions of the
consumer more accurately than the GFE would in this situation. This will
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hold even if the competition set is not particularly “small” or if other prices
have very small effects on purchasing decisions. If price does not enter linearly,
I can add higher order price terms and let the data determine which terms are

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5 Application: Consumer Demand of Soda
I will now estimate consumer demand based on product level data using my
post-Lasso grouped fixed effects estimator.
1.5.1 Nielsen Homescan Data
I will look at the Nielsen Scanner Data which is available through the Kilts
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.3 I will focus on
the results from 2014. This is a helpful application for estimating consumption
behavior since it contains detailed information based on price and quantity of
purchases of many products as well as many household characteristics.
The data contains a representative sample of households in the United States
that use in-home scanners to record all of their purchases intended for personal,
in-home use. Nielsen matches the product scanned by the household to the ac-
tual price of the store where the product was bought. Nielsen estimates that
recorded purchases account for about 30% of total household consumption. I
will refer to the sum over all expenditure in the Nielsen data as total expendi-
ture, which I will use as the relevant total outlay variable because of additive
separability of the utility function. This variable can be used in derivations
involving economic rationality and be the relevant “income” variable.
There are a few concerns with the data. It relies on participants success-
fully recording their purchases in their home, so they may suffer from some
recording error. However, patterns of consumption in this data set are con-
sistent with other commonly used data sets in the literature. Aguilar (2007)
finds that life-cycle pattern of household expenditures recorded in Homescan
3Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at
the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do
not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not
involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
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Data is consistent with those reported for food expenditures at home in Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Einav (2010) finds that these issues are
not more serious than those in any other consumption surveys like the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Lin (2018) compares the fraction of expenditures on
different categories of products in the Nielsen Homescan Data and finds the
results consistent to results from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES).
These issues are discussed further in Appendix 1.7.4.
I will focus on soft drink purchases. The demand for soft drinks and other
comparable drinks has been examined in many settings as policymakers have
been considering the impacts of “soda taxes” (See Allcott et al. (2019) for an
overview. See Falbe et al. (2016), Sturm et al. (2010), and Cawley et al. (2018)
for examples). In particular, there is a strong interest in soft drink consumption
among different groups of individuals (Dubois et al., 2019), such as children
(Han and Powell, 2013) and low-income households (Drewnowski and Specter,
2004; Currie, 2009). It is important to know what the substitution patterns
are and the price elasticity for different consumers since these taxes may have
a negative effect on the groups of individual they are meant to help (Allcott
et al., 2018). For these reasons, I will focus on consumers that purchase large
amounts of soft drinks, which is one of the major focus groups for policymakers
for the US Department of Health (2016).
I will aggregate sales to a monthly level and simply estimate the demand
for the most bought soft drink product (Coca-Cola) based on demographic
characteristics of the individual as well as the prices of the soft drinks and
other popular soft drink products based on my data. The products I examine
are broken up based on brand and type of product such as 12-pack, 6-pack or
size of individual pack. The exact clarification of these size are anonymized to
comply with the source of the data but I will refer to them as Size A, B, C, D
and E. The Coca-Cola size that I will focus on will be considered Size B for the
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remainder of the paper.
I only focus on consumers that purchase at least twelve units of the Coca-
Cola Size B in my sample during the year and soft drinks that are sold over
20,000 times in my sample. That limits my sample to 1,721 individuals (N =
1721) over twelve periods (T = 12) and twenty other sodas besides the Coca-
Cola product most purchased. My estimates for prices of sodas when consump-
tion is zero is an average of the price faced by similar consumers shopping at the
same or similar stores which is similar to a method discussed by Chernozhukov
et al. (2019). A detailed description of this mechanism as well as my summary
statistics for my sample are included in Appendix 1.7.4.
In this setting, I am assuming that the amount of soda each individual buys
will depend on the prices of only a subset of the other sodas available. Other
soda prices will have zero effect because of individual preferences and search
costs. There is not enough information to identify each individual’s competition
set, but I will break down the sample into groups and find the competition set
for each group using my PL-GFE estimator.
1.5.2 Coefficient Estimates
I will estimate the following model using my post-Lasso grouped-effects esti-
mator:




it + θ4giEit + αgit + vit
(1.5.1)
where QCocaColait is the log quantity purchased of Coca-Cola Size B products
by consumer i in time t. Xi are the demographic characteristics of consumer
i, including household income, age, education level, and number of children.
Eit is the log of household expenditure for each month to estimate total outlay
(“income”) elasticity of the household, θ4gi . Because I do not know how many




G: 1 2 4 5 6 7 8
Brand Size
Pepsi A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 −0.289∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(0.151)
Diet P A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0.133∗∗ 0 0 0
(0.063)
MD A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0.076 0 0 0
(0.130)
Diet MD A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coca-Cola A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B −0.508∗∗∗−0.490∗∗∗ 0 0 −0.525∗∗∗−10.522∗∗∗ 0
(0.075) (0.071) (0.058) (0.238)
C 0 0 -0.334 0 0 0 0.527∗∗
(0.285) (0.217)
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diet CC A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 −0.235∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0.255∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.075)
CC Zero A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0.085 0 0 0
(0.061)
C-F CC Zero A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dr. Pepper A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B -0.346 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.212)
Diet Dr. P A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diet P is short for Diet Pepsi. MD is short for Mountain Dew. CC is short for Coca-Cola.
C-F is short for Caffeine Free. Dr. P is short for Dr. Pepper. Note that the Coca-Cola
Size B is the own-price elasticities. All other estimates are cross-price elasticities. Values in
parenthesis are estimates of the standard deviation. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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with this data. PCocaColait is the log price of Coca-Cola while P
OtherSoda
it is the
log price of the fourteen other most popular sodas for each individual i in time t.
Thus, θ2gi and θ3gi are estimates for each groups own- and cross-price elasticities
respectively. I use individual clustered standard errors. I will use ten groups,
which is chosen using the BIC criterion in Appendix 1.7.3.2.
I will now discuss the overall results before briefly examining the demand
patterns of certain group of consumers. Table 1.3 contains my estimates for the
own-price (θ2gi) and cross-price elasticities (θ3gi). Notice that the main compe-
tition for the Coca-Cola Size B products that I am trying to estimate is mostly
other Size B products. The only other type of product whose price has a signif-
icant effect in estimating demand for Coca-Cola Size B products is Coca-Cola
Size C products. Most competitors have a positive cross-price elasticity within
reasonable ranges, but there are exceptions that will be discussed later. Own
price elasticity generally falls around -0.5 which is similar to other estimates
(Chernozhukov et al., 2019). This is because we are taking out individuals from
Group 7 with high own-price elasticity. I will discuss this group further on in
the paper.
Table 1.4 contains my estimates for the demographic effects on Coca-Cola
Size B demand. Note that the numbers for log of overall expenditure, which
can be an estimate of “income” elasticity, are positive and around 0.2, which
is similar to previous estimates (see Allcott et al. (2018) for example). It may
be a bit low compared to the average value because we are focused on the
subgroup of consumers who purchase soda frequently. Remember that the
parameters that are set to zero from the Lasso selection does not imply that
the value of that coefficient is zero, but that it is close to zero and the value
does not have a significant impact on predicting quantity of soda purchased.
Most of the variables I originally included were not selected by the post-Lasso
selection in any group so these not included in the table. Even many of the
36
demographic variables that are included are not statistically significant. Very
few demographic variables are included and statistically significant because
individuals with different demographic effects are often split between different
groups so there are very few significant demographic effects within each group.
The demographics of each group of consumers is discussed in Appendix 1.7.5.2.
Table 1.4
Demographic θg Estimates
Group: 2 4 5 8 9
Demographic
Log(Expenditure) 0.204∗ 0.151 0.215∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.128) (0.104) (0.088) (0.112)
Male Head High School Education -0.233 0 0 0 0
(0.283)
Married -0.153 0 0 0 0
(0.278)
Cable 0 0 0 0.180∗ 0
(0.104)
Internet 0 0 0.133 0 0
(0.261)
Note that the first row is a measure of “income” elasticity for various groups. Further, the
only demographic variables included in this table are those with at least one non-zero θg.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
My estimates for group time-varying fixed effects (αgt) is displayed in Figure
1.1. The first graph contains all the group fixed effects while the second ignores
two groups with fixed effects significantly different than the majority of the
groups, Group 7 and Group 9. I will discuss those groups more later. Note
that you cannot compare the fixed-effects across groups as differences of demand
because of their different values of θg. However, you can see how demand for
Coca-Cola Size B changes over time within a group, and find group demand
shocks. Additional information on the fixed values, included their fixed point
estimates and their standard errors, can be found in Appendix 1.7.5.1.
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Figure 1.1: My estimates for αgt. The graph on the right excludes the case
where G = 7 and G = 9.
1.5.3 Results Discussion
In this section, I will discuss the demand estimates of a few unique groups. A
detailed examination of the demographics of each group is left for Appendix
1.7.5.2. I will reference the distribution of purchase quantities of Coca-Cola
Size B products for each group, which is contained in Figure 1.3 in Appendix
1.7.5.2.
Group 7 is a particularly interesting case. The own-price elasticity is very
low, while the fixed-effects are very high as well. This would imply that Coca-
Cola Size B products were only purchased (or purchased at a much higher rate)
when they are on sale. Further, using an indicator in the data for whether the
item was on sale, I can say that the soda purchased in Group 7 was on sale 66%
of the time versus just 53% of the time in non-dynamic groups. Thus, they are
about 25% more likely to purchase soda on sale compared to their peers. This
seems similar to the research done by (Hendel and Nevo, 2006) that consumers
purchase good when they are on sale and store them during periods the goods
are not on sale. Thus, for this group, an dynamic analysis would need to be
done to determine the true own-price elasticity.
Group 1 has an own-price elasticity of Coca-Cola of -0.51 which is consistent
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with previous results. The demand of this group seems to have season trends
since it increases in the summer and decreases in the winter. Of note is the
negative cross-price elasticity of Dr. Pepper. This would appear counterintu-
itive but there are some explanations. Quantity purchased of Dr. Pepper and
Coca-Cola is positively correlated and has an R2 of about 0.1. Further, when
Coca-Cola is purchased, the consumers are more likely to purchase 3-4 products
in each time period meaning that when they buy soda, they seem to buy mul-
tiple quantities of soda. This pattern continues for groups 2 and 4. Thus, for
groups 1, 2 and 4, consumers do not consume any soda most periods, but when
they do, they consume more than one unit of multiple kinds of soda. Using the
same type of sales analysis with group 7, I find that soda purchased by these
groups are purchased on sale 64% of the time versus just 52% in non-bundling
groups. These consumers appear to like bundles of soda and their demand
may be more precisely estimated using a bundle choice estimation such as the
methods outlined by Chintagunta and Nair (2011) or Berry et al. (2014).
Group 9 also has unique fixed-effects, but in the opposite way. Group 9
has fixed-effects that are lower than any other group each month. It also has
the highest estimated income-elasticity. That seems to imply that the primary
driver of how much members of this group purchase soft drinks is their income
each month. It is also worth noting that members of this group also have a large
negative price shock in January, that could be because of new years resolution
to eat healthy or some other reason.
1.5.4 Implications
My PL-GFE estimator can have practical implications for firms as well as policy
makers. By having group specific aggregate demand shocks, researchers can
evaluate how different groups responded to certain events in time as well as
group time trends. For example, if a Coca-Cola appeared in a movie that came
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out in July, researchers could use the PL-GFE estimator and notice that the
only groups that had a positive demand shocks in that month were groups 2 and
10 while there was an actual negative shock for individuals in group 6. While
these groups do not seem to be geographically concentrated in certain regions
of the country, groups 2 and 10 are the two youngest groups while group 6 is the
second oldest. This allows the researchers to know which types of individuals
seemed to positively and negatively respond to the July event.
By having group specific price elasticities, researchers can evaluate imple-
mentation of different treatments on specific groups they are interested in. For
example, when assessing the consequences of soda taxes, researchers are par-
ticularly interested in low-income households and households with children, as
outlined in Section 1.5.1. I will proceed in evaluating the each of these sub-
groups using my PL-GFE estimates.
The group with the highest fraction of households with a yearly income
lower than $25,000 is group 8. Because this group only has positive cross-price
elasticities for other Coca-Cola products, it appears that they choose Coca-Cola
based on their price relative to other Coca-Cola products. This would imply
that raising the price of one product would not decrease their consumption of
Coca-Cola Size B products because they would substitute to another Coca-Cola
product. It is also worth noting that this group had a large negative demand
shock in November, so it is worth examining what happened this month to lead
to this shock.
The group with the highest fraction of households that have children under
13 years of age are groups 3 and 6. Group 3 does not have any significant covari-
ates, but it does appear to have a trend to increase their soft drink purchases
throughout the year. This would imply that price did not have a significant
impact on these households, so there may be better policies if the goal is to
decrease soft drink consumption in these households. Group 6, however, has a
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significant negative own-price elasticity, which makes sense because household
heads in group 6 are much less likely to have full-time jobs than household-heads
in group 3.
The group that consumes the most soda overall was group 5. They are also
the oldest group. This group had positive cross-price elasticities for Diet Pepsi,
Mountain Dew and Coca-Cola Zero Size B products. They further have the
most consistent demand across the twelve month period. They do not seem to
have strong specific preference in terms of which soda they choose to consume.
These examples illustrate how researchers can use the PL-GFE estimator to
provide insights that are not available through more basic or standard estima-
tors. Researchers in firms can use it to see how demand is effected across time
and before and after certain events for different groups of individuals and then
further identify unique characteristics about these groups of individuals such
as age and where they live. Further, policy makers can use these estimates to
predict consequences of certain policies for different groups of individuals rather
than solely on the aggregate or average effect of their policy.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces post-Lasso techniques to a grouped fixed-effects model
(PL-GFE) to deal with situations with a large number of variables and signifi-
cant unobserved heterogeneity. I use this PL-GFE model to estimate a demand
system which has many prices and heterogenous consumers with grouped time-
varying demand shocks. I am able to group individuals together based on
their demand shocks as well as how they respond to prices. Using grouped
time-varying fixed-effects allows me to use prices in my model rather than in-
struments which improves precision and does not impose instrumental variable
assumptions on the model.
My application was able to find significant heterogeneity among the con-
41
sumers of soda. Groups had different and often unique demand shocks. We
were able to identify which consumers were likely to only purchase Coca-Cola
when it was on sale, as well as consumers whose Coca-Cola consumption was
particularly dependent on their income. Through my estimator, we were able to
examine groups with particularly high interest households (low-income house-
holds, households with children, and households that consume large quantities
of soda) and understand their consumption behavior better.
There are a few ways to expand my work in this paper. One would be
to include individual heterogeneity or random coefficients within each group.
Combining random coefficients with lasso technique would increase the com-
putation time which is already a major burden but it could decrease the large
variation often needed to compute random-coefficients model. Although com-
bining random coefficients with lasso has been done (Fan and Li, 2012), it has
not been done with the penalty loadings (Belloni et al., 2012) which could
improve them.
Further, because I make the assumption that demand shocks only effect
groups of individuals for the groups as determined by the estimation procedure,
individuals cannot change groups (Su et al., 2017) and the number of groups
cannot change (Bonhomme et al., 2017). Thus, in a consumer demand setting I
would be hesitant to extend to scenarios covering a long period of time because
scenarios like this are possible. However, there may be a way to accommodate
individuals changing groups or number of groups changing over time which can
then accommodate settings with large T .
Demand estimation is often done in a discrete choice. Changing the struc-
ture of this to a logit like structure may be helpful and can be done using a
Lasso-type estimator as well (Belloni et al., 2016). However, the asymptotics
of the grouped fixed effects would be difficult and in its current form would
introduce bias. Leaving out grouped-fixed effects would require instrumental
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variables if one were to try and estimate demand, which could be problematic





I will use the (hdm) package in R explained in (Chernozhukov et al., 2016) to
accelerate the Post-Lasso computation. If I were to use Algorithm 1 in most
empirical application, an infeasibly large number of starting values would need
to be used to get reliable solutions. To illustrate, if I were to have N = 1000
and G = 10 then that would open 9.59 ∗ 1029 possible combinations. Note
that each starting iteration of Algorithm 1 addresses many combinations but
the possible combinations is so large that the number of iterations needed to
achieve the proper solution would remain infeasibly large. This can be helped
by using parallel computing and it is extremely parallelizable, but there are
further improvements to be made.
I can significantly decrease the computation time further by using an ex-
tension to Algorithm 1 (Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015) which introduces the
Variable Neighborhood Search method (Hansen and Mladenović, 2001; Hansen
et al., 2010). This would increase the number of combinations covered by each
iteration of the algorithm. This specific algorithm extends from (Pacheco and
Valencia, 2003) and (Brusco and Steinley, 2007). As before, let γ = {g1, ..., gN}
be a generic partition of N units into G groups.
Algorithm 2. (Variable Neighborhood Search)
1. Let γinit be some starting assignment to groups.
Perform steps 2-3 of Algorithm 1 to obtain Post-Lasso estimates of (θ, α)
based on this initial group.
Set itermax and neighmax to some desired values.
Set j = 0.
Set γ∗ = γinit
2. Set n = 1.
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3. (Neighborhood jump) Relocate n randomly selected units to n randomly
selected groups, and obtain a new grouping γ′.















and do Algorithm 1.
5. (Local search) Obtain a new grouping γ” based on the (θ, α) from Step 4.
6. If the objective function using γ” improves relative to using γ∗ set γ∗ = γ”
and go to Step 2. Otherwise, set n = n+ 1 and go to the next step.
7. If n ≤ neighmax, then go to Step 3. Otherwise go to the next step.
8. Set j = j + 1. If j > itermax, then Stop. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Algorithm 2 combines two different search techniques. It applies a local
search (Step 5) which guarantees that a local optimum is attained since re-
assigning any single individual to a different group will not decrease the ob-
jective function. Secondly, re-assigning randomly selected units into randomly
selected groups (Step 3) allows for broader exploration. This is a neighborhood
jump of increasing size up to size neighmax which is chosen by the researcher.
Algorithm 2 adds two parameters to be set by the researcher: the maximum
neighborhood size neighmax and maximum number of iterations itermax. Along
with Algorithm 1, the researcher still has do determine Ns, the number of start-
ing values. In my simulations, I set Ns = 5000, neighmax = 20 and itermax = 20
to guarantee convergence. The parameters set should be large enough to always
yield the same result. Ns can be split between processors and this algorithm is
also extremely parallelizable which can make most computations feasible with
this estimator.
In order to insure convergence in my empirical application with N = 1, 721,
I set Ns = 100, 000. This is very demanding computationally, but by splitting
it between 8000 nodes, it can be completed in a few days. However, once my
estimator is calculated, I can use the identified groups to find trends and learn
about consumers, which is not computationally intensive at all. There is a large
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starting cost to use my estimator, but the resulting groups and estimates have
many uses that are not demanding computationally.
1.7.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proof. I will follow a similar pattern to the Proposition S4 in the supplementary
appendix to Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). Let γ0 = {g01, ..., g0N} denote the
population grouping. Let also γ = {g1, ..., gN} denote any grouping of the
cross-sectional units into G groups. Let:






(yit − x′itθgi − αgit)2 (1.7.1)
Note that my estimator minimized Q̂(·) over all (θ, α, γ) ∈ BG × AGT × ΓG.
Note also:











− θgi) + α0gASi t − αgit)
2 (1.7.2)
Consider the following auxiliary objective function over the same domain.







































|Q̂(θ, α, γ)− Q̃(θ, α, γ)| = 0 (1.7.4)
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Proof. I have:




















− θgi) + α0g0i t − αgit)
I know that the first term goes to zero based on lemma S3 from the supplemen-
tary appendix of Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) based on Assumption 1.1. I









































































The left term is bounded based on Assumption 1.1.a and the right term is
bounded based on Assumption 1.2.a. This holds for the first term in equation
(1.7.5) as well so both of these terms are uniformly op(1). Now I will focus on


































































Assumption 1.1.a implies that the first item is uniformly bounded. I will now

































































∣∣∣ 1T ∑Tt=1 E(a(xit)a(xjt))∣∣∣ ≤ MN . Using the CS inequality on the

























which is bounded by M
T






is uniformly op(1). Thus, with the results of the inequality in (1.7.6), equation
(1.7.5) is uniformly op(1) and this ends the proof of Lemma A1. 
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Let dH (θ1, θ2) and dH (α1, α2) to denote the Hausdorff distances on RGP



















































2 . As in Lemma S4 of the supplementary
appendix of (Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015):











Where ρ̂ is bounded away from zero asymptotically by Assumption 1.4.a.
Let
(θ̂, α̂, γ̂) ∈ B̂G ×AGT × ΓG. Remember that
sup(θ,α,γ)∈ΘG×AGT×ΓG
[
Q̃(θ̂, α̂, γ̂)− Q̂(θ, α, γ)
]
= op(1) (Bonhomme and Man-
resa, 2015) and B̂ ⊆ Θ. Also note that Q̂(θ̂, α̂, γ̂) ≤ Q̂(θAS, α0, γ0) since I
assume θAS ∈ T , from my AS assumption, and T ⊆ B̂ (Belloni and Cher-
nozhukov, 2013). Thus, using Lemma 1.7.1:
Q̃(θ̂, α̂, γ̂) = Q̂(θ̂, α̂, γ̂) + op(1) ≤ Q̂(θAS, α0, γ0) + op(1) = Q̂(θ0, α0, γ0) + op(1)
= Q̃(θ0, α0, γ0) + op(1)
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The rest of the proof follows Lemma S4 of the supplementary index of Bon-
homme and Manresa (2015) and holds under Assumption 1.4.b. 
This proof shows that there exists a permutation σ : {1, ..., G} → {1, ..., G}
such that:







I may relabel such that σ(g) = g. For any η > 0, let Nη denote the set of
parameters (θ, α) ∈ ΘG × AGT that satisfy
∥∥θg − θ0g∥∥ < η. and 1T ∑Tt=1(αgt −
α0gt) < η for all g ∈ {1, ..., G}. I will now work on the following result:








1{ĝi(θ, α) 6= g0i } = op(T−δ).
Proof. Based on the definition of ĝi(·), for all g ∈ {1, ..., G} :




(yit − x′itθg − αgt)2 ≤
T∑
t=1
























(yit − x′itθg − αgt)2 ≤
T∑
t=1








I will proceed by bounding Zig(θ, α)∀(θ, α) ∈ Nη, by a quantity that does not
depend on (θ, α). Consider:


















































((αg̃t − αg) + (x′itθg̃ − x′itθg))
×
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The right hand side of the inequality in the indicator function does not depend
on (θ, α), so define: sup(θ,α)∈NηZig(θ, α) ≤ Z̃ig, where:







(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
)

















































































Take M̃ > max(
√
M,M∗), where M and M∗ are given by assumptions 1.1 and
1.4.c, respectively. Note that E(v2it) ≤
√
M and E(a(xit)2) ≤
√
M because the
approximation error has the same magnitude as the model error.Now consider:
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+T (C3 + C4 + C7)
√





For the rest of the proof, I will take advantage of Lemma B5 from Bonhomme
and Manresa (2015).
Lemma. B5 Let zt be a strongly mixing process with zero mean, with strong




)d2 , where a, b, d1 and d2 are positive constants. Then, for all z > 0 I
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(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
)2]







(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
)2] ≥ 2cg,g̃
3
Now I can apply Lemma B5 to
zt =
(
(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
)2 − E [((α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g))2] which
satisfies appropriate mixing and tail conditions because of Assumptions 1.1.a.
and 1.3.c.. Take z =
cg,g̃
6

















Continuing with this reasoning, let zt = v
2
it − E [v2it] and z = M̃ −
√
M and














for all δ > 0. This holds because {v2it}t is strongly mixing since {vit}t is strongly






































+ T (C1 + C2)
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(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
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Because of Assumptions 1.3.b-d,
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has zero mean, is strongly mixing with faster than polynomial decay rate and
satisfies the tail condition of Lemma B5. Thus, let zt =
(









(α0g̃t − α0g) + (x′itθ0g̃ − x′itθ0g)
)









Plugging in equations (1.7.12), (1.7.13), (1.7.14), and (1.7.16) into equation
















































To complete the proof for Lemma 1.7.3: Choose η that satisfies equation
56




































The rest of the proof of this theorem follows Theorem 1.2 of Bonhomme
and Manresa (2015). 
1.7.3 Number of Groups
I will simulate to estimate the capability of the BIC estimator in Equation
(1.3.13).Then I will use it to estimate the number of groups in my estimation
application.
1.7.3.1 Groups Simulations
I will use each of the simulations from Section 1.4. Remember that the first
case is very sparse with three non-zero coefficients and 17 zero coeffients; the
second case is sparse with ten non-zero and ten zero coefficients; the last case
is approximately sparse. For each of the simulations, I simulate four scenarios,
when G = 4 and when G = 10 and when N = 100 and N = 200. The simulation
is run 500 times.
The simulation results from Table 1.5 compare quite favorably compared
to those done by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). This makes sense because
their simulations rely on covariate coefficients being consistent across groups,
which increases the overall variation significantly compared to my model where
coefficients are different for each group of individuals.
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As long as the results are sufficiently sparse, such as in Simulation 1, then
the BIC criterion applied to my PL-GFE estimator performs very well and
correctly identifies the number of groups over 99% of the time in each case of
N and G0 simulated.
There are significant errors when N is small relative to G and the sparsity
assumption may not be fully satisfied. Specifically, the correct number of groups
in Simulation 2, when S = 10, is misidentified more than 30% of the time when
N = 100 and G0 = 10. However, if N increases to 200, the misidentification
almost ceases completely. A similar trend exists in Simulation 3, but it is
less magnified. The overall trend that if the sparsity assumption may not be
satisfied, a large N will be required to properly identify Ĝ.
1.7.3.2 Groups for Consumer Demand of Soft Drinks
Here I will apply the methodology outlined by Section 1.3.4 to my soft drink
data outlined in Section 1.5 to choose the number of groups used in my es-
timation. The calculated Baisian Information Criterion is reported in Table
1.6.
Thus, I will use G = 10 or ten groups because it has the lowest BIC esti-
mates. N is sufficiently large with respect to G based on my simulations such
that I feel confident that it is the best choice to explain the consumer behavior
in my data.
All of the numerical values of these criteria are pretty similar and this is not
the only way to choose the number of groups. One can choose the number of
groups based on prior beliefs of what the groups will be (Bonhomme and Man-
resa, 2015). For instance, in a consumer demand case, you may be interested in
which consumers only buy products when they are on sale and stores products
while they are not on sale, such as in group 7 in my study. These consumers
can be estimated dynamically using the model from Hendel and Nevo (2006).
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Table 1.5
Choice of Number of Groups (BIC)
Simulation 1
S=3
N = 100 N = 200
G0 = 4 G0 = 4
G = 2 3 4 5 6 G = 2 3 4 5 6
%(Ĝ = G) 0 0 100 0 0 %(Ĝ = G) 0 0 99.8 0.2 0
G0 = 10 G0 = 10
G = 8 9 10 11 12 G = 8 9 10 11 12
%(Ĝ = G) 0 0 99.6 0.2 0.2 %(Ĝ = G) 0 0 100 0 0
Simulation 2
S=10
N = 100 N = 200
G0 = 4 G0 = 4
G = 2 3 4 5 6 G = 2 3 4 5 6
%(Ĝ = G) 0 5.6 93.2 1.2 0 %(Ĝ = G) 0 0 99.2 0.8 0
G0 = 10 G0 = 10
G = 8 9 10 11 12 G = 8 9 10 11 12
%(Ĝ = G) 22 7 67.6 3 0.4 %(Ĝ = G) 0 0.2 99.8 0 0
Simulation 3
Exponential
N = 100 N = 200
G0 = 4 G0 = 4
G = 2 3 4 5 6 G = 2 3 4 5 6
%(Ĝ = G) 0 0.2 97.6 2.2 0 %(Ĝ = G) 0 0 98.8 1.2 0
G0 = 10 G0 = 10
G = 8 9 10 11 12 G = 8 9 10 11 12
%(Ĝ = G) 5.2 2.2 90.4 2.0 0.2 %(Ĝ = G) 0.2 0.4 99 0.4 0
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Table 1.6
Demand Estimation BIC Estimates
G = 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
BIC = 13.62 13.38 13.23 13.12 13.05 12.98 12.93 12.97 12.98
This table reports the Bayesian information criterion for the number of groups, G. Gmax is
set at 15.
By choosing two groups, you may be able to identify which consumers purchase
goods dynamically versus statically.
Choosing groups may sometimes be more art than science. However, the
purpose of my PL-GFE estimator is to eliminate research discretion as much
as possible. Researchers can include as many variables as they would like
so they do not need to choose specific variables that they think will matter.
The PL-GFE estimator will determine which variables are important to which
individuals based on the data and not researcher imputed parameters. For this
reason, I recommend using BIC to allow the data to determine the number of
groups.
1.7.4 Nielsen Scanner Data
There are a few issues to keep in mind when dealing with this Homescan data.
The first issue is with misreporting of quantity. Einav et al. (2010) exam-
ines which goods are more likely to be subject to this error. They find that
consumable goods like small drinks (like many soft drinks) is likely to be con-
sumed before getting home so are more likely to not be scanned. There are also
recording errors such as when a six-pack of goods are purchased and recorded
as quantity six. These are both problems that can add noise to my results, but
should not bias my results because quantity is only a dependent variable in my
model.
Another source of measurement error that is more concerning can come from
the price. Individuals record their purchases by scanning the items they buy
when they get home. The individuals input the quantity they purchase and
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Nielsen matches it with the average price of the good at the store where they
purchased it that week. This can lead to two types of errors. The first comes
from the price changing in the middle of the week. These types of errors are
approximately normally distributed.
The second type of error comes from not including discounts from loyalty
cards. Einav et al. (2010) examines a retailer used in the Homescan data
which has loyalty cards and finds that loyalty cards are used in about 75-80%
of the transactions. Further, this would bias my prices upwards, which when
comparing Homescan data with data from the retailer finds that the prices
used in the Homescan data is about 7% higher. On the other hand, these price
measurement errors may be overestimated since some retailers do not have
loyalty cards at all. Further, Homescan data errors are comparable to errors
found in other commonly used data sets (Einav et al., 2010; Aguiar and Hurst,
2007; Lin, 2018). Additional examination of this measurement error and it’s
effect on the results is left for future research.
When there is no good purchased, I attempt to find the average price for
each month at the store the most commonly purchase soft drinks at by matching
with Nielsen Retail Scanner Data. If I am unable to identify the store where the
individual commonly purchases soft drinks in the month, of if the store’s prices
are unavailable, I estimate the prices based on average prices paid by similar
consumers. The subset of similar consumers I choose is explained below. If
there were no prices in the subset I tried to match, I moved to a broader subset
below.
1. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, county and
zip-code
2. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, and county
3. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and zip-code
4. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and county
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5. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, and desig-
nated market
6. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and designated market
7. Individuals with the same zip-code
8. Individuals with the same county
9. Individuals with the same designated market
10. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain
11. All individuals
One could also calculate prices based on an average price consumer paid in
different time periods or by using price they paid in the period before or after.
These different methods do not change the results significantly and my method
allows more price variation over time for each individual. Summary statistics
for the quantity and price of each product is included in Table 1.7 Remember
that I focused my estimator on the group of individuals who averaged one
purchase of Coca-Cola Size B products in a month. This group of individuals
is not representative of the populations, and the demographics of the group is
included in Table 1.8.
1.7.5 Consumer Demand Estimation Results
Below are additional results from my estimation on the demand for soda from
Section 1.5. First, I will examine the estimates for the time-varying grouped
fixed-effects (αgt). Then I will examine the different demographics of the dif-
ferent groups of consumers.
1.7.5.1 Fixed Effects
Table 1.9 contains the means and standard deviations of each groups time-
varying fixed-effects, αgt. Remember that comparing different fixed-effects
across groups is infeasible because of different θg values. For instance, Group 7
62
Table 1.7
Brand Size Price Quantity












Diet Mountain Dew A 1.673 0.014
(1.739) (0.358)




















Caffeine Free Coca-Cola Zero A 1.69 0.005
(1.875) (0.145)




Diet Dr. Pepper A 1.678 0.009
(1.767) (0.211)
Price average is considered its median average monthly price and quantity average is its




Demographic Value Household Male Female
Household Size 2 0.424
≥ 3 0.437
Income Level < 25,000 0.150
> 50, 000 & < 100, 000 0.381
> 100, 000 0.131
Age < 35 0.210 0.145
> 55 0.436 0.442
No Head 0.179 0.088
Type of Residence Multi-Family house 0.099
Mobile-home 0.060
Household Composition Live with spouse 0.704
Live with roommates 0.020
Live with family 0.135
Children Teenager 0.136
Child 0.170
Job Status Full-time 0.468 0.316
Part-time 0.083 0.167
Education High School 0.768 0.876
College 0.255 0.293





Region New England 0.044
Mid-Atlantic 0.083
East North Central 0.219
West North Central 0.080
South Atlantic 0.207
East South Central 0.087
West South Central 0.136
Mountain 0.068




has the largest fixed-effects for every time period, but individuals in that group
bought less Coca-Cola on average than individuals outside of that group.
Table 1.9
Fixed-Effects (αgt) Estimates
Group: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Month
January -2.08 -3.89 -2.51 0.52 -0.85 -3.80 11.61 -3.27 -9.60 0.98
(1.10) (1.19) (1.73) (1.37) (1.03) (1.20) (1.16) (1.06) (1.17) (1.29)
February -3.44 1.17 -3.07 -3.30 -1.73 -2.89 11.40 -3.29 -6.03 -1.50
(1.09) (1.18) (1.75) (1.40) (1.02) (1.18) (1.15) (1.08) (1.19) (1.31)
March -1.19 -3.19 -3.61 -2.58 -1.41 0.52 11.03 -2.50 -4.99 -0.69
(1.11) (1.18) (1.74) (1.39) (1.05) (1.20) (1.14) (1.07) (1.18) (1.32)
April -1.15 -1.97 -4.17 -3.99 -1.50 -0.73 11.57 -2.34 -5.17 0.04
(1.12) (1.18) (1.73) (1.37) (1.05) (1.19) (1.16) (1.04) (1.14) (1.29)
May -0.91 -3.62 -3.05 -4.13 -1.42 -0.27 11.41 -2.57 -5.28 -0.08
(1.14) (1.18) (1.78) (1.33) (1.03) (1.18) (1.13) (1.07) (1.18) (1.31)
June -0.25 -3.21 -1.27 -3.55 -1.40 -0.69 11.32 -2.52 -5.36 -2.34
(1.14) (1.18) (1.74) (1.38) (1.04) (1.21) (1.15) (1.08) (1.19) (1.30)
July 2.37 -1.72 -2.05 -5.18 -1.68 -3.90 10.82 -2.46 -5.26 -1.20
(1.09) (1.20) (1.73) (1.38) (1.01) (1.19) (1.14) (1.07) (1.15) (1.31)
August -0.77 -3.52 0.50 -2.99 -1.12 -0.81 11.17 -2.16 -5.38 -1.65
(1.13) (1.18) (1.74) (1.37) (1.03) (1.20) (1.15) (1.06) (1.17) (1.35)
September -1.82 -3.57 -0.36 -4.94 -1.77 -2.61 11.33 -3.08 -5.53 -2.45
(1.11) (1.17) (1.72) (1.36) (1.05) (1.22) (1.15) (1.05) (1.15) (1.32)
October -2.48 -3.69 -0.80 -3.64 -1.51 -2.53 11.32 -3.80 -6.00 -1.23
(1.01) (1.19) (1.74) (1.38) (1.04) (1.19) (1.16) (1.08) (1.16) (1.32)
November -2.59 -3.80 0.64 -4.93 -1.01 -2.09 11.59 -7.10 -3.91 0.89
(1.11) (1.19) (1.74) (1.37) (1.03) (1.20) (1.13) (1.04) (1.17) (1.30)
December -1.87 -3.33 -1.07 -3.85 -1.58 -1.80 11.36 -4.33 -6.25 -2.54
(1.12) (1.20) (1.78) (1.38) (1.03) (1.19) (1.17) (1.08) (1.19) (1.30)
The estimates for each αgt is listed above with the standard deviation of each estimate listed
below in parenthesis.
However, one can compare fixed-effects over time within each group. For
this purpose, I include graphs of each groups’ time-varying fixed-effects along
with their 95% confidence bands in Figure 1.2. There you can see some groups
do not change demand over time (see Groups 5 and 7), some groups general
increasing or decreasing trends across multiple time periods (see Groups 1 and
3), and some groups have single time period shocks (see Groups 2 for a positive
shock and Group 9 for a negative shock).
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Figure 1.2: The solid lines are my PL-GFE estimates the the dotted lines are
the 95% confidence bands of my estimates.
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1.7.5.2 Demographics of Groups
Since I know which individuals are in each group, I can estimate the demo-
graphics of each group and compare the groups with each other. The estimates
for the average for the demographic variables I included in my model is shown
in Table 1.10. Remember that the PL-GFE estimator groups individuals based
on their response to prices, θg, and their time-varying fixed-effects, αgt. Thus,
demographics does not directly factor into groupings so the groupings in my
case do not have distinct demographic characteristics, but there are important
differences that could tell us more about the groups.
Further, with knowledge of group membership I know the purchase history
of each individual in the group. This can allow me to see which products are
more often bought in one group or another. I will use this information to
graph the distribution of Coca-Cola Size B purchases of each group in Figure
1.3. With these resources and the estimates from my PL-GFE estimator, I will
expound on information I know about each of the groups of consumers. This
discussion expands on the discussion in Section 1.5.3.
Group 1, which has Dr. Pepper as a complement to Coca-Cola, consumes
less soda overall than any other group. As discussed previously, they don’t
purchase Coca-Cola often, but when they do they normally purchase more
than one unit of it and often with Dr. Pepper. They appear to consume more
Coca-Cola in the Summer and less in the Winter. Compared to other groups
they are more likely to live along the East Coast of the United States in states
like Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland and Virginia, while being less likely
to live in the middle of the United States in states like Utah, Colorado, Ohio
and Michigan. Compared to most other groups, there are high-income families
with a stay-at home mother.
Group 2, which has Pepsi and Diet Coca-Cola as complements for Coca-




Group: 1 2 3 4 5
Demographic
Log(Expenditure) 8.656 8.604 8.612 8.532 8.803
(0.580) (0.577) (0.561) (0.578) (0.596)
Soda Expenditure 102.93 110.26 140.28 116.42 288.20
(67.28) (80.14) (122.68) (83.47) (178.72)
CC Bought 18.07 18.61 22.12 17.43 60.20
(6.62) (6.33) (11.15) (5.33) (29.38)
Household Size = 2 0.405 0.386 0.393 0.436 0.442
Household Size ≥ 3 0.458 0.503 0.441 0.443 0.401
Income < 25,000 0.137 0.157 0.159 0.164 0.143
> 50, 000 & < 100, 000 0.353 0.451 0.393 0.379 0.387
> 100, 000 0.157 0.111 0.124 0.121 0.120
Age < 35 0.216 0.222 0.241 0.221 0.194
Age > 55 0.399 0.444 0.414 0.436 0.498
Teenager Dependent 0.144 0.144 0.083 0.107 0.106
Child Dependent 0.196 0.203 0.228 0.136 0.092
Male Full Time Job 0.477 0.444 0.524 0.486 0.415
Female Full Time Job 0.209 0.288 0.310 0.357 0.327
High School 0.758 0.732 0.759 0.757 0.797
College 0.248 0.268 0.255 0.229 0.253
New England 0.078 0.039 0.062 0.043 0.041
Mid-Atlantic 0.078 0.118 0.076 0.093 0.101
East North Central 0.150 0.183 0.193 0.264 0.235
West North Central 0.059 0.098 0.083 0.057 0.051
South Atlantic 0.288 0.176 0.214 0.157 0.244
East South Central 0.098 0.072 0.076 0.121 0.101
West South Central 0.144 0.163 0.193 0.143 0.120
Mountain 0.026 0.085 0.034 0.036 0.060
Sample Size 153 153 145 140 217
These are the means for each of these demographic variables for each group. The continuous
variables includes a standard deviation in parenthesis as well. Log(Expenditure) is the log of
the monthly expenditure of the household. Soda Expenditure is the total spent on soda by
the household in the year. CC Bought is the number of Coca-Cola Size B products bought
by each household. If not specified, the variable is applied to the male head of the household.
Sample size is the number of individuals in each group. For each demographic variable, the




Group: 6 7 8 9 10
Demographic
Log(Expenditure) 8.640 8.590 8.703 8.660 8.626
(0.578) (0.518) (0.588) (0.617) (0.583)
Soda Expenditure 124.29 127.59 172.81 170.54 143.47
(87.38) (122.63) (201.16) (123.44) (84.11)
CC Bought 18.96 24.80 30.25 31.07 27.19
(8.44) (15.43) (17.13) (14.75) (13.85)
Household Size = 2 0.363 0.429 0.457 0.461 0.449
Household Size ≥ 3 0.462 0.432 0.431 0.404 0.411
Income < 25,000 0.163 0.094 0.181 0.177 0.165
> 50, 000 & < 100, 000 0.263 0.424 0.394 0.369 0.361
> 100, 000 0.150 0.173 0.106 0.106 0.120
Age < 35 0.206 0.191 0.234 0.213 0.184
Age > 55 0.463 0.451 0.410 0.440 0.373
Teenager Dependent 0.150 0.150 0.164 0.199 0.108
Child Dependent 0.225 0.162 0.181 0.156 0.152
Male Full Time Job 0.406 0.552 0.457 0.454 0.430
Female Full Time Job 0.293 0.387 0.309 0.277 0.348
High School 0.744 0.786 0.771 0.745 0.804
College 0.213 0.289 0.255 0.284 0.234
New England 0.025 0.045 0.027 0.021 0.057
Mid-Atlantic 0.081 0.060 0.080 0.078 0.076
East North Central 0.188 0.252 0.213 0.227 0.266
West North Central 0.088 0.090 0.085 0.113 0.076
South Atlantic 0.213 0.177 0.197 0.199 0.209
East South Central 0.144 0.056 0.101 0.057 0.057
West South Central 0.081 0.094 0.181 0.149 0.127
Mountain 0.088 0.105 0.074 0.078 0.063
Sample Size 160 266 188 141 158
These are the means for each of these demographic variables for each group. The continuous
variables includes a standard deviation in parenthesis as well. Log(Expenditure) is the log of
the monthly expenditure of the household. Soda Expenditure is the total spent on soda by
the household in the year. CC Bought is the number of Coca-Cola Size B products bought
by each household. If not specified, the variable is applied to the male head of the household.
Sample size is the number of individuals in each group. For each demographic variable, the
highest value is highlighted in green while the lowest is highlighted in red.
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1. Like Group 1, they don’t purchase Coca-Cola often, but when they do they
normally purchase more than one unit of it and often with other sodas. They
also appear to have a demand shock in February. Compared to households
in other groups, households in Group 2 have more than two individuals in
the household, are most likely to have annual income between $50,000 and
$100,000. The male heads of these households are least likely to have a High-
School education. This appears to be working class households.
Group 4, which has Coca-Cola Size C as a complement for Coca-Cola Size
B, but the least Coca-Cola Size B overall and make the fewest overall purchases
compared to every other group. Similar groups 1 and 2, they do not frequently
buy Coca-Cola Size B products but when they do, they purchase large quan-
tities of Coca-Cola Size B products and often do so along with Coca-Cola Size
C products. They had a demand shock of Coca-Cola in January. There are no
other demographic characteristics unique to this group, but it is the smallest
out of all of the groups.
The Group 3 PL-GFE estimate selected no covariates in the model, so the
estimation comes from its estimates of αgt. There is a trend in the αgt such that
it increases over time, implying that Coca-Cola 12-pack consumption increases
throughout the year. Compared to other groups, households in group 3 are
often younger and are more likely to have young children in the household.
Group 9 is similar in that αgt is lowest in January and increases to a steady
level after March. Thus, in both of these groups, consumers that consume less
in the beginning of the year, perhaps because of a new-years resolution, and
increase throughout the year. Group 9 also has the highest income-elasticity
out of all of the groups. Group 3 are much more likely to have young children
in the home, while Group 9 is much more likely to have a teenager in the home.
The Group 10 PL-GFE estimate selected no covariates in the model, so
the estimation comes from its estimates of αgt. There seems to be a general
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trend in the αgt such that it decreases over time besides a demand shock in
November. Compared to other groups, the male head of household is most
likely to be between 35 and 55 and they are the most likely to have graduated
from high school. It may be worth what is driving these households to their
unique demand time-trend.
Group 5 consumes the most goods overall, soda overall and Coca-Cola com-
pared to other groups. They have no distinct time trend in their fixed-effects
but have substitutes in Diet Pepsi, Mountain Dew and Coca-Cola Zero. Com-
pared to other groups, these are often older households without children living
at home.
Group 8 has a negative demand shock in November and has substitutes
in Coca-Cola Size C products, and Diet Coca-Cola Size B products. They
have the lowest income compared to individuals in other groups, but purchase
soda and Coca-Cola more than any group besides Group 5. However, they
are more likely to have income below $50,000 and least likely to have income
over $100,000. They are also the most likely to have children living in the
household. These appear to be low-income households that purchase Coca-
Cola consistently and will choose the cheapest product from their competition
set of Coca-Cola products.
The most unique characteristic of group 6 is the shape of its fixed effects
graph, since it appears to have multiple demand shocks. Compared to other
groups, this group is most likely to have a household size of one and least likely
to have a male with a full time job in the household. They are also least likely to
have gone to college. This group has many unique demographic characteristics
and multiple unique demand shocks. This group might be individuals that
respond to advertising or other cultural trends, but I cannot tell what with the
data I have.
Group 7 is the group that appears to follow the consumer model of Hendel
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Figure 1.3: These show the distribution of the amount of Coca-Cola Size B
products that are purchased each month for each group.
and Nevo (2006). There doesn’t appear to be a demand shock for individuals at
specific times. These individuals appear to have higher income, more likely to
have a full-time job and more likely to have graduated from college compared to
other groups. Also, compared to other groups they are less likely to live in the
Mid-Atlantic, which is the most densely populated region which would make
sense because storage would be more expensive for these households. This is
also the largest group.
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Chapter 2
A Panel Data Estimator for the Distribution
and Quantiles of Marginal Effects in Nonlinear
Structural Models with an Application to the
Demand for Junk Food
2.1 Introduction
It is commonplace that panel data allows researchers to model the impact of
correlated unobserved individual specific heterogeneity, as is illustrated by the
fixed effects approach and generalizations to linear random coefficients models
(Chamberlain, 1982; Wooldridge, 2005; Graham and Powell, 2012; Arellano and
Bonhomme, 2012). A particular challenge, however, arises with the presence of
nonlinearities in many microeconometric models, even in models that do not
feature a limited dependent variable. This situation arises frequently in eco-
nomics. While economic models often exhibit qualitative restrictions stemming
from constrained optimization of rational agents, e.g., convexity or monotonic-
ity, they feature linearity or additivity only in exceptional cases. In consumer
demand which motivates the application of this paper, this has led to the rise
and popularity of nonlinear models (e.g., the QUAIDS, (Banks et al., 1997)),
and nonparametric and nonseparable models in general, because they capture
important aspects of the data that are otherwise missed.
But while it is now commonly found that microeconomic relationships should
allow for nonlinearities on the individual level, there is even more experimental
and observational evidence that individuals differ across the population in ways
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that are not entirely captured by observable variables. There are basically two
ways to deal with this complex unobserved heterogeneity: considering average
effects, or recovering the distribution of heterogeneity parameters. The former is
easier to obtain than the latter, and frequently less stringent assumptions have
to be imposed for its recovery. As a case in point, in a cross-section setup, av-
erage treatment effects are identified under general conditions, while to recover
heterogeneous functions or parameters one has to, for instance, impose mono-
tonicity of the structural function in a scalar unobservable (Matzkin, 2003), or a
linear random coefficients structure (Hoderlein and Mammen, 2007). Moreover,
when covariates are endogenous, further restrictions are necessary (Imbens and
Newey, 2009; Kasy, 2011; Hoderlein et al., 2017).
This paper establishes the strength of panel data to allow recovery of the
distribution of heterogeneous nonparametric marginal effects, even if covariates
are correlated and the time span considered is very short. More precisely, we
show that the distribution of marginal effects of a general class of structural
models is nonparametrically identified. This allows for arbitrary dependence
between the time-invariant unobservable and the covariates of interest, provided
as little as two observations are available for the individuals. Formally, we
consider a nonparametric and heterogeneous model of the form
Yk,t = Φ(Xk,t, Ak) + Uk,t , k = 1, . . . , n; , t = 1, . . . , T , (2.1.1)
where Yk,t ∈ Y ⊆ R, and Xk,t ∈ X ⊆ RJ are observable variables, and Ak ∈
A ⊆ R∞ and Uk,t ∈ U ⊆ R are unobserved. Note that in this model, the
dimension of Ak is not restricted, and the structural function φ is assumed
to be smooth in the sense of being twice continuously differentiable in xj for
all j = 1, .., J, with bounded second derivatives, but is otherwise unrestricted.
Moreover, we allow for arbitrary dependence (correlation) between any element
of Ak and any element of Xk,t for any k, t. These facts make our model different
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from the models of Altonji and Matzkin (2005) and Evdokimov (2010) with
which it shares structural similarities.
The main result in this paper establishes nonparametric identification of
the (marginal) distribution of marginal effects ∂xjφ(x,A), for j = 1, . . . , J , and
all x ∈ X , even with many regressors and only two time periods (i.e., T = 2).
If T ≥ J + 1, we also show that the joint distribution of all marginal effects,
i.e., ∇xφ(x,A) = (∂x1φ(x,A), . . . , ∂xJφ(x,A))′ is identified, for all x ∈ X , see
Remark 2.4. As a corollary, we obtain identification of objects like the aver-
age structural marginal effect, as well as the variance of marginal effects. An
important limitation of our analysis is that we can only make statements for
the population for which Xk,1 = Xk,2 = ... = Xk,T , i.e., we are only identifying
the distribution f∇xφ(x,A)|X1−X2=0 for the “stayers” (in the sense of Chamberlain
(1982)). To fix ideas, in our demand application this will be the population
for which income and prices stay approximately constant. As an important
contribution, we establish that this limitation is not an accident of the iden-
tification approach taken, but a consequence of a profound non-identification
result for nonlinear marginal effects outside of the stayers sub-population. The
intuition behind this result is as follows: Suppose the true model is a J-th order
polynomial in a scalar Xit with random coefficients on every term. Then, the
number of time periods acts as limiting factor for our ability to learn about
this complex models - if J exceeds T − 1,; there is generic non-identification
(i.e., with T = 2, at most a linear random coefficients model is identified for
x2 6= x1).
The essential idea which underlies this strong constructive identification
result for the stayers is as follows: Unlike with repeated cross section data,
we utilize the fact that we observe individuals repeatedly in a panel to form a
derivative dependent variable ∂Y/∂X. Specifically, by considering individuals
whose Xk,2 is close to their Xk,1 we construct a sample counterpart to the
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limiting process when taking derivatives. A complication arises because we
have to correct for the transitory error Uk,t. This is done by considering people
who have exactly Xk,2 = Xk,1 = x for every x ∈ X (or, in the sample, almost
exactly), because for these individual all changes in Yk,t can be attributed to
changes in Uk,t. In the sample, we thus use the difference between people who
are at or very near the diagonal from those who are near, but not quite as near,
to the diagonal. The difference in the distribution of Yk,t is then due to the
(heterogeneous) causal marginal effect of Xk,t. This effect depends, obviously,
in general on the position Xk,2 = Xk,1 = x we consider; by letting the position
x vary, we obtain an arbitrary nonlinear relationship. Fig. 1 illustrates the
population used in the sample. Finally, that this works only near the diagonal
(i.e., only for the stayers) is due to the fact that higher order terms in the
derivative approximation only disappear in this neighborhood.
Figure 2.1: The shaded region is the region we will use, which is more than h1
away from where X1 = X2 but less than h2 away from where X1 = X2.
The baseline specification allows us to identify the marginal distribution
of every marginal effect needing only two time periods. However, its driving
force is the time invariance of the unobservable as well as the structural func-
tion. With more time periods, we may relax this assumption and allow for the
structural relationship to change over time under restrictions on the way time
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enters which may be weakened as T becomes large. Several other extensions
are briefly discussed in this paper: The approach can be augmented to allow
for discrete covariates; however, the effect of interest has to be on a continuous
variable. More generally, we may control for additional covariates through a
semiparametric specification. Finally, we conjecture that the approach can be
extended to a discrete dependent variable if one exogenous regressor with large
support is available, similar to Honoré and Lewbel (2002).
When it comes to estimation, we follow a semiparametric route. That is,
we assume that the distribution of marginal effects follows a known parametric
distribution governed by a finite parameter θ(x) which depends on the posi-
tion X1 = X2 = x at which we evaluate the conditional distribution. As such,
our approach can be described as conditionally parametric. The advantage of
such a procedure is as follows: Since our identification argument and the as-
sociated sample counterparts estimator is based on (conditional) characteristic
functions, we avoid having to invert these estimators to obtain the (conditional)
density. In the sample, this inversion step comes at the cost of having to pick
an additional regularization parameter. Moreover, since one of the main objec-
tives of our approach is to get an estimator for the quantiles of marginal effects
as well, we avoid having to add another cumbersome inversion. Instead, the
conditional parametric approach obtains all of these quantities: the conditional
characteristic function, density, as well as the quantiles in one convenient step.
Moreover, the characteristic function need not be observed for every value of
the argument (s, say).
The core principle employed in our estimator is a minimum contrast step.
We first form the sample counterpart to the identified nonparametric character-
istic function for every value of X1 = X2 = x, and then pick the the parameter
θ(x) that minimizes the contrast (distance) between the approximating para-
metric specification and this object. For this estimator, we establish the (op-
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timal) minimax rate, and establish that our estimator achieves this rate. The
rate is governed by the dimensionality of X and the fact that we work with the
set X1 = X2 = x. If there is no Uk,t and X is scalar, the rate is equivalent to
a two dimensional nonparametric regression. Having, in addition, a Uk,t that
follows an ordinary smooth distribution slows the convergence rate down by
the expected factor, α, due to the added deconvolution step in removing the
influence of Uk,t.
Importantly, this paper contains an application to consumer demand for
junk food. Because of the relationship to obesity and other adverse health
effects, this is a question of obvious importance for the society (see also the
short literature review in the applied section). A key concern is that “poor”
households - which we define to be households with low total expenditure for
goods that Nielsen scanner data tracks - spend marginally more on junk food
than wealthy, high income households. This means that a model that forces all
households to have the same “income” and price elasticities, i.e., a linear ran-
dom coefficients model, is not able to capture this important feature. Similarly,
we want to control for unobserved factors that are correlated with poverty, e.g.,
education levels, in particular regarding nutrition, and hence it is imperative
to allow for the unobservables to be correlated. Therefore, we feel that our
approach, which allows for nonlinearities, high dimensional heterogeneity, and
complicated correlation patterns, is particularly well suited for this application.
When applying our approach to the Nielsen Homescan data, we indeed find
evidence of the aforementioned nonlinearities. Indeed, for every dollar spent
on Nielsen products, poor households seem to consume twice as much junk
food on average compared to wealthy households, even implicitly controlling
for persistent correlated effects like education. Moreover, there also seems to
be more heterogeneity within poor households (compared to wealthy ones),
perhaps a function of the larger degree of addiction to an unhealthy lifestyle of
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at least parts of this subpopulation. It is interesting to muse about the reason
for the significant correlation between expenditure levels and marginal effects,
even after controlling for fixed factors. We also find very reasonable price
elasticities that increase in the own price. Since we use a bundle of goods and
Stone-Lewbel prices, we feel that this reflects heterogeneity in the composition
of junk food. The more high level it is, the higher the price and the more elastic
demand. More details can be found in the section on the application below.
Related Literature: Analyzing nonlinear panel data models has a long
tradition, dating back to the conditional ML approach by Rasch (1961); see
also Andersen (1970), Chamberlain (1982) and Chamberlain (1984) for models
with non-additive individual heterogeneity. Nonlinear parametric panel data
models have frequently been analyzed. For an overview of work related to
discrete choice models, see Arellano (2003). Closely related to our work is
that of Graham and Powell (2012), and Arellano and Bonhomme (2012), who
consider estimation of moments and the distribution of random coefficients in a
linear correlated coefficient panel data model. Compared to this line of work, we
allow for the structural model to be arbitrarily nonlinear. Chamberlain (2010)
discusses the identification of the dynamic panel data binary choice model, and
why the logistic distribution assumption is required for identification of βo,
unless one is willing to assume unbounded support for one of the regressors,
as is the case in Manski (1987). For other nonlinear fixed effects models, see
also Hausman et al. (1984) for panel count data and Honoré (1992) for panel
censored regression. Like all of this work, our approach assumes a fixed number
of time periods. Indeed, it is one of the appealing features of our approach that
we only require T = 2.
All of the work just described is concerned with a specific semiparametric
model, e.g., the dynamic binary choice model. Approaches that are closer in
spirit to our work are those of Chernozhukov et al. (2009), who consider discrete
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variation, whereas we consider derivatives, and Graham and Powell (2012), who
focus on a linear heterogeneous population (i.e., the structure is linear in the
coefficients, with coefficients that vary across the population) and not on a fully
nonseparable structure. Other than the differences mentioned above, Graham
and Powell (2012) also require (at least) as many time periods as regressors
plus one, while we require only two time periods, even with a large number of
regressors. Less closely related is the work on the correlated random coefficients
models in panel data, see in particular Wooldridge (2005) and Murtazashvili
and Wooldridge (2008). This line of work studies the linear random coefficients
model as well, but imposes restriction on the correlation between time invariant
individual specific effects and covariates of interest. In contrast, our approach
allows for unobserved heterogeneity to enter nonlinearly and does not limit its
correlation with the covariates of interest.
Finally, related is also the literature on nonseparable models using panel
data, in particular Altonji and Matzkin (2005), Evdokimov (2010), Hoderlein
and White (2012) and Chernozhukov et al. (2015). Unlike our paper, Altonji
and Matzkin (2005) impose constraints on the correlation between Ak and the
Xk,t process, but are more general in the structural function φ in that they
allow interaction between the transitory error Uk,t and the other variables, and
focus on averages. Evdokimov (2010) also imposes additivity of the error Uk,t,
but assumes that Ak is a scalar and independent of Xk,t. Hoderlein and White
(2012) and Chernozhukov et al. (2015) again admit a more general structural
function φ (as in Altonji and Matzkin (2005)), but are only able to identify
averages of the marginal effects, even though Chernozhukov et al. (2015) use
distributional information. Instead, in this paper we use a deconvolution step to
purge the model from the influence of Uk,t. This also allows to impose different,
and arguably weaker, assumptions on the Uk,t.process. In particular, we do not
require the stationarity assumption in their papers (Manski, 1987).
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Outline of the Paper: Section 2 introduces the model and the precise
assumptions we require. In Section 3, we present the general non-identification
result for arbitrary values x2 6= x1, which motivates our focus on the set of
stayers. Section 4 then presents the main constructive nonparametric identi-
fication result and discusses extensions. Section 5 establishes the asymptotic
lower bound for any estimator under this scenario. In Section 6, we introduce
our conditional parametric estimator and the modeling assumptions, establish
an upper bound under these conditions, and show that our estimator achieves
the minimax rate. Section 7 analyzes the finite-sample performance of our es-
timators using several example of nonlinear heterogeneous DGPs. Section 8
discusses the application to consumer demand for junk food. The final section
contains a summary and concluding remarks.
2.2 The Model: Basic Structure and Main Assumptions
We consider the panel data model
Yk,t = Φ(Xk,t, Ak) + Uk,t , k = 1, . . . , n; , t = 1, . . . , T , (2.2.1)
where allXk,t and Yk,t are observed. Therein, the random vectors (Xk,t, Ak, Uk,t)t=1,...,T
are i.i.d. (i.e. independent copies) for all k = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, when ad-
dressing identification issues, we omit the index k in the notation of all random
variables. We impose the following assumptions:
(A.2.1) The random vectors U := (U1, . . . , UT ) and (A,X1, . . . , XT ) are indepen-
dent.
This assumption is similar in spirit to the strict exogeneity assumptions
commonly invoked in the panel data literature. It could be weakened, as is
obvious from the proof. In particular, for T = 2 and using the notation ∆S =
S1 − S2 for any random variable S, we only need that ∆U independent of
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∆X,A|X1. However, since we use this stronger version in the construction of
the estimator, we impose it henceforth.
(A.2.2) The random vector X := (X1, . . . , XT ) has a T -dimensional Lebesgue
density.






given X. From a famous result in probability theory (e.g. p. 439, Theorem 33.3,
Billingsley (1995)), we learn that there exists a function ζj from the domain RT




(B) = P [Zj ∈ B | X] , a.s. ,
for all elements B of the Borel σ-field B(R). This equation, however, does
not determine the value of the mapping ζj at any fixed x ∈ RT . In particular,
the value of ζj at one singular x ∈ RT can be changed without switching to
an observationally non-equivalent model due to condition (A2). As a conse-
quence, identification and estimation of ζj(x), for any specific value x ∈ RT , is
impossible unless continuity conditions are assumed such as
(A.2.3) There exists a function ζj on the domain RT to the set of all probability
measures on B(R) which is continuous with respect to the Fourier distance




(B) = P [Zj ∈ B | X] , a.s. ,
for all B ∈ B(R).1
1Here, the Fourier distance between two probability measures P and Q on B(R) is defined
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Condition (A.2.3) resembles the usual constraints in the setting of standard
nonparametric regression where the regression function is required to be con-
tinuous under continuously distributed covariates in order to attain pointwise
consistency at a fixed site. The following lemma shows that ζj(x) is uniquely
determined for each x in the support of X.
Lemma 2.2.1. Assume two functions ζj and ζ̃j which satisfy the continuity








(B) a.s., ∀B ∈ B(R) .
Then the restrictions of ζj and ζ̃j to the support SX of X coincide.
2.3 Non-Identification
Now we focus on the question for which elements x of SX the probability mea-
sure ζj(x) can be identified from the observed data (Xt, Yt), t = 1, . . . , T , under
the Assumptions (A.2.1)–(A.2.3). Using the notation p(x) := (1, x1, . . . , xT )†
and q(x) := (0, 1, 2x, . . . , TxT−1)†, we provide the following useful tool.
Lemma 2.3.1. The vectors p(x1), . . . , p(xT ), q(xj), for any j ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are
linearly independent if and only if all x1, . . . , xT differ from each other.
By H(x), x = (x1, . . . , xT ), we denote the linear hull of p(x1), . . . , p(xT ). The




∣∣P ft(s)−Qft(s)∣∣ , (2.2.2)
where P ft(s) :=
∫
exp(isx)dP (x) denotes the Fourier transform of P . Note that the total




dominates the Fourier distance F(P,Q). The set of all probability measures on B(R),
equipped with the Fourier distance F , forms a complete metric space thanks to the com-
pleteness of the space C0(R) and Lévy’s continuity theorem (e.g. Williams, 1991, section
18.1).
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Lemma 2.3.2. The function τj is continuous and takes on only strictly positive
values on the set TX :=
⋂
k 6=l{x ∈ RT : xk 6= xl}.
In order to prove a non-identification result, we may, in addition, assume
that the function Φ and the distribution of the random vector U, as well as the






Let q∗j (x) denote the orthogonal projection of q(xj) onto the orthogonal
complement of H(x) with respect to RT+1 as this notation has already been
used in the proof of Lemma 2.3.2. This lemma also yields q∗j (x) 6= 0 for all
x ∈ TX since |q∗j |2 = τj. Then we are ready to define the random variables
A[b] := A[0] +
√
b δ q∗j (X) , b ≥ 0 , (2.3.2)
where the random variable δ is standard normal; A[0] is an arbitrary (T + 1)-
dimensional random vector; and (X,A[0]) and δ are independent. Then
L[b](A | X) = L(A[b] | X) , b ≥ 0 ,
denote competing candidates for the conditional distribution of A given X.
The conditional characteristic function of V :=
(
Φ(X1, A), . . . ,Φ(XT , A)
)
given X equals








































for all t ∈ RT whenever (2.3.1) holds true. Hence, for the candidates L[b](A | X),
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b ≥ 0, it holds that
ψ
[b]



















for all t ∈ RT and b ≥ 0 so that the conditional distributions L[b](V | X)
coincide almost surely for all b ≥ 0. Therefore, the distribution of the observed
data (X, Y ) with Y := (Y1, . . . , YT ), are identical for all candidates (b ≥ 0)
thanks to the independence of U and (A,X). Therefore one is unable to decide
what is the value of b based on the distribution of the observations.










q(xj) | X = x
)
∗ N(0, bτ 2j (x)) , (2.3.3)
where ∗ denotes convolution. Consider N(0, 0) as the Dirac measure which is
















, s ∈ R . (2.3.4)
We impose the Assumption
(A.2.4) The random vector A[0] has a conditional Lebesgue density fA[0]|X=x given





L(A[0] | X = x),L(A[0] | X = y)
)
= 0 , ∀x ∈ RT .
In Assumption (A.2.4), we have extended the definition of the Fourier dis-
tance in (2.2.2) to probability measures on B(RT+1) in a natural way by the
supremum norm distance of the Fourier transforms of both measures. Note
that Assumption (A.2.4) is satisfied in particular if A[0] has a Lebesgue density
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and A[0] and X are independent, which is related to the scenario considered
in Evdokimov (2010). The following lemma verifies Assumption (A.2.3) in our
setting.
Lemma 2.3.3. The functions ζ
[b]
j in (2.3.3) are continuous for any b ≥ 0 with
respect to the Fourier distance on the codomain under the Assumption (A.2.4).
Furthermore Lemma 2.3.2 and the equation (2.3.3) yield that, for all b 6=
b′ > 0, the probability measures ζ
[b]
j (x) and ζ
[b′]
j (x) are different from each other
for all x ∈ SX ∩ TX where we use the following result.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let Q be an arbitrary probability measure on B(R). Then the
equality Q ∗ N(0, α) = Q ∗ N(0, α′) implies α = α′ for all α, α′ ∈ [0,∞).
Thus, we have established the following theorem about non-identification
of ζj(x), for all x ∈ SX ∩ TX , i.e., values of x for which x1 6= x2, in the model
(2.2.1).
Theorem 2.1. In the model (2.2.1), fix some j = 1, . . . , T ; select the function
Φ as in (2.3.1); and grant the Assumptions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2). Set the random
variable A equal to A[b] in (2.3.2) where the choice of A[0] is only restricted by
Assumption (A.2.4). Then the corresponding distributions of the observations
(X, Y ) coincide for all b ≥ 0 while Assumption (A.2.3) is satisfied for all b ≥ 0;
and ζ
[b]
j (x) 6= ζ
[b′]
j (x) holds true for all b 6= b′ and x ∈ SX ∩ TX .
2.4 Identification
Now assume that T = 2 and j = 1. According to Theorem 2.1, the function ζ(x)
cannot be identified from the data distribution unless we restrict to x ∈ SX\TX ,
which equals {(x1, x2) ∈ SX : x1 = x2}. Moreover we impose
(A.2.5) There exists some ρ > 0 such that the density fX of X = (X1, X2) is
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continuous and strictly positive on the strip
S(ρ)X := {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : |x1 − x2| ≤ ρ} .
Under Assumption (A.2.5) it holds that SX\TX is a subset of S(ρ)X . The
smoothness condition (A.2.4) is quantified via the Assumption








∣∣∣ ∣∣∣X1, X2) ≤ cΦ a.s.,






≤ cζ |x− y| , ∀x, y ∈ S(ρ)X ,
for some constant cζ ∈ (0,∞).
We introduce the notation
∆Y := Y1 − Y2 = ∆Φ + ∆U ,
∆Φ := Φ(X1, A)− Φ(X2, A) ,
∆U := U1 − U2 ,
∆X := X1 −X2 . (2.4.1)
The Assumption saying that
(A.2.1’) the random variables ∆Φ and ∆U are conditionally independent given
X; and ∆U and X are independent,
is weaker than the Assumption (A.2.1) and suffices to show that the corre-
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sponding conditional characteristic functions satisfy
ψ∆Y |X = ψ∆Φ|X · ψ∆U , a.s. . (2.4.2)
In fact, as mentioned before and as is obvious from what follows, this assump-
tion could even be weakened further, but since we implement our estimator
with this stronger assumption we desist from doing so. For some h0 ∈ (0, ρ) let
us consider the term













for any s ∈ R, which is directly accessible from the distribution of the obser-




> 0 is guaranteed for any
h0 ∈ (0, ρ) by Assumption (A.2.5); and that we have used (2.4.2). By Assump-
tion (A.2.6) it holds that
∣∣Eψ∆Φ|X(s) · 1S(h0)X (X) − P [X ∈ S(h0)X ]∣∣ ≤ cΦ |s|E|∆X| · 1S(h0)X (X)





so that ∣∣TU(h0, s)− ψ∆U(s)∣∣ ≤ cΦ |s| |ψ∆U(s)|h0 ,
and, thus, limh0↓0 TU(h0, s) = ψ∆U(s) for any s ∈ R. Therefore ψ∆U and,
hence, the distribution of ∆U are identified from the distribution of (X, Y ).














(Xk,1, Xk,2) , (2.4.4)
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based on the moment method, for some h0 ∈ (0, ρ) still to be selected. By
convention put ψ̂
(h0)
∆U (s) equal to 0 if the denominator in (2.4.4) vanishes.




X for some ρ > h2 > h1 > 0, we consider the
term
TZ := TZ(x, h1, h2, h3, s) := Eψ∆U(−s/∆X) exp(is∆Y/∆X)1S(h1,h2)X (X)1[0,h3](|X1 − x|)
/E
∣∣ψ∆U(s/∆X)∣∣21S(h1,h2)X (X)1[0,h3](|X1 − x|)
= E
∣∣ψ∆U(s/∆X)∣∣2ψ∆Φ|X(s/∆X)1S(h1,h2)X (X)1[0,h3](|X1 − x|)
/E
∣∣ψ∆U(s/∆X)∣∣21S(h1,h2)X (X)1[0,h3](|X1 − x1|) ,
for some h3 > 0 and any fixed x = (x1, x2) with x1 = x2, which is directly acces-
sible from the distribution of (X, Y ) as ψ∆U has already been identified. Again
we have used (2.4.2). Combining Assumption (A.2.5) with the Assumption
(A.2.7) The characteristic function ψ∆U does not vanish,
we may ensure that the denominator of the term TZ does not vanish. Assump-
tion (A.2.6) and Taylor approximation yield that
∆Φ = Z1 ·∆X + R , (2.4.5)









∩ {|X1 − x1| ≤ h3}, we
have that
∣∣ψ∆Φ|X(s/∆X)− {ζ1(x)}ft(s)∣∣ ≤ (cΦ|s|/2)h2 + cζ (2h3 + h2) ,
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using Assumption (A.2.6) so that
lim
h2↓0
TZ(x, h1, h2, h3, s) = {ζ1(x)}ft(s) ,
for all s ∈ R where we arrange that h1 = h2/2 and h3 = h2 to calculate the
limit. Note that x ∈
⋂
h2>0
S(h2/2,h2)X . Therefore ζ1(x) is identified. Moreover



















∣∣ψ̂(h0)∆U (s/∆Xk)∣∣2 · 1S(h1,h2)X (Xk,1, Xk,2) ·K(|Xk,1 − x1|/h3)} ,
(2.4.6)
for some 0 < h0 < h1 < h2 < ρ, h3 > 0, some kernel function K and some ridge
parameter ρn > 0 in order to prevent the denominator from getting too close
to zero. This approach to heteroskedastic deconvolution is inspired by Delaigle
and Meister (2007); Delaigle et al. (2008).
Before studying the estimator (2.4.6) let us summarize the identification
result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Under the Assumptions (A.2.1’), (A.2.2), (A.2.3) and (A.2.5)–
(A.2.7), ζ1(x) is identified in the model (2.2.1) for any x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2 with
x1 = x2 from the distribution of the observations (X, Y ).
Remark. The model (2.2.1) may be generalized to the setting of multiple
regressors, i.e. one observes the i.i.d. data (Xk,t, X
′
k,t, Yk,t), k = 1, . . . , n, t =
1, 2, where
Yk,t = Φ(Xk,t, X
′
k,t, Ak) + Uk,t .
90




(x, x′, A) |x=Xj ,x′=X′j ,





four dimensional Lebesgue density, which is continuous and strictly positive.
Also impose additional Lipschitz conditions on ζ1 and its partial derivatives
with respect to the bivariate component (x, x′) in Assumption (A.2.6). Then
Theorem 2.2 can be extended to identify ζ1(x, x









2. For any unitary matrix U define
Φ̃(x, y, a) := Φ(UT (x, y)T , a) .




















2 based on the data Zj and (Wj,W
′
j)




for j = 1, 2. That opens the perspective to identify any directional derivative





′ and, hence, the gradient of Φ under
appropriate smoothness conditions on Φ and ζ1.
Remark. If there are more time periods, it is also possible to allow for a
time trend. Specifically, we allow for a linear time trend which modifies the
structural function φ by adding the same the structural function in each time
period. More formally, the model takes the form
Yk,t = Φ0 (Xk,t, Ak)+Φ1 (Xk,t, Ak) t+Ukt, t = 1, . . . , T, k = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.7)
where Φ0 and Φ1 satisfy analogous conditions to before. To identify this model,
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we require T = 4. Since
Y1,2 − Y1,1 = U1,2 − U1,1 + Φ1(X1,1, A1) ,
Y1,4 − Y1,3 = U1,4 − U1,3 + Φ1(X1,3, A1) ,
holds on the event {X1,1 = X1,2, X1,3 = X1,4} we are able to identify the con-
ditional distribution of ∂xΦ1(x,A) |x=X1,1 given X1,1 = x at x = λ · (1, 1, 1, 1),
λ ∈ R, by the arguments from section 2.4 under the given assumptions. More-
over
2Y1,1 − Y1,2 = 2U1,1 − U1,2 + Φ0(X1,1, A1) ,
4Y1,3 − 3Y1,4 = 4U1,3 − 3U1,4 + Φ0(X1,3, A1) ,
holds on {X1,1 = X1,2, X1,3 = X1,4} again so that the conditional distribution
of ∂xΦ0(x,A) |x=X1,1 given X1,1 = x at x = λ · (1, 1, 1, 1), λ ∈ R, is identified as
well. Note that continuity conditions analogous to Assumption (A.2.6) have to
be imposed on both Φ0 and Φ1.
Remark. Our framework may be extended to allow for additional covariates,
denoted in the following by St. The main motivation to do so stems typically
from the objective to simply control for these variables; their influence is typi-
cally of lesser interest. Due to the curse of dimensionality, it is impractical to
let them enter in an unrestricted fashion. Hence we propose a partially linear
structure, i.e.,
Yk,t = Φ (Xk,t, Ak) + γ
′Sk,t + Ukt, t = 1, . . . , T, k = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.8)
where γ ∈ Rdim(St) is a fixed parameter. Constructive identification of γ is
straightforwardly established by noting that, conditional on Xk,1 = Xk,2 = x,
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this equation is
Yk,t = Ãk + γ
′Sk,t + Ukt, t = 1, . . . , T, k = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.9)
where Ãk = Φ (x,Ak) is a classical, time invariant, additive “fixed effect”. This
implies that, for every value of x, we obtain a classical linear fixed effect model.
Since the coefficient γ is invariant over x, we can then average out over x. A
sample counterpart estimator to this identification argument would produce an
estimator that converges at the dim(X) nonparametric regression rate (because
we have to impose that Xk,1 = Xk,2).
Finally, after forming Yk,t − γ′Sk,t, the further analysis can proceed exactly as
outlined above.
2.5 Asymptotic Lower Bound
In this section, we investigate the limits for the asymptotic performance of an
arbitrary estimator under the conditions of Theorem 2.2. For that purpose we








where the random vector B remains to be specified. Under given X = (X1, X2),
observing
Y1 + Y2 = U1 + U2 ,
∆Y/∆X = B + ∆U/∆X , (2.5.2)
is equivalent with the observation of the data (Y1, Y2), i.e. the random variable
(Y1, Y2) can be uniquely reconstructed from (2.5.2) and vice versa. Then ζ1(x),
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at any x = (x1, x2) with x1 = x2, equals the conditional distribution of B given
X = x. With respect to the random vector U we impose Assumption (A.2.1)
and
(A.2.8) U = (U1, U2) has the bivariate Lebesgue density
(s, t) 7→ 2f∆U(s− t)f∆U(s+ t) ,
where the Fourier transform of the univariate density f∆U satisfies
0 < cU,1 ≤ (1 + |t|α) ·
∣∣ψ∆U(t)∣∣ ≤ cU,2 < ∞ , ∀t ∈ R ,
for some constants α > 0 and cU,1 < cU,2. Moreover ψ∆U is twice contin-
uously differentiable and its derivatives satisfy
sup
t
(1 + |t|α+`) ·
∣∣ψ(`)∆U(t)∣∣ ≤ cU,3 ,
for another constant cU,3 > 0 and ` = 1, 2.
Under the Assumption (A.2.8), f∆U is an ordinary smooth density in the ter-
minology of Fan (1991). Moreover (A.2.8) yields that U1 + U2 and ∆U are
independent and that ∆U has the density f∆U . Considering (2.5.2), it follows
that
(Xj,t,∆Yj/∆Xj), j = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, 2 , (2.5.3)
forms a sufficient statistic for ζ1(x) in the model in which the data (Xj,t, Yj,t),
j = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, 2, are observed. Therefore we may focus on that experiment
in which only the i.i.d. sample (2.5.3) is available.
Let us now determine the conditional distribution of B given X. Define
f0(x) := c · {1− cos(x)}2/x4 , x ∈ R ,
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· (1+ |t|)−4 + 1
2






, ∀t ∈ R ,
(2.5.4)
for any θ ∈ [0, 1], as the competing conditional densities of B given X. Therein
K denotes some continuously differentiable kernel function which is supported
on [−1, 1], bounded by 1 and satisfies K(0) = 1. As f ft0 is supported on
[−2, 2] the function f [θ]B|X is a probability density indeed. Moreover we put
f
[0]
B|X(t) := 3(1 + |t|)−4/4 + f0(t)/2.
With respect to the design distribution we modify Assumption (A.2.5) via
(A.2.5’) There exists some ρ > 0 such that the density fX of X = (X1, X2) is
continuous and strictly positive on the ball around x = (x1, x1) with the
radius ρ. Moreover fX is compactly supported.
We provide the following lower bound on the convergence rates for the estima-
tion of the parameter θ in the model (2.5.4).
Theorem 2.3. We impose that Φ has the polynomial shape (2.3.1) with T = 2;
that A and B obey (2.5.1) and (2.5.4), respectively; and that the Assumptions
(A.2.1), (A.2.2), (A.2.5’) and (A.2.8) hold true. Then Assumption (A.2.6) is
satisfied for appropriate finite constants cΦ and cζ. For an arbitrary sequence
of estimators (θ̂n)n, where θn is based on the i.i.d. data (Xj,t, Yj,t), j = 1, . . . , n,









|θ̂n − θ|2 > d2 · n−1/(2+α)
]
> 0 .
2.6 A Conditional Parametric Estimator
In this section, our goal is to construct a parametric estimator of ζ1(x) which
attains the convergence rates outlined in Theorem 2.3. The parametric nature
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of the estimation problem is represented by the following assumption
(A.2.9) For some fixed x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2 with x1 = x2, there exists a parametriza-
tion
θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd, θ 7→ ζ1(θ;x) ,








/|θ′ − θ| ≥ cp > 0 ,
holds true for some fixed R ∈ (0,∞).






The specific parametrization in (2.5.4), which has been used to prove the lower





f 20 (t)dt .





∣∣ψ̂(h0,h1,h2,h3)Z1 (x; s)− {ζ1(θ̃;x)}ft(s)∣∣2ds ,
among all θ̃ ∈ Θ where ψ̂(h0,h1,h2,h3)Z1 is as in (2.4.6) and h0, h1, h2 and h3 remain
to be selected.
The following theorem provides an upper bound on the estimation error of
our estimator θ̂ under appropriate selection of the smoothing parameters. For
simplicity we restrict to the uniform kernel K.
96
Theorem 2.4. We consider the model (2.2.1) for T = 2 under the Assumptions
(A.2.1’), (A.2.2), (A.2.5’), (A.2.6), (A.2.8) and (A.2.9). The distribution of
(X1, X2) and the constants in the assumptions are imposed to be fixed while Φ,
θ and the distributions of A and (U1, U2) may move in n and d. Then, our
estimator θ̂ of θ satisfies
∣∣θ̂ − θ∣∣2 = OP (n−1/(2+α)) ,
under the selection K = 1[0,1], ρn  1, h2 = 2h1, h3  h1, h0  h21, h1 
n−1/(4+2α).
Combining Theorem 2.3 and 2.4, it follows that our estimator θ̂ achieves the
optimal minimax convergence rate. It is remarkable that, in spite of the para-
metric nature of the estimation problem, the usual square-root-asymptotics
are not attainable by any estimator. In the error-free case (i.e. α = 0), the
convergence rate is OP (n−1/4) with respect to the non-squared estimation error.
Critically we mention that the asymptotic order of h1 in Theorem 2.4 de-
pends on the parameter α from Assumption (A.2.8), which is usually unknown.
Therefore we propose a data-driven choice of h1 (and h0, h2, h3 according to
Theorem 2.4) by splitting the sample. Precisely the estimator θ̂ is only based on
bqnc of the complete sample for some constant q ∈ (0, 1). All other observations




∣∣ψ̂(h4)∆U (sn)∣∣) / log sn ,
with some deterministic positive parameters h4 and sn > 1 and the estimator




The following result suffices to show that the asymptotic upper bound from
Theorem 2.4 is maintained when using the split-of-the-sample estimator with
the plug-in selector ĥ1 for h1. Nevertheless a rough upper on α is required to
be known in order to select the parameter γ in Theorem 2.5.
Theorem 2.5. We impose the conditions of Theorem 2.4; and we choose K =
1[0,1], sn = n
γ for some γ ∈ (0, 1/(1 + 2α)); and h4 = 1/sn. Then there exist





n1/(4+2α) · ĥ1 ∈ [b0, b1]
)
= 1 .
Remark. Note that we estimate the parameter α under general nonparametric
constraints (see Assumption (A.2.8)), leading to the empirical bandwidth ĥ1 in
(2.6.1). If more restrictive parametric assumptions are imposed on the distri-
bution of ∆U then the parameter α could also be estimated e.g. by maximum
likelihood methods.
2.7 Simulation
For an illustration of the estimator in the univariate case, remember the panel
data model in (2.2.1). Within this class of models, we constructed two leading
specifications: a second and a third-order polynomial in the sole regressor Xk,t.
Yk,t = Φ (Xk,t, Ak) + Uk,t where:
Φ (Xk,t, Ak) = A0,k + A1,kXk,t + A2,kX
2
k,t Quadratic 1D Model




k,t Cubic 1D Model
where, for all k = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T :
• Aj,k ∼ N (0, .5) ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
• Xk,t ∼ .5 + ex ex ∼ N (0, .5)
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• Uk,t ∼ ev ev ∼ Laplace(0, .1)
Since this is a univariate case, we can simply nonparametrically estimate the
distribution of the conditional characteristic functions by using our estimator
from Equation (2.4.6).
We select a proper α to optimize our results, and determine the bandwidths
in the following way: h1 = n
−1/(4+α), h2 = 2h1, h3 = h1, h0 = h
2
1, as suggested
by Theorem 2.4. While these are the asymptotically most efficient bandwidths,
there may be better bandwidths in practical application. The restrictions that
the bandwidths must obey imply that 0 < h1 < h2 < ρ and h3 > 0.
We will compute the values of µ and σ to minimize the Euclidean distance
between φ̂Z(s, x) and the characteristic normal distribution.
φ∆Z(s, x) = exp(iµs− σ2s2/2)
2.7.1 Results in the Baseline Specification









(x,A)|x=Xk,t = A1,k + 2A2,kXk,t + 3A23,kX2k,t Cubic 1D Model
To display the true model, we use an oracle kernel density estimator that uses
the (in the real world unobserved) values of Zk.t. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the
results comparing our estimator to the true distribution estimated by such an
oracle kernel density estimator.
Start out by considering Figure 2.2: The blue line in the left two graphs
corresponds to the true mean, resp., standard deviation, of the conditional
marginal effects. The left two graphs display moreover the estimated condi-
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tional means, resp. standard deviations, for each value of x, and the corre-
sponding estimation uncertainty as given by bootstrap 95% confidence bands.
As is evident, the estimated means track the true values very closely, while
the standard deviations perform (expectedly) worse, yet still deliver a quite
satisfactory fit.
On the right are two contour graphs showing first a contour plot of the
true conditional density of the marginal treatment effects along with the condi-
tional means, as estimated using again an oracle kernel density estimator, and
secondly an estimate of the conditional densities estimated using our method.
As before, our estimator for the density of marginal effects matches the true
distribution of the marginal effect very closely.
Figure 2.2: Estimates of quadratic 1D model using: α = 2 and N = 10,000.The
black line is our estimate. The dotted lines are our 95% confidence bands
estimated with 100 bootstraps. The blue line is the true means and standard
deviation we are trying to estimate.
Figure 2.3 then repeats the exercise for the cubic model and obtains similar,
if slightly worse, performance, which is to expected given the slightly more
complex model.
We also include an estimate of the quantiles of marginal effects in Figure 2.4,
using our approach. This is done by inferring the quantiles from the conditional
normal density, for which we have estimates of µ and σ for each value of X.
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Figure 2.3: Estimates of cubic 1D model using: α = 2 and N = 10,000. The
dotted lines are our 95% confidence bands estimated with 100 bootstraps. The
blue line is the true means and standard deviation we are trying to estimate.
Figure 2.4: Estimates of Quantile Effects.
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Note that these are conditional densities of marginal effects, so the most
dense regions are on the boundaries where the standard deviation is the lowest,
even though most of the data are near the mean of X. We can also estimate
the joint densities of Z := ∂Φ
∂x
(x,A) and X, by multiplying our estimate of the
conditional density with the density of X, f(x). We estimate the density of
X using a kernel density estimation function. The resulting joint densities are
displayed in Figure 2.5 below:
Figure 2.5: Estimates of joint distribution of the quadratic 1D model on the
left and of the cubic 1D model on the right using the same parameters as above.
2.7.2 A Violation of Conditional Normality: Skewed Distribution
of Effects
Next, in order to evaluate the robustness of our estimation procedure, we study
the performance of our estimator in a simulation scenario which violates the
conditional parametric assumption imposed for semiparametric estimation. We
will assume that A comes from a mixed normal distribution.
• Aj,k ∼ 0.5 · N (0.7, 0.2) + 0.5 · N (−0.25, 0.1) ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
This function is skewed to the right, i.e., it will not exhibit symmetrical
marginal effects. The results for both the cubic case and quadratic case are
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included below. In Figures 2.6 and 2.7, we see that our estimates of the means
are still quite accurate. However, our estimates for the standard deviation are
slightly too high, since the estimated density exhibits a wider spread because
of the skewed density of marginal effects.
Figure 2.6: Estimates of quadratic 1D model using: α = 2 and N = 10,000.The
black line is our estimate. The dotted lines are our 95% confidence bands
estimated with 100 bootstraps. The blue line is the true means and standard
deviation we are trying to estimate.
Moreover, the joint and conditional estimated densities (see Figures 2.6,
2.7, and 2.8) do a reasonable job in capturing the general orientation of effects,
but are unsurprisingly not fully able to capture the true model perfectly, as
we (wrongly) impose normality of the conditional distribution. Note, however,
that estimated conditional means are quite close to the true results, and the
overall performance appears to be reasonably robust against violations of the
parametric specification.
2.8 Empirical Application
In this section, we study the performance of our estimation procedure using
real world data. We consider the estimation of the distribution of marginal
effects of every additional dollar on the consumption of junk food. Because
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Figure 2.7: Estimates of cubic 1D model using: α = 2 and N = 10,000. The
dotted lines are our 95% confidence bands estimated with 100 bootstraps. The
blue line is the true means and standard deviation we are trying to estimate.
Figure 2.8: Estimates of joint distribution of the quadratic 1D model on the
left and of the cubic 1D model on the right using the same parameters as above.
104
of the implied health consequences, as outlined below this question is highly
policy relevant. In addition, our model is very well suited to capture differences
in these marginal effects between wealthy and poor households, which are not
captured at all by linear random coefficients models. This ability to exhibit
differences for different wealth and income levels is crucial for the policy debate,
as it is widely believed that excessive consumption of junk food is particularly
prevalent at the lower end of the income distribution. As such, we hope that
our estimator is able to inform this policy debate by providing a more nuanced
picture of the distribution of marginal effects.
We start out with an overview of the data we use in our estimation exercise.
After that, we provide a brief review of the policy debate surrounding junk food
demand, especially with respect to differences in income. We then display our




For our application, we use the Nielsen Scanner Dataset which is available
through the Kilts Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Busi-
ness2. We will focus our study on the year 2014 where there are about 55,000
individuals. This is a helpful dataset for estimating demand behavior since it
contains detailed information based on price and quantity of all retail purchases
as well as detailed household characteristics for all consumers. The data contain
a representative sample of households in the United States who use in-home
scanners to record all of their purchases intended for personal, in-home use.
2Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at
the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do
not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not
involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
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Nielsen matches the product scanned by the household to the actual price of
the store where the product was bought. Nielsen estimates that about 30% of
household consumption is accounted for by these purchases.
We will call this sum over all Nielsen expenditure categories total expen-
diture; under additive separability of the utility function this is the relevant
total outlay variable. The same variable also takes the place in derivations
involving economic rationality - under additive separability, this is the relevant
“income” variable, e.g., to analyze Slutsky negative semidefiniteness. For this
model, we estimate the total outlay (“income”) and own price elasticities and
the marginal effects of an additional unit of total outlay (“income”) on the
demand for junk food. Nielsen aggregates millions of universal product codes
(UPC) into different groups of food.
We define junk food as any food classified as potato chips, candy or car-
bonated beverages by Nielsen. Junk food is a good example in our situation
because these items lie on one extreme of the nutrition-taste trade-off (Blay-
lock et al., 1999). Junk food sacrifices almost all of its nutrition for taste. We
aggregate the data to a monthly level such that period 1 is January 2014 and
period 2 is February 2014. Of course, we could use different months as the time
periods in our dataset as long as these periods exclude the irregular Christmas
shopping period.
Prices are more precisily an aggregate price index called Stone-Lewbel (SL)
cross section prices (see Lewbel (1989) and Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008)).
Generally speaking, SL prices use the fact that within a category of goods
(junk food in our case), people have different tastes for the individual goods.
Using standard aggregate price indices for junk food implicitly assumes that
all individuals have identical Cobb Douglas preferences for all goods within
this category, but SL prices allow all individuals to have heterogeneous Cobb
Douglas preferences for the various commodities in this bundle. This implies
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that the typical approach of using aggregate price indices is a restrictive case of
using SL prices. For this reason, SL prices should always be used when possible.
Total expenditure for all Nielsen goods and all junk food is aggregated each
month as well. In order to get the proper expenditure, we only use households
with two individuals and no children and divide expenditure by two, in order
to estimate average expenditure per consumer. This is justified, as junk food
is arguable a private good, and household composition effects can be expected
to be negligible.
2.8.1.2 Limitations
There are a few concerns with the data. The data rely on participants success-
fully recording their purchases in their home, so they may suffer from recording
error. The specific issue that we might be concerned with is that consumers
may consume a good when it is purchased and will not record the purchase
when they return home. Einav et al. (2010) finds that consumable goods like
soft drinks, chips, or candy are likely to be consumed before getting home so
are more likely to not be scanned. There are also recording errors such as when
a six-pack of goods are purchased and recorded as quantity six. However, these
errors only seem to have minor effects. When compared to data from grocery
store recorded sales, the data in Nielsen Homescan data matched 94% of the
time (Einav et al., 2010).
Another potential source of measurement error is related to the price rather
than the quantity. Individuals record their purchases by scanning the items they
buy when they get home. The individuals input the quantity they purchase,
and Nielsen matches it with the average price of the good at the store where
they purchased it that week. This can lead to two types of errors. The first
comes from the price changing in the middle of the week, though frequent
changes during several weeks are less likely. The second type of error comes
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from not including discounts from loyalty cards. Einav et al. (2010) examines
a retailer used in the Homescan data which has loyalty cards and finds that
loyalty cards are used in about 75-80% of the transactions. Further, this would
bias our prices and expenditure upwards. When comparing Homescan data
with data from the retailer, Einav et al. (2010) finds that the prices used in the
Homescan data is about 7% higher and the overall expenditure is 10% higher.
On the other hand, these price measurement errors may be overestimated since
some retailers do not have loyalty cards at all.
Finally, homescan data errors are comparable to errors found in other com-
monly used data sets. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) finds that life-cycle pattern
of household expenditures recorded in Homescan Data is consistent with those
reported for food expenditures at home in Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). Einav et al. (2010) finds that these issues are not more serious than
those in any other consumption surveys like the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Lin (2018) compares the fraction of expenditures on different categories
of products in the Nielsen Homescan Data and finds the results consistent to
results from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). In sum, we feel that
these potential sources of measurement error may bias our results somewhat,
but are unlikely to invalidate them.
2.8.2 Literature Review
There is a large literature on the determinants, extent and consequences of the
consumption of junk food. As regards determinants, sometimes low-income
propensity to consume unhealthy is attributed to the cost of healthy food (see,
e.g.,Drewnowski and Darmon (2005), Golan et al. (2008), and Drewnowski and
Eichelsdoerfer (2010)). However, Carlson and Frazão (2012) found that junk
food is cheaper on a per-calorie basis than healthier foods like fruits, vegetables,
whole grains and proteins, but that the healthier foods are actually cheaper on
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a per-serving basis. Rider et al. (2012) found that health attributes have been
found to not be associated with higher average transaction prices.
When it comes to extent and possible consequences, obesity is one of the
most important health problems in the United States, as well as many other
countries. Many of the junk foods we consider are high in sugar, and excess
sugar consumption is strongly linked with many diet-related diseases such as
diabetes, cancers and heart disease (World Health Organization, 2015). Obe-
sity leads to several hundred billion dollars spent on medical costs in the US
annually, about 10-27 percent of all medical costs Finkelstein et al. (2009);
Cawley et al. (2015). Thus, consumption of unhealthy food, such as junk food,
can have a major impact on individual well being as well as the economy at
large.
Our estimator allows for a more nuanced picture of the demand patterns
for junk food, and hence enables policy makers to better target policy mea-
sures on subgroups of the population. Obesity and diabetes rates are higher for
low income individuals (Drewnowski and Specter, 2004; Robbins et al., 2001).
Binkley and Golub (2011) and Chen et al. (2012) all found that low-income
households consume less nutritious foods. Allcott et al. (2017) showed that
even when controlling for supply side factors, high-income households have a
greater demand for healthy foods. We add to this literature a more differen-
tiated description of the distribution of marginal effects for individuals with
different incomes, which crucially relies on the added flexibility that our ap-
proach warrants relative to linear random coefficients models, e.g.,Graham and
Powell (2012).
2.8.3 Income Elasticities and Marginal Effects of Income
To begin, as a building block for our model, but also to obtain naive “income”
elasticities, we display the mean budget share of junk food (i.e., the proportion
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Figure 2.9: Nardaya-Watson kernel regression estimator of Budget Share of
Junk Food based on total expenditures
of Nielsen recorded junk food over all Nielsen recorded items) for each house-
hold, ωk,t, as the dependent variable and total log expenditure, Ek,t, as the
right hand variable in the first period (denoted t). Throughout this subsection,
we control for prices by using households whose prices are in a neighborhood
of the median price in period t, denoted p. Thus, the model we estimate is as
follows:
ωk,t = Φ (Ek,t, Ak,t, pt) + Uk,t (2.8.1)
The associated graph is included in Figure 2.9. Note that budget share is
decreasing with total expenditure which strengthens the idea that low-income
households eat more unhealthy food than high-income households. The convex
curve implies that both the marginal effect of income on consumption of junk
food and the income-elasticity of demand of junk food varies across expenditure.
We will use our method to estimate Zj(e, p) =
∂Φ
∂e
e. We then follow standard
arguments from Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton, 1980), and use
equation (2.8.2) estimate to identify and estimate the elasticity of income, εd
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Figure 2.10: Estimates of Elasticity of demand using: α = 6. For this sample,
N = 6, 870
using our estimate of Zj(e, p) from equation (2.8.1).




To utilize this for the estimation of the elasticities, we use ωj(e, p) which, as
mentioned, is estimated using Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression estimator.
This allows us then to estimate the conditional density of income elasticities of
demand for junk food. The means and standard deviations of the coefficients, as
well as the conditional density of marginal effects, are displayed in Figure 2.10.
The pointwise standard errors have been constructed using the naive bootstrap.
Note that the income elasticities of demand decrease with expenditure, and are
clearly significantly non-linear. Thus, given an one percent increase in income,
low-income individuals will increase their junk food consumption by a higher
percentage than high-income individuals.
Note that these are estimates of the conditional density of income elas-
ticities of the demand for junk food conditioned on “income” (as discussed,
actually total Nielsen goods expenditure). We can estimate the joint density
by multiplying this conditional density by the distribution of total expenditure,
111
measured using a kernel density estimation. The result of this procedure can be
seen in Figure 2.11 where we also include estimates of the conditional quantiles
of the distribution of income elasticities and income.
Figure 2.11: Joint distributions are calculated by multiplying the conditional
distribution by the distribution of expenditure.
Furthermore, we can then use the elasticity estimates to estimate the density
of marginal effects of an unit of additional income on the demand for junk food,
















Since we control for own price and keep it constant, we can normalize price
to be equal to one for computational ease. Thus, we can estimate the marginal
effect of an additional dollar on consumption of junk food, ∂q
∂e
. The result of this
analysis is displayed in Figure 2.12, along with the quantile of these marginal
effects. The effects follow the same trend as the income elasticities of demand,
but the difference between low-income individuals and high-income individuals
is more pronounced.
To understand this graph better we show, in Figure 2.13, the estimated
density of marginal effects of income on consumption of junk food for different
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Figure 2.12: Estimates of the marginal effect of an additional dollar of expen-
diture on junk food using: α = 6. For this sample, N = 6, 870
groups based on their income quantile. Specifically, we graph the distribution
of marginal effects for those at the .2, .4, .6 and .8 quantiles of the income
distribution. To illustrate this point, consider the following example. In our
example, low income individuals have income elasticities of about 0.8 and high
income individuals have income elasticities of about 0.5. Consider that low
income budget share of junk food is 0.08 while high income budget share of junk
food is about 0.04. If we plug these values into equation (2.12), for low income




so that the marginal effect is ∂q
∂e
∼= 0.064.
For high income individuals, ∂q
∂e
∼= 0.02. Thus, while the income elasticity of
low income individuals is on average only 50% higher than the elasticity of
high income individuals, the marginal effect of income on quantity of junk food
consumed of poor individuals is more than twice as high compared to their high
income counterparts. In other words, for every dollar they spend on Nielsen
goods, they consume more than twice the quantity of junk food.
Remember that these densities of marginal effects are conditional on total
expenditure (“income”). To estimate the joint density, as before we multiply
the estimate of the conditional density by a kernel density estimate of total
expenditure (“income”). The results for the joint density of marginal effects
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Figure 2.13: Conditional density and different expenditure quantiles of the
estimates of marginal effect.
are found in Figure 2.14, along with the density of marginal effects for those in
the .2, .4, .6 and .8 quantiles of the “income” distribution. As is to be expected,
this reweighting results in the 0.6 quantile of the income distribution to deliver
the density with largest values, rather than the edge case of the 0.8 quantile as
is the case with the conditional densities.
Figure 2.14: Joint distributions are calculated by multiplying the conditional
distribution by the distribution of expenditure
Finally, note that a naive estimator could be based on an estimated deriva-
tive of the budget share graph in Figure 2.9. However, we expect these estimates
to be biased because they do not account for the endogeneity stemming from
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the correlation between the high dimensional unobservables and income. The
results are included below in Figure 2.15, which exhibit significant differences
from our previous estimates.
Figure 2.15: Mean and 95% bands of the mean of our estimates of income
elasticity and marginal effect estimates compared to a nonparametric estimate
of the derivative of the budget share graph.
Additional results with a different method to control for prices can be found
in the appendix.
2.8.4 Own Price Elasticities
Following similar steps as above, we estimate own-price elasticities by using the
budget share of junk food for each household, ωk,t, as the dependent variable
and log of our SL price indices, Pk,t, as the right hand variable, but control
again for income by selecting households with total expenditure close to the
median, denoted e. Thus,
ωk,t = Φ (e, Pk,t, Ak,t) + Uk,t (2.8.4)
We will use our method to estimate Z̃j(p, e) =
∂Φ
∂p
(p, e, A) |p=Pj , and use
equation (2.8.5) to identify the elasticity of income, εp using our estimate of






We use again the Nadaraya-Watson estimator of ωj(e, p), now as a function
of price, see Figure 2.16.
Figure 2.16: Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression estimator of Budget Share of
Junk Food based on prices
With the estimate of budget share conditional on price, we can use our esti-
mate of the density of Z̃j(e, p) and equation (2.8.5) to estimate the conditional
distribution of own-price elasticities of for junk food. Below are the means and
standard deviations of the coefficients as well as a contour map of the density
in Figure 2.17, along with bootstrap standard errors. Note that own-price elas-
ticities generally are negative and decrease with prices, i.e., increase in absolute
value. Thus, given an increase of one percent in price, the reduction in demand
for high-priced junk food is larger than for low-priced junk food.
Note again that these estimates are for the own-price elasticity for junk
food conditional on price (and income). We can estimate the joint distribution
by multiplying this conditional distribution by the density of expenditure, es-
timated using a kernel density estimation, see Figure 2.18 for the result. We
also include the quantile estimates of own-price elasticities which allows to as-
sess the difference in quantiles of consumers’ own-price elasticities at different
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Figure 2.17: Estimates of Elasticity of demand using: α = 6. For this sample,
N = 8, 086
prices.
Figure 2.18: Joint distributions are calculated by multiplying the conditional
distribution by the distribution of prices.
Finally, we compare our results again with the naive procedure that takes
the derivative of the budget share regression, which differ because they do
not properly account for the correlation stemming from the high dimensional
correlated unobservables, see Fig 2.19.
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Figure 2.19: Mean and 95% bands of the mean of our estimates of own-price





Proof of Lemma 2.2.1: As B(R) is generated by a countable system of sets (e.g.
consider the intervals (−∞, q], q ∈ Q) the uniqueness theorem for probability
measures guarantees that the measures ζj and ζ̃j coincide almost surely by the
assumptions of the lemma. Thus the set
Zj :=
{
x ∈ RT : ζj(x) 6= ζ̃j(x)
}
,
is a L(X)-null set; and Zj is open in RT thanks to the continuity of ζj and
ζ̃j. Hence, the random vector X lies in the closed set SX\Zj almost surely. As
SX is defined as the intersection of all those closed sets in which X is located
almost surely, it follows that
SX = SX\Zj ,
so that ζj(x) = ζ̃j(x) for all x ∈ SX . 
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1: For any x ∈ R, we consider the (T + 1) × (T + 1)-
Vandermonde matrix M(x) which contains p(x1)
†, . . . , p(xT )
†, p(x)† as its rows;
and the matrix N(x) which is obtained from M(x) by replacing its last row
by q(x). Note that detN(xj) = 0 is equivalent to linear independence of the
vectors p(x1), . . . , p(xT ), q(xj). Thanks to the multilinearity of the determinant
















Thus, detN(xj) vanishes if and only if at least two of the x1, . . . , xT coincide
or the polynomial x 7→
∏T
t=1(x−xt) has a multiple zero at xj. The latter claim
requires at least one of the xt for t 6= j to coincide with xj, which implies the
first claim. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2: We easily recognize by definition that the vectors
p(x1), . . . , p(xT ), q(xj) are all continuous functions in x ∈ RT . Applying a









∣∣p∗l (x)∣∣2 , k = 1, . . . , T ,











for x ∈ X so that τj is continuous on TX as well. The positivity of τj is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 2.3.1 as τj(x) = 0 implies linear dependence
between p(x1), . . . , p(xT ), q(xj). 



















∣∣ψA[0]|X=x(sq(xj))∣∣ · ∣∣∣ exp(− 12bs2τ 2j (x))− exp(− 12bs2τ 2j (y))∣∣∣ .
(2.9.1)
The first term in (2.9.1) converges to 0 as y → x by Assumption (A.2.4). As A[0]
has a conditional Lebesgue density given X = x it follows from the Riemann-
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Lebesgue lemma (see e.g. Bochner et al. (1949)) that lim|u|→∞ ψA[0]|X=x(u) = 0.
Thus, for any ε > 0, there exists some R > 0 such that
∣∣ψA[0]|X=x(u)∣∣ < ε/4 for
all u with |u| > R. Since |q(x)| ≥ 1 for all x ∈ R the second term in (2.9.1)
obeys the upper bound
ε/2 + sup
|s|≤R
∣∣ψA[0]|X=x(sq(xj))− ψA[0]|X=x(sq(yj))∣∣ . (2.9.2)
As the function x 7→ q(x) is continuous and any characteristic function is
uniformly continuous, (2.9.2) is bounded from above by ε whenever |y − x|
is sufficiently small with respect to only ε and R. Therefore the second term
tends to 0 as y → x.
It remains to consider the third term in (2.9.1). Let ε and R be as in the













As x 7→ τj(x) is continuous (see Lemma 2.3.2) and the exponential mapping
is uniformly continuous on any bounded domain, the term (2.9.3) is bounded
from above by ε whenever |y − x| is sufficiently small with respect to ε and R.
Finally we have shown that all three terms in (2.9.1) converge to 0 as y tends
to x. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4: Applying Fourier transformation to both sides of the













, ∀x ∈ R .
As Qft is continuous and satisfies Qft(0) = 1 there exists a non-void open










coincide on this neighborhood
so that α = α′. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3: Thanks to (2.5.4) and the compact support of fX , which
is guaranteed by Assumption (A.2.5’), we may easily verify the first part of
Assumption (A.2.6) for some cΦ sufficiently large. With respect to the second





≤ cζ · |y − z| ,
for all y, z ∈ R where cζ := ‖K ′‖∞/2. Thus Assumption (A.2.6) holds true.
As the statistic ∆Yj, j = 1, . . . , n, has been shown to be sufficient for ζ1(x)
and, hence, for the parameter θ, we may consider P
(n)
θ as the image measure of
this statistic. Now we put θn := 3d ·n−1/(4+2α) so that at least one of the events
{|θ̂n − θn| > d · n−1/(4+2α)} and {|θ̂n| > d · n−1/(4+2α)} occurs. For sufficiently








































B|X ∗ f∆U(·/(X1 −X2)), f
(0)




where χ2 stands for the χ2-distance between two measures. By Parseval’s iden-
122





B|X ∗ f∆U(·/(X1 −X2)), f
(0)
B|X ∗ f∆U(·/(X1 −X2))
)





∫ ∣∣{f0 cos(4·)} ∗ f∆U(·/(X1 −X2))∣∣2(t)(1 + t4)dt








∫ ∣∣{f ft0 }(`1)(t± 4)∣∣2 ∣∣ψ(`2)∆U (t/(X1 −X2))∣∣2




















which completes the proof of the theorem. 










(Xk,1, Xk,2) · 1[0,h3](|Xk,1 − x1|) ,
we introduce the events
E0 := {N0 ≥ c · nh0} ,
E1 := {N1 ≥ c · nh3(h2 − h1)} ,
for some constant c > 0. By Chebyshev’s inequality and Assumption (A.2.5’)
we deduce that the probabilities for the complements of E0 and E1 converge to
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zero as n tends to infinity for c > 0 sufficiently small. The events E0 and E1 are
contained in the σ-field σX which is generated by the random variables Xk,t,
k = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, 2.
Now put εn := dn




∣∣{ζ1(θ̂;x)}ft(s)− {ζ1(θ;x)}ft(s)∣∣2ds ≥ c2p ε2n ,
holds true on the event {|θ̂ − θ| > εn}. Then it follows from the definition of θ̂
that ∫ R
−R
∣∣ψ̂(h0,h1,h2,h3)Z1 (x; s)− {ζ1(θ;x)}ft(s)∣∣2ds ≥ 14c2p ε2n ,
whenever |θ̂ − θ| > εn. Hence, by Markov’s inequality, we deduce that
P
[







∣∣ψ̂(h0,h1,h2,h3)Z1 (x; s)− {ζ1(θ;x)}ft(s)∣∣2ds
+ 1− P (E0 ∩ E1) . (2.9.4)
By a standard bias-variance decomposition for the conditional expectation, the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Assumption (A.2.6), we obtain that
E
{∣∣ψ̂(h0,h1,h2,h3)Z1 (x; s)− {ζ1(θ;x)}ft(s)∣∣2 | σX , ψ̂(h0)∆U }






cΦRh2/2 + cζ(2h3 + h2)
}2



















∣∣ψ∆U(s/∆Xk)∣∣2 · 1S(h1,h2)X (Xk,1, Xk,2) · 1[0,h3](|Xk,1 − x1|) .





≤ N1/N0 + R2c2Φ ΞU h20/h21 . (2.9.6)
Thus, on the event E3(s) := {Ξ̂U > ΞU/2}, |s| ≤ R, the conditional expectation









1 + 1/ΞU +N1/(ΞUN0)
)
, (2.9.7)
where Ξu has the asymptotic lower bound N1 ·h2α1 with uniform constants by the
Assumptions (A.2.5’) and (A.2.8). On the complement of E3(s), the conditional





2− cΦh0/h1)2c2U,1(1 +R/hα1 )−2/8
}
, (2.9.8)
by Assumption (A.2.6) and Hoeffding’s inequality. Applying the expectation
to the terms (2.9.7) and (2.9.8) – multiplied by 1E0∩E1 – we conclude that the
right hand side of (2.9.4) tends to zero if, first, the limit superior is taken with
respect to n→∞ and, then, the limit d→∞ is applied. 
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(∣∣α̂− α∣∣ > c/ log n) = 0 . (2.9.9)
Using that the probability of E4 (equivalent to the event E0 from the proof of
Theorem 2.4 when replacing h0 by h4) converges to 1; that (2.4.2) holds true;
and Hoeffding’s inequality – conditionally on σX – we can verify (2.9.9) when
c is sufficiently large with respect to γ. 
2.9.2 Summary Statistics
Below is the Summary Statistics for the data we used in our empirical applica-
tion.
Table 2.1
January 2014 February 2014
SL Price Index 0.7751 0.8069
(0.5850) (0.5769)
Junk Food Share 0.0567 0.0639
(0.0596) (0.0631)
Total Expenditure 477.96 448.33
(325.43) (302.09)
This table contains the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis beneath the means)
for the variables that we use in our analysis
2.9.3 Application with Different Prices
Below are the results when we control for prices a little differently. Here, price
is controlled such that price is centered around the .4 quantile. This serves as
a robustness check on the results from our empirical application of the paper.
The overall trends are consistent in both cases.
The only difference of significance is that the decline of mean Elasticity of
Demand does not change as much for low-income vs. high-income individuals
(see Figure 2.20 compared to Figure 2.10). For example, in our base case,
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Figure 2.20: Estimates of Elasticity of demand using: α = 6. For this sample,
N = 8, 631
mean income elasticity for low-income individuals is about 0.8 and for high
income individuals it is about 0.5. In our adjusted case, the income elasticity
of low-income individuals is 0.8 while for high income individuals it’s about 0.6.
This is a minor difference and the results from these estimates easily fit in our
confidence bands from our paper.
Our marginal effects estimation in this case is also very similar (see Figures
2.12 and 2.22). These results imply that these results are consistent across
different prices, as long as prices are properly controlled for.
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Figure 2.21: Joint distributions are calculated by multiplying the conditional
distribution by the distribution of expenditure.
Figure 2.22: Estimates of the marginal effect of an additional dollar of expen-
diture on junk food using: α = 6. For this sample, N = 8, 631
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Figure 2.23: Conditional density and different expenditure quantiles of the
estimates of marginal effect.
Figure 2.24: Joint distributions are calculated by multiplying the conditional
distribution by the distribution of expenditure
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Chapter 3
A Binary Choice Difference-in-Differences Model
with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects and an
Application on Soda Taxes
3.1 Introduction
Difference-in-Differences Models are a well established method for policy evalu-
ation and treatment effect estimation in the applied microeconomics literature.
Some early examples of the use of Difference-in-Differences include Ashen-
felter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985), who have used Difference-in-
Differences methods to quantify the effects of training programs on earnings.
Other well-known examples are Card (1990) and Card and Krueger (1994), who
have explored the effects of exogenous changes in labor market conditions on
employment and wages. A more recent paper by Abadie and Dermisi (2008)
estimates the effects of a terrorist threat on agglomeration economies in central
business districts using a Difference-in-Differences approach.
The reasons for the abundant use of Difference-in-Differences models in ap-
plied research are manifold. First, Difference-in-Differences models are easy to
implement, as they can be estimated via simple OLS. This allows for covariates
to be included as additional regressors in a straightforward way. Second, one
of the coefficients from the OLS regression can be directly interpreted as the
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) which is usually the object of
interest in the treatment effect literature. Third, the Difference-in-Differences
approach does not require a strict exogeneity assumption, as the two-period
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panel structure of the data allows us to deal with time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity.
Binary outcome variables are very common in applied economics research,
e.g. when studying labor force participation decisions, retirement decisions, fer-
tility decisions, etc. Unfortunately, the standard linear Difference-in-Differences
model breaks down for binary dependent variables as soon as continuous covari-
ates are included in the estimation procedure. The classical OLS assumptions
(constant marginal effects, normality of the error term, and homoskedastic error
terms) are then usually violated and thus standard inference will be wrong.
A possible remedy is to use Probit or Logit models which are able to account
for the non-linearity inherent in models with binary outcome variables, but do
not carry over some of the other convenient properties of standard Difference-
in-Differences model. Namely, the standard Probit and Logit models do not
allows for correlation between treatment status and time invariant unobserv-
ables. Also, the marginal probability of the interaction term of the pre-post
treatment dummy and the treatment-control group dummy does not equal the
ATT as holds true in the standard Difference-in-Differences model for continu-
ous outcomes. While adding heterogeneity to standard Probit or Logit models
has been done using a control function approach (Petrin and Train, 2010), to our
knowledge the proper extension of Differences-in-Differences models to binary
outcome variables allowing for continuous covariates has not been discussed so
far.
Further, neither Probit, Logit or OLS approaches account fully for hetero-
geneity. Specifically, they do not allow for possible correlation of heterogeneous
unobservables. For example, they do not allow for correlation between het-
erogeneous time invariant unobservables and heterogeneous treatment effects.
Ignoring these effects could lead to biased estimates of the ATT, incorrect stan-
dard error estimation and, thus, flawed inference.
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To close this gap in the literature, we propose a nonparametric binary
choice Difference-in-Differences model with heterogeneous treatment effects.
Our model accounts both for the non-linearity that emerges from the binary
outcome setting and for treatment effect heterogeneity via the introduction of
random coefficients. These random coefficients allow us to estimate the dis-
tribution of treatment effects on the treated which allows us to estimate the
quantile treatment effects. As in the original Difference-in-Differences set-up,
our model allows for correlation between treatment status, treatment effect and
time-invariant unobservables.
The main idea of the paper is analogous to continuous outcome Difference-
in-Differences. The data is split into a treatment group, affected by a par-
ticular treatment, and a control group, not affected by this treatment. We
observe units in the treatment and the control group both before the treatment
occurs and after the treatment occurs. It is important that we observe the
same units before and after treatment. Furthermore, it is essential that pre-
treatment observations are not causally affected by later occuring treatment
due to anticipations effects.
In order to identify the ATT in a Difference-in-Differences model, one needs
to be able to compare the actual post-treatment outcomes in the treatment
group with the counterfactual post-treatment outcomes in the treatment group
had treatment not occurred. The former are generally directly observable in
the data. The latter are not and must thus be identified off the Difference-in-
Differences model. How is it done? One has to make some type of common
trend assumption for the treatment and control group. Namely, outcomes would
develop similarly over time in the treatment group and the control group if no
treatment occurred. This allows us to use the control group to isolate the
time trend and thus to predict a post-treatment counterfactual outcome for the
treatment group, absent treatment.
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Several additional layers of complications arise in our case. First, binary
outcome variables force us to work with latent outcome variables instead of
directly observable outcome variables. Second, to identify the whole distribu-
tions of the random coefficients we need to introduce special regressors as the
variation in the binary outcome variables is not sufficient. Third, we switch to
a nonparametric set-up.
Applications: As binary outcome variables are very common in microeco-
nomic modeling, applications of our proposed model are manifold. They range
from the classical labor economic issues of female labor force participation, fer-
tility decisions, and preventive health care decisions all the way to individual
consumer demand estimation as a central question of the industrial organization
literature.
In the labor economics literature, the body of existing applications using
Difference-in-Differences methods in the context of a binary outcome variable
is large. Two recent examples are Staubli (2011) and Campolieti and Riddell
(2012). Both investigate the effect of a change in disability policy on employ-
ment and disability enrollment in Austria and Canada, respectively. Further-
more, papers by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) and Bargain et al. (2012) ex-
plore the effects of policy changes on female labor force participation. Schönberg
and Ludsteck (2014) use the expansion in maternity leave coverage in Germany
as treatment, whereas Bargain et al. (2012) make use of the introduction of
divorce laws in Ireland as an exogenous shifter.
Prifti and Vuri (2013) and Dyer and Fairlie (2004) are recent examples of
papers studying the fertility decision and out-of wedlock births, respectively.
Prifti and Vuri (2013) look at the effects of a chance in employment protection
legislation in Italy, whereas Dyer and Fairlie (2004) compare outcomes in states
with family caps with outcomes in states without family caps. Lastly, Gruber
and Poterba (1994) estimate the effects of tax incentives on the decision to buy
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health insurance.
To the best of our knowledge, difference-in-differences methods have so far
not been used in individual consumer demand and willingness-to-pay estima-
tion. Our model would be well-suited for investigating the effect of a public
policy on the willingness-to-pay for a public good via contingent valuation stud-
ies as in Lewbel et al. (2011). Further, it fits our model better than standard
DiD models because one would expect individual willingness-to-pay to be corre-
lated with individual treatment effect. The fact that we are able to identify the
joint distribution of actual and counterfactual latent outcomes, i.e. actual and
counterfactual willingness-to-pay in this context, could be of political relevance.
Our application will examine the effect of a Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
(SSB) tax implemented in Cook County, Illinois. We will do a difference-in-
differences estimation comparing individuals in Cook County to individuals
in neighboring counties. Under reasonable assumptions, our estimator will
evaluate the effect of the SSB tax on consumers’ likelihood to pay for soda.
We will be able to estimate many aspects of the heterogeneous effects of the
tax as well as the ATT.
Related Literature: Difference-in-Differences models have a long tradition
in applied microeconomics. Theoretical literature on Difference-in-Differences
methods is however fairly limited. Lechner (2011) provides an extensive overview
of Difference-in-Differences models for continuous outcome variables. Some re-
cent papers have extended the classical model in several directions. Athey and
Imbens (2006) propose a scale invariant version of the Difference-in-Differences
model. Another model by Bonhomme and Sauder (2011) accounts for treatment
effect heterogeneity and is thus most closely related to our model. However,
Bonhomme and Sauder (2011) along with all other papers cited above, do not
allow for binary outcome variables.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on special regressors. Special
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regressors are exogenous regressors with full or large support that have been
suggested to introduce additional observable variation into e.g. binary choice
models thus helping identification of parameters or distributions of interest.
Leading references are the papers by Lewbel (2000) and Dong and Lewbel
(2015) and the survey article by Lewbel (2014).
Furthermore, our model features nonparametrically identified and estimated
random coefficients and thus relates to the random coefficients literature. Hoder-
lein et al. (2010) discuss nonparametric identification of a linear random coef-
ficient model, whereas Ichimura and Thompson (1998) and Gautier and Ki-
tamura (2013) show nonparametric identification of a binary choice random
coefficient model.
Lastly, there is a large strand of literature on consumer heterogeneity in
discrete choice models used for demand estimation in industrial organization.
Examples include parametric approaches as the random coefficients Logit model
suggested in Berry et al. (1995b), as well as nonparametric approaches as dis-
cussed in Berry and Haile (2010) and Fox and Gandhi (2016).
Outline of the Paper: Section 2 focuses on the main identification result. We
start with a discussion of the precise assumptions we require, and present and
discuss the main result, which establishes the identification of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT) in the binary choice Difference-in-Differences
Model with heterogeneous treatment effects. Further, we present two exten-
sions. Extension 1 shows identification of the joint distribution of the actual
and counterfactual latent outcomes for the treatment group. Extension 2 out-
lines how covariates can be included in the basic model in two alternative ways.
Section 3 proposes a sample counterpart estimator of our model. Section 4
documents the results from Monte Carlo simulations. Section 5 contains the
results of an empirical application of our estimator on the SSB tax in Cook
County, Illinois. Section 6 contains a summary and concluding remarks.
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3.2 Identification
3.2.1 Basic Model without Covariates
Notation and Assumptions: Our proposed model makes use of the latent
variable formulation and takes the following form for t = 1, 2.
Y ∗1 = B1 − Z1 (3.2.1)
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
Yt denotes the binary (observed) outcome variable of interest. Y
∗
t denotes the
latent outcome variable, which is unobservable. 1{·} represents the indicator
function, such that Yt = 1 if Y
∗
t < 0, and Yt = 0 otherwise. D is a binary
variable denoting whether an individual obtains treatment (D = 1) or belongs
to the control group (D = 0). B = (B1, B2, B3) are random coefficients with
unknown distribution satisfying the above restrictions. V2 can be interpreted as
a time trend plus potential shock at t = 2. B3 denotes the effect of treatment
on the latent outcome variable Y ∗2 . Z = (Z1, Z2) are special regressors.
Example for Empirical Application: Effect of an advertising campaign on
the willingness to pay for a good. D = 1 denotes individuals who are exposed
to the campaign (treatment group), D = 0 denotes individuals who are not
exposed to the campaign (control group). Price, Zt, is chosen randomly from a
known distribution with large support in the course of the contingent valuation
experiment conducted both before and after treatment occurs. At both time
points individuals make decisions on whether they will purchase (Yt = 1) the
good or not (Yt = 0) at price Zt. Yt is observed by the econometrician. B1
136
represents the individual preference heterogeneity, i.e. willingness to pay for
the good and B3 the treatment effect. V2 summarizes both trends between
time periods in demand for the good as well as second period shocks. The
latent outcome variable Y ∗t can thus be directly interpreted as the offered price
minus the individual’s willingness to pay, which would be their utility from
purchasing that good. If the willingness to pay exceeds the price, the individual
will purchase the good. 1.
We impose the following assumptions on the model:
Assumption A.3.1 Let (Ω, F, P ) be a complete probability space on which
are defined the random vectors (B1, B2, B3, V2) : Ω → B1 × B2 × B3 × V2,
B1 ⊆ R, B2 ⊆ R, B3 ⊆ R, V2 ⊆ R, and (D, Yt, Y ∗t , Zt) : Ω→ D ×Y ×Y∗ ×Z,
D = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1}2, Y∗ ⊆ R2, Z ⊆ R2, t = 1, 2, such that for t = 1, 2, (i)
Y ∗1 = B1 − Z1
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
where (ii) realizations of (D, Yt, Zt) are observable, whereas those of (Y
∗
t , B1, B2, B3, V2)
are not.
Assumption A.3.2 There is no pre-treatment effect in period 1, i.e. there is
no causal effect of D on Y ∗1 .
Assumption A.3.3 V2 ⊥ D,B1, Z.
Assumption A.3.4 Z ⊥ B1, B3|D.
1Please note that we are laxly calling Zt the price here, where Zt is actually the negative
price. Similarly for the willingness to pay B1. This is just to make the example more intuitive
and comes at no cost, as we can always arbitrarily recode our binary Yt variable. Further, the
willingness to pay and treatment effect variables (B1 and B3) are actual ratios of willingness
to pay and treatment effect and the price elasticity, since the price variable has no coefficient.
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Assumption A.3.5 Z has full support and the support of Z2 − Z1 spans
the support of V2.
Discussion of Assumptions: Assumption A.3.1 formally specifies the data
generating process discussed at the beginning of this section. The special re-
gressors Z are crucial for the identification of the distributions of the random
coefficients in the model, as they introduce observable variation, where the out-
come variables can only take on one of two values. The effect of Z on the latent
variable is assumed to be of known sign. The corresponding coefficients are
normalized to one ensuring identification of the remaining coefficients of the
model2.
Assumption A.3.2 is one of the classical Difference-in-Differences assump-
tions. If individuals in the treatment group somehow anticipate the treatment
and react to this anticipation, our estimate of the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) will be biased. What does this assumption say in the con-
text of our example? If the news reports on the advertising campaign before
the campaign begins, the treated individuals might exhibit higher willingness
to pay already before treatment actually takes place. Thus there would be an
anticipation effect, the assumption would be violated and our estimated ATT
would be biased towards zero.
Next, Assumption A.3.3 contains three independence assumption. First,
V2 ⊥ D replaces another classical Difference-in-Differences assumption of com-
mon time trends in the treatment and control groups. The time trend V2 is
random in our model and needs to be independent of treatment status D. As
in classical Difference-in-Differences we will identify the time trend from the
control group and then use it to construct the counterfactual outcomes of the
treatment group had they not been treated. If the time trends are different in
the two groups, then the Difference-in-Differences identification strategy breaks
2Please see Appendix 3.7.2 for a detailed discussion of the restrictions we impose on the
coefficients on Z.
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down. What does this condition mean in terms of our purchase decision ex-
ample? If the treatment group was also affected by a different sales campaign
besides the advertising campaign we are examining, but the control group was
not, then the time trend in the two groups absent our treatment of interest
would likely not look the same. Our strategy of identifying the time trend of
the treatment group off the control group would thus fail.
Second, V2 ⊥ B1 is a technical assumption that becomes necessary for our
identification proof as both the intercept B1 and the time trend V2 are random
in our model. If V2 ⊥ B1|D does not hold, we cannot perform convolution with
fB1|D=1 and fV2|D=1 to obtain fB1+V2|D=1 in our identification proof. Let’s look
at this assumption in the light of our example. B1 represents the individual’s
willingness to pay. V2 denotes the time trend that includes preference changes
along with personal preference shocks. Our assumption says that any preference
changes from period 1 to period 2 are unrelated to individual’s initial willingness
to pay. This might be violated if individuals with a higher initial willingness
to pay live clustered in certain areas. Thus, individuals living in each of these
areas might change their preference to be more aligned with their neighbors
between the pre-treatment and post-period time periods. Thus, preferences
might change systematically differently for high versus low willingness to pay
individuals.
The last independence V2 ⊥ Z imposes that the time trend has to be inde-
pendent of the special regressors in either of the periods. In our example this
means that the offered prices cannot depend on the time trend, i.e. it cannot be
the case that individuals that experience a demand shock between the two time
periods are offered higher or lower prices than other individuals. This assump-
tion would easily hold if we could randomly assign prices to our individuals as
in Lewbel et al. (2011). This exogeneity assumption may be difficult to satisfy
in most other empirical applications, but Extension 3 discussed in section 3.2.5
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allows for a control function approach that allows for an endogenous special
regressor.
The next assumption, A.3.4, is another exogeneity assumption on the spe-
cial regressors Z. The special regressors Z need to be independent of the
random coefficients B1, B3, conditional on the treatment status D. What does
this assumption mean in terms of our example? Within treatment and control
groups, the initial willingness to pay B1, and the treatment effect B3 are not
correlated with prices Z. Again, this assumption is not trivially valid, but Ex-
tension 3 in Section 3.2.5 allows for more flexible empirical applications. This
assumption – combined with the third independence assumption in A.3.3 – is
needed in our identification proof, as this allows us to scratch the conditioning
on Z. If the Z’s were still conditioned on, we would not be able to integrate
over the Z’s and thus our proof would break down.
Finally, the last assumptions, A.3.5 are support assumptions on Z. In our
willingness to pay example, these assumptions are met as long as prices vary
sufficiently over time. This may not be the case in empirical applications as
stores will keep the price near equilibrium, but Extension 4 discussed in Section
3.3.5 allows for a semi-parametric approach that allows for special regressors
with limited support. The first part of assumption A.3.5 is a classical special
regressor assumption. To help overcome the fact that Y exhibits only very little
variation due to its binary character a variable Z with plenty of variation is
needed3. See Lewbel (2000), Lewbel (2014), or Dong and Lewbel (2015) for
more information on how special regressors can be used to ensure identification
in a binary choice model. The second part of assumption A.3.5 is a necessary
condition for our identification proof to go through, as the distribution of the
time trend V2 is broadly speaking identified as a difference of control group
3Please note that the full support assumption on Z is a sufficient condition for the identifi-
cation of the ATT under arbitrary distributions of the random coefficients. If some combina-
tions of random coefficients have distributions with restricted support, this assumption can
we weakened accordingly. Moreover, Z could actually be a linear combination of more than
one variable. See Extension 2 for more information on how to apply this idea in practice.
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outcomes Z between the two observed time periods before and after treatment.
The Main Result: The assumptions introduced above now allow us to identify
the object of interest, the ATT. Our result is as follows:





CATT (z2) = P
1[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]− P 0[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]






fB1+V2,B1|D(y + x, x; 0)dxFB1|D(z2 − y; 1)dy,
and
FB1+V2+B3|D(Z2; 1) = P [Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2],
fB1+V2,B1|D=0 = ∂Z1∂Z2P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = 0, Z = z],
FB1|D=1 = P [Y1|D = 1, Z1 = z1].
Remark: 2.1 - Discussion of Theorem 3.1: Our main result establishes
that the ATT is identified in our model. The ATT is usually the primary ob-
ject of interest in the treatment effect literature, as it measures the average
treatment effect on the actually treated population. In our example above, the
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ATT measures the average effect of the advertising campaign on the probabil-
ity that the households consume the product among treated households, i.e.
households who were subject to the advertising campaign. The proof of The-
orem 3.1 can be found in Appendix 3.7.1. Note that if FB1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) and
FB1+V2|D(z2; 1) are uniform distributions, our model breaks down to a simple
Linear Probability Model.
3.2.2 Extension 1: Joint Distribution of Latent Variables
Even though the focus of our paper lies in identifying the ATT in this model,
as shown in the previous section, we can actually identify the joint distribution
of all random coefficients in the model conditional on being treated. For this
we need to go through characteristic functions.
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumptions A.3.1 – A.3.5 hold. Then
ΦB1,B3,V2|D=1(σ, t, r) = E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3 + rV2)] |D = 1}
= E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3)] |D = 1} × E {exp(irV2)|D = 1} ,
where
E {exp(irV2)|D = 1} = E
{
exp [ir(Z2 − Z1)]ψ(Z1, Z2, 0)
fZ|D(Z; 0)
∣∣∣∣D = 0} ,
and










∣∣∣D = 0} ,
with
ψ(z1, z2, d) = ∂z1∂z2P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = d, Z = z] .
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Remark: 2.2 - Discussion of Theorem 3.2: This theorem establishes that
the model proposed by us is fully identified. The proof of Theorem 3.2 can
be found in Appendix 3.7.1. Starting from the above result, it is easy to show
that the joint distribution of the actual and counterfactual latent variables
in the post-treatment period are also identified for the treatment group, i.e.
fB1+V2+B3,B1+V2|D=1 is identified
4. In our example above, this distribution would
capture the joint distribution of the actual and counterfactual willingness to pay
of individuals in the treatment group, i.e. individuals who were subject to the
anti-smog campaign. This could be of high interest to policy makers, e.g. when
deciding on the pricing of public goods.
3.2.3 Extension 2A: Conditioning on Covariates
Our proposed model can be easily adjusted to include covariates as is common
in applied research by conditioning everything on the covariates. This can even
help to relax some of our assumptions of the previous section, as these will now
only have to hold conditional on the covariates. Let us go back to our example
to illustrate this point.
When e.g. demand trends are different in treatment and control groups,
our assumption A.3.3 does not hold, as V2 6⊥ D, and identification in our
basic model without covariates breaks down. But what if demand trends are
really only different for people on different income levels and the differential
time trends in treatment and control group are due to the different income
distributions in the two groups? Then we get that among people with the
same income environmental trends are independent of treatment status, i.e.
V2 ⊥ D|X, and we can identify our model conditional on X.
Alternatively, when B1 ⊥ Z|D is not satisfied, as e.g. within treatment and
control groups, individuals with higher willingness to pay are offered higher
4For example, obtain fB1,V2,B3|D=1 via multivariate inverse Fourier transform.
Then, apply change of variables to obtain fB1+V2+B3,B1+V2,V2+B3|D=1. Lastly, get
fB1+V2+B3,B1+V2|D=1 via integration.
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prices, then again identification in our basic model without covariates breaks
down. But what if the above dependency was fully driven by a third factor, say
income? Then, once we condition on income, we will not see any relationship
between willingness to pay and prices among individuals of the same income
in treatment and control groups, respectively, i.e. B1 ⊥ Z|D,X, and again we
can identify our model conditional on X.
Model:
Y ∗1 = B1(X,ω)− Z1
Y ∗2 = B2(X,ω) +B3(X,ω)D − Z2
B2(X,ω) = B1(X,ω) + V2(X,ω)
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
where X denotes the random vector of observable covariates and ω denotes the
unobservable random scalar.
Assumption A.3.2.1 There is no pre-treatment effect in period 1, i.e. there
is no causal effect of D on Y ∗1 conditional on X.
Assumption A.3.3.1 V2 ⊥ D,B1, Z|X.
Assumption A.3.4.1 B1, B3 ⊥ Z|D,X.
Assumption A.3.5.1 Z has full support and the support of Z2 −Z1 spans
the support of V2 conditional on X.
3.2.4 Extension 2B: Exogeneous Covariates with Fixed Coefficients
Of course conditioning everything on the covariates also means that we obtain
all distributions of the random coefficients conditional on the covariates, i.e. we
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receive a different set of distributions for every possible set of values x. If the
set of possible values that the covariate vector X can take on becomes large, e.g.
due to a continuous variable in X, conditioning on all covariates might become
infeasible in practice. In this case we suggest to include exogenous covariates
with fixed coefficients into the model.
Model:
Y ∗1 = B1 +X1γ1 − Z1
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D +X2γ2 − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
where X1 and X2 denote the respective sets of obervable covariates, and γ1 and
γ2 denote the vectors of fixed coefficients.
3.2.5 Extension 3: Using a Control Function with an Endogenous
Special Regressor
Finding an exogenous special regressor can be difficult in many scenarios, so
it may be necessary to use an instrumental variable. For example, in demand
estimation, price seems like a logical special regressor but has some endogeneity
concerns that are typically solved by using instrumental variables. Controlling
for this type of endogeneity opens the door to many more empirical applications.
We will use a control function approach first introduced by Heckman and
Robb (1985). This approach is helpful in our case because it is powerful when
dealing with heterogeneous effects and is useful for nonparametric models Arel-
lano and Bond (1991). Thus, we assume the following model:
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Model:
Y ∗1 = B1 − Z1
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
Zt = G(Wt) + εt
Where Wt is the instrumental variable and G(Wt) is the control function.
Thus, we can adjust our estimator as long as W holds standard IV assumptions
like E[ε|W ] = 0. Thus, we now only need the following assumptions to hold
rather than assuming that Z is exogenous:
Assumption A.3.3.2 V2 ⊥ D,B1,W.
Assumption A.3.4.2 B1, B3 ⊥ W |D.
Assumption A.3.5.1 W has full support and the support of W2−W1 spans
the support of V2 conditional on ε.
In our previous example, this would allow us to use different instrumental
variables for price, such as Hausman Instruments (Hausman et al., 1994), the
average prices in neighboring cities of the good. These Hausman prices must be
independent of the consumer’s willingness to pay for a good in the pre-treatment
or post-treatment time period as well as the time trend of demand, which
is similar to standard assumptions made in the demand estimation literature
where these are commonly used.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Basic Model without Covariates









ĈATT (z2) = F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1)− F̂B1+V2|D(z2; 1).
F̂B1+V2+B3|D=1 can be directly estimated from the data via nonparametric re-
gression:
F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) = P̂ [Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2].
Estimating the counterfactual CDF F̂B1+V2|D=1 involves generating data and













1{b1 + v2 < z2}fB1|D(b1; 1)fV2|D(v2; 1)db1dv2






1{b1i + v2i < z2}
How to generate b1i and v2i?
1. Generating b1i:
(a) Estimate FB1|D=1 via local constant regression of P [Y1 = 1|D =
1, Z1 = z1].
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(a) Estimate ∂z1FB1+V2,B1|D=0(z2, z1) via local linear regression of P [Y2 =
1, Y1 = 1|D = 0, Z = z] (partial derivative).
(b) Estimate fB1|D=0(z1) via local linear regression of P [Y1 = 1|D =
0, Z1 = z1] (first derivative).
(c) Obtain FV2(z2−z1) = FV2|D=0(z2−z1) as the ratio of ∂z1FB1+V2,B1|D=0(z2, z1)
over fB1|D=0(z1). Average over all FV2(z2 − z1) with z2 − z1 = v2 to
obtain FV2(v2).
(d) Perform inverse transform sampling to obtain generated data points
v2i.
3.3.2 Extension 2A: Conditioning on Covariates
Include X’s into all local polynomial regressions mentioned above and get all
densities as before but conditional on X.
3.3.3 Extension 2B: Exogeneous Covariates with Fixed Coefficients
1. Estimate γ1 and γ2 semi-parametrically via average derivative estimator,
e.g. Ichimura (1991), Klein & Spady (1993), etc.
2. Generate new Z variables and proceed with estimation as before.
3.3.4 Extension 3: Using a Control Function with an Endogenous
Special Regressor
1. Estimate Ĝ(W ) non-parametrically from the equation Z = Ĝ(W ) + ε.
5The intuition behind this estimation is that the variation in Z moves the same as the
variation in V2. Thus, the different movements of Z can allow us to trace what happened
with V2 across the distribution
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2. Use Ĝ(W ) and Z to estimate ε̂
3. Include ε̂’s into all local polynomial regressions mentioned above and get
all densities as before but conditional on ε̂.
3.3.5 Extension 4: Semi-parametric Estimation for Special Regres-
sors with Limited Support
In applications it is often not plausible to find special regressors Z with full
support. In this section, we thus extend our model to handle special regressors
with compact support via a semi-parametric approach. The basic argument
is an extrapolation argument. First, we estimate non-parametrically the two
CDFs of interest F̂B1|D=1 and F̂V2 as described above, but only on a compact
support. In a second step, we then construct a minimum-distance parametric
estimator on the limited support based on a known parametric distribution
(with full support), e.g. the normal distribution. We can then use the estimates
for the parameters of these known distributions to obtain estimates for our
CDFs of interest outside the compact support provided by the special regressors
Z. Once we put the non-parametric and parametric part together, we can
perform inverse transform sampling as if the special regressors had full support.
Formally, let Z1 ∈ [z1, z1] and Z2 ∈ [z2, z2]. The process of generating
b1i now needs an additional step between 1(a) and 1(b), as F̂B1|D=1 is only







F̂B1|D=1(z1i)− CDF (z1i, θ)
]2
,
















The process of generating v2i also needs an additional step between 2(c)
and 2(d), as F̂V2 is only obtained for z2 − z1 < v2 < z2 − z1. To obtain F̂V2 for






F̂V2(v2i)− CDF (v2i, θ)
]2
,
where v2i are the sample realizations of Z2 − Z1 for D = 0. What follows is
analogous to generating b1i.
This approach is less prone to misspecification than a fully parametric ap-
proach, as we only use a parametric distribution where we cannot obtain esti-
mates non-parametrically in the estimation of the counterfactual CDF F̂B1+V2|D=1
due to limited support of the special regressors Z. The actual CDF F̂B1+V2+B3|D=1
can always be estimated fully nonparametrically.
Note that you can use both Extension 3 and Extension 4 in our model.
However, in order to properly, the CDF functions must be constructed condi-
tional on εi. We will demonstrate this in our empirical application.
3.3.6 Extension 5: Parametric Estimation for Special Regressors
with Limited Support
An alternative approach to work around a limited support of the special regres-
sors is to fully parametrize the estimation of our model. This means that we
either have to assume parametric distributions directly for B1 +V2 +B3|D = 1,
B1|D = 1, and B1 + V2, B1|D = 0 or indirectly through distributional assump-
tions on the random coefficients including their dependence structure.
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The easiest way for now seems to be to assume normal distributions for the
three expressions above, two univariate normal distributions and one bivariate
normal distribution. This can be extended later on. Once we know the three
above mentioned quantities have normal distributions, we can find the respec-
tive parameters of these distributions via univariate and bivariate Probit.
For B1|D = 1, e.g., we can write:
P [Y1 = 1|D = 1, Z1 = z1] = P [B1 < z1|D = 1, Z1 = z1]















= Φ(β0 + β1z1)
Once we have F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1), f̂B1+V2,B1|D(z2, z1; 0), and F̂B1|D(z1; 1), we can
plug in the sample values for z2 and integrate numerically to obtain ĈATT (z2)
for all z2.





f̂B1+V2,B1|D(y + x, x; 0)dxF̂B1|D(z2 − y; 1)dy
Take the sample average over all z2 to obtain an estimate of the ATT.
Another advantange of the fully parametric approach is that covariates X can
be easily included.
How is this different from the Probit model that practitioners like to estimate
for binary choice difference-in-differences? In terms of estimation, practitioners
usually estimate only one Probit model of the following specification:
P̂ [Y = 1|D = d, T = t,X = x] = Φ(β0 + β1D + β2T + β3DT + δX),
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where Y and X are the stacked observations of the pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods, the dummy variable D denotes treatment status and the
dummy variable T denotes whether the observation is pre-treatment or post-







(Φ(β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + δxi)− Φ(β0 + β1 + β2 + δxi)) ,
where n is the number of observations in the treatment group post-treatment in
the sample. Clearly, this quantity is different from the quantity above. What is
the intuition? The standard Probit model does not allow for correlation between
treatment status and time invariant unobservables, but our model does. This
is why our model requires some extra steps. To obtain the counterfactual
distribution for the treatment group had the treatment not occurred, one has
to use information on the time trend V2 which has to be identified off the control
group first.
3.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
We run Monte Carlo simulations of our model with different set-ups. We start
off with a low dependence DGP, with P (Yt = 1) around one half in expectation.
Then, we run different variations increasing P (Yt = 1) (Variation a), increasing
P (Yt = 1) further (Variation b), and decreasing P (Yt = 1) (Variation c) by
changing the mean of the distributions of the random coefficients B1 and B3.
Next, we manipulate the binomial distribution of the treatment indicator D to
both a lower probability (Variation d) and a higher probability (Variation e).
A second set of simulations assumes a higher dependence structure in the
DGP. In particular, the random coefficients B1 and B3, as well as the time
trend plus potential shock in the second period V2 now follow different distri-
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butions for treatment and control group. In a first variation of this scenario,
we extend this high dependence to the special regressors Z as well and make
their distribution different for treatment and control group (Variation a). In a
second variation, we introduce dependence between the random coefficient B3,
measuring the heterogeneous treatment effect on the latent outcome variable,
and the time trend plus potential second period shock V2 (Variation b).
We run simulations with 1000 repetitions and sample sizes N = 1, 000. We
estimate the ATT the following ways: we use our standard non-parametric esti-
mator (CHW), our estimator using the semi-parametric specification as outlined
in Extension 4 (CHW-P), a basic linear probability model (LPM), a standard
Probit model, and a Oracle model. The oracle model is estimated by taking
the distance between the true and counterfactual distributions of the latent
variable based on the unobserved random coefficients. Bandwidths for the non-
parametric estimations are determined via grid search. Let us recall the model:
Y ∗1 = B1 − Z1
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
3.4.1 Simulation Set-Up 1 (Low Dependence DGP)
Distribution of unobservables:













(Z1, Z2) ∼ N(µZ ,ΣZ) with µZ =
0
0




D is binomial with probability 0.5.
Variations:
























(d) D is binomial with probability 0.3.
(e) D is binomial with probability 0.8.
3.4.2 Simulation Set-Up 2 (Higher Dependence DGP)























 for D = 0.
Distribution of observables:
(Z1, Z2) ∼ N(µZ ,ΣZ) with µZ =
0
0




D is binomial with probability 0.5
Variations:







 and Σ1Z =
 4 0.5
0.5 4




 and Σ0Z =
 6 0.5
0.5 6
 for D = 0
(b) Distribution of unobservables with higher dependence structure:
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 for D = 0.
3.4.3 Simulation Results
Below are the results of simulations for sample size N = 1, 000. Our model
does consistently better than LPM and Probit, sometimes even better than an
oracle estimator that estimates the distributions directly off the (in practice
unobservable) realizations of random coefficients via empirical CDF. Gains of
the CHW estimator compared to LPM and Probit seems to be mainly due
to smaller biases. The gains for the CHW-P estimator appear to be smaller
than the CHW estimator for most simulations but there are still significant
improvements to the bias of the estimator.
Note that the Oracle estimates are biased in the same direction as the
LPM and Probit estimates. This is because it generally suffers from the same
bias as those estimates: they do not allow for correlation between treatment
effect and time invariant unobservables. These correlations seem realistic in
our applications to consumer demand and are thus included in each of our
simulations.
We further show examples of simulations of the CATT random coefficients
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compared to the oracle and true CATT values in Figure 3.1. Note that these
are singular simulations so they have higher variance than the average of our
bootstrap estimates. The CHW and CHW-P estimates are generally very close
and generally have similar shape and density as the true estimates.
Table 3.1: Simulation Results
Set-up Category CHW CHW-P LPM Probit Oracle
1 MSE 0.0013 0.0013 0.0023 0.0021 0.0013
1 Bias 0.0175 -0.0090 0.0368 0.0361 0.0359
1 Var 0.0010 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0001
1a MSE 0.0005 0.0007 0.0012 0.0008 0.0005
1a Bias 0.0010 -0.0111 -0.0218 -0.0190 -0.0207
1a Var 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0004 0.0000
1b MSE 0.0011 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 0.0006
1b Bias 0.0165 0.0108 0.0235 0.0234 0.0230
1b Var 0.0009 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003 0.0000
1c MSE 0.0015 0.0016 0.0040 0.0038 0.0032
1c Bias -0.0229 -0.0276 0.0580 0.0547 0.0559
1c Var 0.0010 0.0023 0.0006 0.0008 0.0001
1d MSE 0.0013 0.0020 0.0023 0.0021 0.0014
1d Bias 0.0160 0.0186 0.0347 0.0341 0.0359
1d Var 0.0011 0.0016 0.0011 0.0009 0.0001
1e MSE 0.0017 0.0024 0.0027 0.0026 0.0013
1e Bias 0.0190 -0.0164 0.0375 0.0378 0.0360
1e Var 0.0013 0.0021 0.0013 0.0012 0.0000
2 MSE 0.0025 0.0035 0.0084 0.0048 0.0072
2 Bias 0.0218 0.0262 0.0869 0.0633 0.0845
2 Var 0.0021 0.0028 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001
2a MSE 0.0025 0.0035 0.0050 0.0054 0.0071
2a Bias -0.0038 -0.0024 0.0648 0.0672 0.0838
2a Var 0.0024 0.0035 0.0008 0.0009 0.0001
2b MSE 0.0014 0.0016 0.0037 0.0036 0.0026
2b Bias 0.0215 -0.0039 0.0538 0.0532 0.0499
2b Var 0.0009 0.0015 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001
This table compares simulation results for several estimators: CHW, CHW-P, LPN, and
probit. The sample size is N = 1000.
3.5 Empirical Application
In this section, we discuss all matters pertaining to our empirical implementa-
tion where we examine whether the taxes on Sugar Sweetened Beverages (SSBs)
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Figure 3.1: These graphs show the distribution of CATT for each of our sim-
ulations. We graph the true CATT values, oracle CATT values, CHW CATT
values and CHW-P CATT values.
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effected the fraction of individuals that consumed soda in Cook County, Illinois.
This is an evaluation of the extensive effects of the tax: the impact of the tax
on whether or not consumers purchased soda. We give an overview of the tax
implementation, examine the data, discuss the current literature on the issue,
and present the results.
3.5.1 SSB Tax
SSB tax was first implemented in Berkeley, California in November 2014 which
specifically a one-cent-per-ounce soda . Starting in 2017, it was followed by
many other cities implementing soda tax of different levels, including Philadel-
phia, PA, Oakland, CA, Albany, CA, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, CA and
Seattle, WA. Since the tax level was different for most of these cities, we will
examine the effect of the one-cent-per-ounce SSB tax implemented in Cook
County, Illinois where the majority of the population lives in Chicago and thus
is the largest single implementation of a SSB tax in the US.
The tax was passed into law in November 2016, and was expected to go into
effect in July 1, 2017. However, on June 27th, the Illinois Retail Merchants
Association filed a suit to challenge the constitutionality of the tax. On July
28th, the lawsuit was dismissed and the tax was implemented at the beginning
of August. This sudden implementation of the tax prevented most consumers
from purchasing large amounts of soda right before the treatment started. The
government decided to repeal the tax in October of 2017 and the tax expired
on December 1, 2017.
For most customers, the tax was shown as a line-item on their receipt.
Some retailers simply added the tax to the display price at checkout. This
could decrease the impact of the tax on soda consumption Chetty et al. (2009).
However, many large retail stores in the area added a disclaimer to soda bev-
erages stating that the tax would be added at the register. While this setting
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could lead to a significant impact on consumer information on the tax, this
tax was newsworthy and I will assume that all of our households knew about
the tax when making their purchase decision. In the end, a full Difference-in-
Difference analysis is necessary because people respond to this tax differently
than a standard price change.
3.5.2 Data
We will look at the Nielsen Scanner Data which is available through the Kilts
Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business6. We will focus
our study on the year 2014 where there are about 2,000 households in our area of
interest. This is a helpful dataset for estimating consumption behavior since it
contains detailed information based on price and quantity of all retail purchases
as well as detailed household characteristics for all of the consumers. The data
contains a representative sample of households in the United States that use
in-home scanners to record all of their purchases intended for personal, in-home
use. Nielsen matches the product scanned by the household to the actual price
of the store where the product was bought. Nielsen estimates that about 30%
of household consumption is accounted for by these purchases.
I will be doing a difference-in-difference analysis comparing Cook County to
other counties in the designated market area surrounding Chicago to determine
how the SSB tax effected whether households purchased soda. Because the
law suits happened to soon before the tax was implemented, and Figure 3.2
shown below, we do not find evidence of a significant increase in the number
of individuals who purchased soda right before the soda tax was implemented
(as well as the fact that the tax was authorized less than a week before it was
6Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at
the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do
not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not
involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
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implemented), so we will use July 2017 as our pre-period. Although there has
been evidence that consumers purchase soda when it is cheap in bulk and store
it until it is on sale again (Hendel and Nevo, 2006), we avoid this problem by
focusing on monthy sales and whether or not households consumed soda.
Note that it is possible that the SSB tax in Cook County decreased the
probability a household consumed soda in the suburbs, but there is no evidence
of this in the data and it is unlikely since the purchases being measured are
made at retail stores which likely occur at stores near where the consumers’
homes. Using similar cities to Chicago is a possible alternative but that might
lead to other demand shocks that would bias our results.
Figure 3.2: These graphs compare the fraction of consumers who purchased
soda each month. The black vertical line is the implementation of the SSB tax
in Cook County.
We aggregated the data to a monthly level such that period 1 is July 2017
and period 2 is September 2017. We chose September 2017 as the post-period
to allow for the use of August 2017 as our instrumental variable to control
for endogoneity, which we will discuss more later. We will use a measure of
price deviation as our special regressor. Price is estimated using an aggregate
price index called Stone-Lewbel (SL) cross section prices (see Lewbel (1989)
and Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008)). Generally, SL prices use the fact that
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within a category of goods (soda in our case), people have different tastes for
the individual goods. Using standard aggregate price indices implicitly assumes
that all individuals have identical Cobb Douglas preferences for all goods within
a category, but SL prices allow all individuals to have heterogeneous Cobb
Douglas preferences. This implies that the typical approach of using aggregate
price indices is a restrictive case of using SL prices. For this reason, SL prices
should always be used when possible.
There are a few concerns with the data. The data relies on participants
successfully recording their purchases in their home, so they may suffer from
some recording error. The specific issue that we should be concerned with is
that consumers may consume a good when it is purchased so will not record the
purchase when they return home. Einav et al. (2010) finds that consumable
goods like soft drinks are likely to be consumed before getting home so are
more likely to not be scanned. However, these errors only have minor effects
on estimates. When compared to data from grocery store recorded sales, the
data in Nielsen Homescan data matched 94% of the time Einav et al. (2010).
The major source of measurement error that is more concerning can come
from the price rather than the quantity. Individuals record their purchases
by scanning the items they buy when they get home. The individuals input
the quantity they purchase and Nielsen matches it with the average price of the
good at the store where they purchased it that week. This can lead to two types
of errors. The first comes from the price changing in the middle of the week.
These types of errors are approximately normally distributed. The second type
of error comes from not including discounts from loyalty cards. Einav et al.
(2010) examines a retailer used in the Homescan data which has loyalty cards
and finds that loyalty cards are used in about 75-80% of the transactions.
Further, this would bias our prices upwards, which when comparing Homescan
data with data from the retailer finds that the prices used in the Homescan
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data is about 7% higher and the overall expenditure is 10% higher. On the
other hand, these price measurement errors may be overestimated since some
retailers do not have loyalty cards at all.
However, Homescan data errors are comparable to errors found in other
commonly used data sets. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) finds that life-cycle pattern
of household expenditures recorded in Homescan Data is consistent with those
reported for food expenditures at home in Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). Einav et al. (2010) finds that these issues are not more serious than
those in any other consumption surveys like the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Lin (2018) compares the fraction of expenditures on different categories
of products in the Nielsen Homescan Data and finds the results consistent to
results from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES).
3.5.3 Literature Review
Obesity is one of the most important health problems in the United States as
well as other countries. Most soft drinks are high on sugar and excess sugar
consumption is strongly linked with many diet-related diseases such as diabetes,
cancers and heart disease World Health Organization (2015). Obesity leads to
several hundred billion dollars spent on medical costs in the US annually, about
10-27 percent of all medical costs as shown in Finkelstein et al. (2009); Cawley
et al. (2015). This is particularly relevant for policy makers since 88% of obesity
related medical expenses as shown in Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012). Thus,
consumption of unhealthy food, such as soft drinks, can have a major economic
impact. About 40% of sugar and 7% of total calories consumed by Americans
come from soft drinks (United States Department of Agriculture, 2020; Allcott
et al., 2019).
There is a strong interest in soft drink consumption among different groups
of individuals (Dubois et al., 2019), such as children (Han and Powell, 2013) and
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low-income households (Drewnowski and Specter, 2004; Currie, 2009). Alcott
et al. (2017) showed that even when controlling for supply side factors, high-
income households have a greater demand for healthful foods.
The demand for soft drinks and other comparable drinks has been examined
in many settings as policymakers have been considering the impacts of “soda
taxes” (See Allcott et al. (2019) for an extensive overview). Many papers
examine how these taxes effects sales at the store level (Silver et al., 2017;
Seiler et al., 2019). However, this fails to capture the aggregate effect since
there is evidence that sales in neighboring towns increases and consumers move
across borders for purchases (Seiler et al., 2019; Bollinger and Sexton, 2018).
Other research has attempted to find the aggregate effect of SSB taxes on
each consumer. Sturm et al. (2010) examines soda taxes in a broad sense rather
than a specific SSB tax to see which types of consumers are effected by them the
most. Falbe et al. (2016) examined the SSB taxes in San Francisco, Oakland
and Berkeley by using repeated cross-sectional surveys to estimate how much
soft drink consumption decreased across consumers. Cawley et al. (2018) finds
that consumers in Boulder purchased 8.9 ounces of SSB less per shopping trip.
Allcott et al. (2018) used the obesity costs outlined above and estimates the
external as well as internal costs of SSB consumption. They use these estimates
to propose an optimal tax rate for the US between 1 and 2.1 cents per ounce,
while the optimal tax rate for a city is between 0.5 and 1 cent per ounce because
of the availability of cross-border shopping.
Our analysis differs from the above analysis in that it examines whether the
households we are looking at purchase soft drinks at all, rather than examining
how much soft drinks each household consumes: we are focused at looking at
the extensive effect of the tax. Thus, our approach will look at how effective the
Cook County SSB tax was at decreasing the fraction of families that consumed
soft drinks. This could be a particularly important treatment effect since sugar
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can be addictive (see Avena et al. (2008) for an overview) so eliminating it
from the household could be a more effective long-term outcome.
3.5.4 Results
3.5.4.1 Model
We want to compare the soda consumption between the Cook County (Chicago)
and neighboring suburbs before and after the SSB tax was implemented. The
basic linear graphical depiction of the model is shown below in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: This is a graphical depiction of the linear estimation of the ATT.
Our model follows similarly to the example used in Section 3.2.1. D = 1
denotes households who live in Cook County while D = 0 denotes households
who live in neighboring suburbs. At both time points, households make de-
cisions on whether they will purchase (Yt = 1) soda or not (Yt = 0) with a
”price” of Zt. B1 represents the willingness to pay for soda and B3 represents
the treatment effect. V2 summarized both trends between time periods in de-
mand for soda as well as asecond period shocks. The latent outcome variable,
Y ∗t , can be interpreted as the ”price” minus the household willingness to pay,
or their utility from purchasing soda7.
7Note that because we are doing price deviations, B1 and B3 is their meaning (willingness
to pay and treatment effect receptively) minus the average price faced by the consumer. This
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Using basic ”price” as a special regressor can be particularly dangerous.
Price is likely correlated with a consumer’s willingness to pay since consumers
with higher willingness to pay will go to stores where goods are more expensive.
Remember based on Assumptions A.3.3.1 and A.3.4.1, our special regressor
must be independent of B1, B3, and V2. To avoid this problem, we will focus
on price deviations, P̄i−Pit, which will take this effect out. We estimate P̄i by
averaging out all Pit, SL price indicies, across time. For ease of notation, these
price deviations will be labeled as P .
Note that Assumption A.3.5 is most likely violated because we do not have
enough price variation to identify the entire CDFs that are required with the
basic CHW estimator. For this reason, we will use our semiparametric estima-
tor, CHW-P, as outlined in Extension 3.
There may be additional concern about price endogeneity. We will generate
a control function using nonparametric regression to predict Pt based on Pt−1,
thus using Pt−1 as my instrumental variable, and calculate ε̂i as the residuals
from these estimates. We can examine whether it is necessary to include ε̂i in
my estimates by regressing quantity of Pt and ε̂i and testing whether ε̂i has a
significant effect. We find that the p-value of excluding ε̂i as calculated using
the control function is 0.77, implying that it might not be necessary. Further,
we find that the percentage of soda products on sale and on display is about
the same in both time periods. However, we will implement our estimator to
compare the results when we control for endogeneity versus when we do not.
We will use both Extensions 3 and 4 by conditioning our estimation on ε̂i and
call this estimate our CHW-P-IV estimator.
3.5.4.2 Numerical Results
Below in Table 3.2 we have the different estimates of ATT as well as bootstrap
estimates of the standard error and confidence bands. We can conclude that the
has a scale effect on utility but not impact of our estimates of CATT or ATT.
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average treatment effect of the SSB tax in Cook County lead to 9.5-9.8% drop
in probability each household that was treated consumes soda. Notice that
both the estimates using CHW-P and CHW-P-IV are larger than the LPM
and Probit estimation. Thus, using more basic estimators will cause you to
underestimate the effect of the SSB tax even though the true average effect is
contained in the confidence bounds.
Table 3.2: Empirical ATT Estimates
CHW-P CHW-P-IV LPM Probit
ATT -0.0949 -0.0978 -0.0856 -0.0862
SE of ATT (0.0200) (0.0678) (0.0211) (0.0206)
90% Bands [-0.114,-0.057] [-0.274, -0.030] [-0.119, -0.060] [-0.119, -0.055]
This table contains our estimates of the ATT in the first row. Bootstrap estimates of the
standard error and 90% confidence bands are included in rows two and three respectively
Because we made additional parametric assumptions, we can learn addi-
tional information that is unattainable using more basic methods. Beyond the
ATT that we have found, we have the distribution of the CATT conditioned
on P , as shown in Figure 3.4. The standard deviation of the CATT effects
for CHW-P was 0.0397, while for CHW-P-IV was larger at 0.0576 which might
just come from a smaller sample size and a decreased range of the support of P
because of our conditioning. It also might come from the curse of dimension-
ality by conditioning on another variable. Here you can see that the effect is
significantly right skewed for both estimators, which meant that while the effect
was large for most people, about 10% of the population has an effect greater
than zero. The quantiles of the distribution are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Empirical Quantile Estimates
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
CHW-P -0.1618 -0.1216 -0.1049 -0.0920 -0.0749 0.0814
CHW-P-IV -0.3864 -0.1330 -0.1117 -0.1017 -0.0631 0.0813
This table contains our quantile estimates of the CATT for our CHW-P and CHW-P-IV
estimates.
Furthermore, with our estimates we can look at F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1), which
167
Figure 3.4: Density of the CATT conditional on the special regressor, price
deviation. The one on the left is our CHW-P estimator CATT while the one
on the right is our CHW-P-IV estimator of CATT.
is just P̂ [Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2] and F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) which is P̂ [Y2 = 1|D =
0, Z2 = z2]. Our CHW-P estimates are shown in Figure 3.5. From examining
these distributions you can see that generally, the higher he likelihood that the
consumer purchases soda without the tax, the less likely the tax is to have en
effect. This implies that this tax has no effect on the individuals most likely to
purchase soda.
Note that we also have the distributions of our other random coefficients,
which can provide other insights depending on the setting. Because our B1 dis-
tribution is not centered on 1, it is clear that our households respond differently
to the tax than to a similar price change.
Examining the CHW-P-IV estimates are trickier to visualize because our
CATT estimates are conditioned on ε̂ as well as P . I will first plot the CDF of
F̂B1+V2+B3|D,ε(z2; 1) and F̂B1+V2|D,ε(z2; 1) in Figure 3.6. Note that they have a
similar shape: The likelihood to consume soda at large negative price deviations
is high but never increased about 0.5 in the data. The effect of positive price
deviations differ between individuals that have high ε̂ and low ε̂ values. Indi-
viduals with high ε̂ values were much more likely ton consume soda no matter
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Figure 3.5: These graphs show the CDFs for our CHW-P estimates. Graph
on the left shows our estimates for F̂B1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) and F̂B1+V2|D(z2; 1). The
graph on the right is a histogram to understand the density of the distribution
of price-deviations, P .
what the price deviation was. This makes sense since these households gener-
ally either faced higher prices the period before or lower prices in the current
period.
Our CATT estimates are taken by taking the difference between the two
distributions shown in Figure 3.6. This distribution, as well as the joint density
of our data, is shown in Figure 3.7. From here we can see that the effect was
the the smallest for the individuals that faced the lowest prices (highest price
deviations), while it was largest on individuals who did not seem to have any
price deviation, but had low ε̂ or those who had a ε̂ near zero and low price
deviations. This would imply it had the greatest effect on individuals who had
faced low prices in the period before, but had their prices return to normal.
This implies that the treatment might be effective at preventing households
from building a habit of purchasing soda.
By constructing the CATT distribution, we can focus on specific subgroups
of individuals and their ATT. We will focus on two groups of individuals
that have been a focus in the literature: households with children and low-
income households (Dubois et al., 2019; Han and Powell, 2013; Drewnowski
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Figure 3.6: These graphs show the CDFs for our CHW-P-IV estimates. Graph
on the left shows our estimates for F̂B1+V2+B3|D,ε(z2; 1) while the graph on the
right shows our estimates for F̂B1+V2|D,ε(z2; 1).
Figure 3.7: These graphs show distribution of CATT conditional on ε̂ and P
for our CHW-P-IV estimates. Graph on the left shows our estimates of CATT.
The graph on the right shows the joint distribution of price-deviations, P , and
ε̂.
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and Specter, 2004; Currie, 2009). We define low-income households as house-
holds with lower than $35,000 of yearly income. The ATT for the households
with low-income was -0.0942 and for households with children was -0.0910.
Based on the CATT distribution of each of these subgroups, shown below in
Figure 3.8, this slight decrease in ATT for the households with children come
from an increase density of the tail. Thus, a slightly higher fraction of these
households have an ATT close to zero compared to the whole population. Low-
income households CATT distribution is very similar to the population CATT
distribution.
Figure 3.8: These graphs compare the CATT distribution for the total group of
households and the subgroups of households with low income and households
with children.
Note that across these results, our CHW-P-IV estimates follow our CHW-P
results closely. The CHW-P-IV is slightly larger so using the CHW-P results
may be underestimating the bias but this difference is minor. Note that the
spread of the CHW-P-IV estimator is much larger and may come from the
curse of dimensionality. However, if we were to use price rather than price
deviation, our results change significantly and we get a ATT of about -0.25.
This shows evidence that using price alone would have endogeneity but using
price deviation appears to control for the endogeneity.
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3.5.5 Implications
Note that both the CHW-P and CHW-P-IV estimates show a similar pattern
in which consumers generally are ten percent less likely to consume soda after
the soda tax but there remains a group between 5-10% of the population for
which the tax has no effect. We were able to show that these individuals are
the same individuals that were most likely to consume soda without the soda
tax.
This is all evidence that is consistent with the idea that consumers who con-
sume the most soda are addicted and cannot be persuaded to stop consuming
soda by a relatively small soda tax. This coincides with the research by Allcott
et al. (2019) and Bernheim and Rangel (2004) which find similar patterns of
addiction or habit formation in terms of responding to taxes for “sin goods”
like soda and cigarettes. This might encourage a more focused policy on pre-
venting teenagers from consuming soda to prevent such addiction suggested by
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003). However, we do not find that our treatment has
a significantly larger or different effect on households with teenagers or children
(see Figure 3.8) which is predicted by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003).
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper is the first to extend the Difference-in-Differences methodology to
binary outcome variables. Additionally, our nonparametric random coefficient
representation rids us of functional form assumptions and allows for unobserved
heterogeneity to be correlated with treatment status. We show identification of
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with and without covariates
and as a further extension, the identification of the full joint distribution of the
latent outcome variables. We propose a sample counterpart estimator for the
ATT that we evaluate with the help of Monte Carlo simulations. These show
favorable small sample properties compared to the estimators conventionally
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used for binary choice Difference-in-Differences estimation.
We provide an empirical application to estimate the effect of a Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages tax on customer’s likelihood to consume soft drinks. We
find that the tax in Cook County, Illinois led to consumers on average to de-
crease their likelihood of consuming soft drinks by about 10% while about 10%
of consumers (who were most likely to consume soft drinks previously) did not
change their likelihood to consume soft drinks. This is consistent with the
previous literature that some consumers are addicted to “sin goods”.
Further research could focus on extending the model to discrete outcome
variables with more than two outcomes. We also leave the assessment of large-
sample properties of our proposed estimator to future research. Further research
could extend our estimator to a panel data framework or with a continuous
treatment effect. Examples of possible applications of our estimator were out-
lined in the Introduction and include estimating the effect of job training on
unemployment, tax incentives on health insurance, and public policy that relies




Proof of Theorem 3.1: Our main object of interest is the ATT. We can




The CATT (z2) can then be rewritten as:
CATT (z2) = P
1[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]− P 0[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]
= P (B1 + V2 +B3 < z2|D = 1, Z2 = z2)− P (B1 + V2 < z2|D = 1, Z2 = z2)
= P (B1 + V2 +B3 < z2|D = 1)− P (B1 + V2 < z2|D = 1)
= FB1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1)− FB1+V2|D(z2; 1)
The first line writes out the definition of the CATT in the context of a bi-
nary outcome as the difference between the actual probability of success of a
treated individual and the counterfactual probability of success had a treated
individual not been treated, both conditional on z2. The equality between line
two and line three makes use of our assumptions A.3.3 and A.3.4 that yield
B1, B3, V2 ⊥ Z|D.
We need: FB1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) and FB1+V2|D(z2; 1).
Obtaining FB1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) is straightforward, as this part is directly observ-
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able in the data:
FB1+V2+B3|D(z2; 1) = P [B1 + V2 +B3 < z2|D = 1]
= P [Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]
Obtaining FB1+V2|D(z2; 1) is more involved, as this part is counterfactual and















































fB1+V2,B1|D(y + x, x; 0)dxFB1|D(z2 − y; 1)dy
The first line uses the definition of the CDF. The second and third line make
use of assumption A.3.3. In the second line we use the convolution formula
for independent random variables as V2 ⊥ B1. In the third line we use V2 ⊥ D.
The fourth line reformulates the conditional density of V2 as the marginal den-
sity of the joint conditional density of V2 and B1. The fifth line uses the change
of variables formula. The sixth line pulls in the limits of integration for dt and
the seventh line again uses the definition of the CDF.
Given assumption A.3.5, fB1+V2,B1|D=0 and FB1|D=1 are directly observable in
the data, where
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fB1+V2,B1|D=0 = ∂z1∂z2P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = 0, Z = z],
FB1|D=1 = P [Y1 = 1|D = 1, Z1 = z1].
This completes the proof. 
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Alternative Proof of Theorem 3.1 going only through densities:




The CATT (z2) can then be rewritten as:
CATT (z2) = P
1[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]− P 0[Y2 = 1|D = 1, Z2 = z2]
= P (B1 + V2 +B3 < z2|D = 1, Z2 = z2)− P (B1 + V2 < z2|D = 1, Z2 = z2)
= P (B1 + V2 +B3 < z2|D = 1)− P (B1 + V2 < z2|D = 1)











[fB1+V2+B3|D(t; 1)− fB1+V2|D(t; 1)]dt
We need: fB1+V2+B3|D(t; 1) and fB1+V2|D(t; 1).
Start off with:
P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = 1, Z = z] = P [B1 + V2 +B3 < z2, B1 < z1|D = 1]







Taking the derivative with respect to z2 and z1 yields:
∂z1∂z2P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = 1, Z = z] = fB1+V2+B3,B1|D(z2, z1; 1)
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If we know fV2 we can do convolution and we are done.
Use P [Y2 = 1, Y1 = 1|D = 0, Z = z] similarly as above and obtain fB1+V2,B1|D(z2, z1; 0).
By change of variables:
fV2,B1|D(z2 − z1, z1; 0) = fB1+V2,B1|D(z2, z1; 0)
Obtain fV2|D(z2 − z1; 0) via integration.
fV2|D(z2 − z1; 0) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fV2,B1|D(z2 − z1, t; 0)dt
Then use V2 ⊥ D and thus fV2|D(z2 − z1; 0) = fV2(z2 − z1) = fV2|D(z2 − z1; 1).
Now use convolution:
fB1+V2|D(z2 − z1; 1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fB1|D(t; 1)fV2((z2 − z1)− t)dt
This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Extension 1:
Define:
















1 {z2 = b2 + b3d}1 {z1 = b1} fB|D(b; d)db
The equality between line one and line two makes use of our assumptions A.3.3












exp [i(sz1 + tz2)] 1 {z2 = b2 + b3d}1 {z1 = b1} fB|D(b; d)dbdz
= E {exp [i(sB1 + t(B2 +B3d))] |D = d}
= E {exp [i((s+ t)B1 + t(V2 +B3d))] |D = d}





∣∣∣∣D = 0} = E {exp(itV2)|D = 0}
And with s+ t = σ, and for d = 1, we get:
E
{
exp [i(σZ1 + t(Z2 − Z1))]ψ(Z1, Z2, 1)
fZ|D(Z; 1)
∣∣∣∣D = 1} = E {exp [i(σB1 + t(V2 +B3))] |D = 1}
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Under the assumption that V2 is independent of B3, B1|D = 1, we get:
E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3)] |D = 1}E {exp(itV2)|D = 1}











∣∣∣D = 0} = E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3)] |D = 1} ,
This is the joint characteristic function of B1 and B3 conditional on D = 1.
The joint characteristic function of B1, B3, and V2 conditional on D = 1 can
then easily be constructed in the following way:
ΦB1,B3,V2|D=1 = E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3 + rV2)] |D = 1}
= E {exp [i(σB1 + tB3)] |D = 1} × E {exp(irV2)|D = 1}











∣∣∣D = 0} ×
E
{
exp [ir(Z2 − Z1)]ψ(Z1, Z2, 0)
fZ|D(Z; 0)
∣∣∣∣D = 0}
This completes the proof. 
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3.7.2 Understanding Restrictions on Coefficients of Zt
Original Model:
Ỹ ∗1 = B̃1 − ΓZ1
Ỹ ∗2 = B̃2 + B̃3D − ΓZ2
B̃2 = B̃1 + Ṽ2
Yt = 1{Ỹ ∗t < 0}
Restrictions:
1. The random coefficients on Z1 and Z2 are the same, i.e. the effect that
Zt has on the latent variable Y
∗
t stays constant over the two time periods
t = 1, 2.
2. Γ 6= 0 and we know the sign of Γ, i.e. there is an effect of Zt on Y ∗t and
we know its direction.
















B̃2 = B̃1 + Ṽ2
Yt = 1{Ỹ ∗t < 0}
Remark B.1: This last assumption is not restrictive, as we can always divide
Zt’s by minus one to obtain a positive Γ.
Now let’s redefine our coefficients: Y ∗1 =
Ỹ ∗1
Γ

















This leaves us with the basic model introduced in the main text.
Y ∗1 = B1 − Z1
Y ∗2 = B2 +B3D − Z2
B2 = B1 + V2
Yt = 1{Y ∗t < 0}
3.7.3 Data
There are a few issues to keep in mind when dealing with this Homescan data.
The first issue is with misreporting of quantity. Einav et al. (2010) examines
which goods are more likely to be subject to this error. They find that consum-
able goods like small drinks (like many soft drinks) is likely to be consumed
before getting home so are more likely to not be scanned. This could add noise
to our results, but should not bias the results because quantity is only a depen-
dent variable and we assume that these problems effect those in Cook County
as well as those in the suburbs equally.
Another source of measurement error that is more concerning can come from
the price. Individuals record their purchases by scanning the items they buy
when they get home. The individuals input the quantity they purchase and
Nielsen matches it with the average price of the good at the store where they
purchased it that week. This can lead to two types of errors. The first comes
from the price changing in the middle of the week. These types of errors are
approximately normally distributed.
The second type of error comes from not including discounts from loyalty
cards. Einav et al. (2010) examines a retailer used in the Homescan data
which has loyalty cards and finds that loyalty cards are used in about 75-80%
of the transactions. Further, this would bias my prices upwards, which when
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comparing Homescan data with data from the retailer finds that the prices
used in the Homescan data is about 7% higher. On the other hand, these price
measurement errors may be overestimated since some retailers do not have
loyalty cards at all. Further, Homescan data errors are comparable to errors
found in other commonly used data sets Einav et al. (2010); Aguiar and Hurst
(2007); Lin (2018). Additional examination of this measurement error and it’s
effect on the results is left for future research.
When there is no good purchased, we find the average price plus tax for each
month at the store the most commonly purchase soft drinks at by matching
with Nielsen Retail Scanner Data. If I am unable to identify the store where the
individual commonly purchases soft drinks in the month, of if the store’s prices
are unavailable, I estimate the prices based on average prices at stores used
by similar consumers. The subset of similar consumers I choose is explained
below. If there were no prices in the subset I tried to match, I moved to a
broader subset below.
1. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, county and
zip-code
2. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, and county
3. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and zip-code
4. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and county
5. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, income level, whether they
lived in Cook County, and designated market
6. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, whether they lived in Cook
County, and designated market
7. Individuals with the same zip-code
8. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain, and designated market
9. Individuals with the same income level and county
10. Individuals with the same income level and whether they lived in Cook
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County
11. Individuals with the same county
12. Individuals on whether they lived in Cook County
13. Individuals with the same designated market
14. Individuals with the same favorite retail chain
15. All individuals
Below is the Summary Statistics for the Nielsen Scanner Data we used
in application for each month and the total data across both months. Our
sample contains 1,008 households in Cook County and 1,080 households from
neighboring counties.
Table 3.4
July 2017 September 2017 Total
SL Price Index 0.5639 0.5886 0.5762
(0.4153) (0.4067) (0.4112)
Price Deviation -0.0059 0.0188 0.0064
(0.2634) (0.2391) (0.2518)
εi -0.0155 0.0080 -0.0038
(0.2451) (0.2195) (0.2329)
Quantity 0.4713 0.3966 0.4339
Chicago 0.4828 0.4828 0.4828
Estimate of each variable mean for each time period and across both time periods is
included. The Standard Deviation is included below in parenthesis. Quantity is a measure
of whether the individual purchased soft drinks. Chicago is a measure of whether they lived
in Chicago.εi is the errors left over from the control functions described previously.
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